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Substantial evidence supports the efficacy of cognitive bias modification (CBM) for attention and interpretation. However, CBM targeting memory bias (CBM-M) remains underexplored despite its clinical relevance. This study examines the effectiveness and neurobiological mechanisms of CBM-M. Fifty-eight individuals with elevated anxious and depressive personality traits (>1 SD) were randomly assigned to either CBM-M or sham training (n = 29 per group) in a parallel, double-blind, randomized controlled trial. The intervention involved eight sessions over 1 month. CBM-M aimed to enhance positive autobiographical memory (AM) recall by focusing on positive and negative words, whereas sham training lacked this enhancement module. Anxiety and depressive traits and symptoms, explicit and implicit memory biases, and AM specificity were assessed. Additionally, intrinsic functional connectivity was measured via functional magnetic resonance imaging, and cortisol levels were assayed via saliva collected at 10 time points across 2 days before and after the intervention. Both groups showed reduced anxiety and depressive traits from pre- to post-intervention. Compared with sham training, CBM-M specifically reduced stress vulnerability, negative explicit memory bias, and daytime cortisol levels, with a large effect size. Improvement in memory bias correlated with stress vulnerability and cortisol reductions. CBM-M also enhanced amygdala functional connectivity with the anteromedial orbitofrontal cortex in comparison with sham training from pre- to post-intervention. CBM-M reduced stress vulnerability and elicited neural changes in amygdala-anteromedial orbitofrontal cortex interactions, which were involved in social reward and AM recall. Future research should identify the most responsive populations and elucidate underlying mechanisms.

Negative self-referent memory bias (the preferential memory for negative self-referent information) is a well-known symptom of depression and a risk factor for its development, maintenance, and recurrence. Evidence shows its potential as an add-on tool in clinical practice. However, it is unclear which self-referent memory bias measure(s) could be clinically relevant. Here, as a first step, we investigate which measures best differentiate current depression status and track depressive symptom severity most closely. The total sample ( N  = 956) from three (naturalistic) psychiatric cohorts with matched controls was divided into a current depression, remitted depression, and non-disordered control group. Self-referent memory bias task measures were calculated and the drift diffusion model (DDM) was applied to assess underlying components of the cognitive self-referent decision making process. Measures were compared between groups and linear regression models were applied to assess their association with depressive symptom severity. The number of negative endorsed words differentiated best between depression status while a combination of the number of positive endorsed words, self-referent negative memory bias, and positive drift rate was most strongly associated with depressive symptom severity. Our results give direction to the clinical implementation of this task. Its value in assessing, monitoring, and predicting depressive state and trait in clinical settings requires further investigation.

Spatial memory is often biased by various factors, such as the region a target belongs to, which can be defined based on physical, perceptual, or implicit boundaries. In the typical dot-localization task first introduced by Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Duncan (Psychological Review 98: 352-376, 1991 ), individuals normally divide the task space into four quadrants delineated at the Cartesian axes (forming “default categories”) and show systematic bias in target localization toward the center of the category. At least two mechanisms have been proposed to account for these categorical biases, namely (a) weighted-average of a metric representation and the category prototype representation and (b) truncation of an un-biased metric representation at the category boundary. Both models can account for these findings and cannot be differentiated by existing research methods. Using a new distribution analysis, the current study sought to differentiate between these two models. Participants viewed a dot inside a circle and recalled its location after a delay either with the same blank circle (i.e., the standard dot-in-circle paradigm) or when an alternative V-shaped category boundary was visually presented at retrieval. The data from three experiments showed symmetrical distribution of the errors that shifted toward the category center when people primarily used the default category, supporting the weighted-average model. In contrast, when people primarily used the alternative category, the errors showed a highly skewed distribution, more consistent with the truncation model. Overall, these results provided the first experimental evidence for both mechanisms separately.

Influential models of visual working memory treat each item to be stored as an independent unit and assume that there are no interactions between items. However, real-world displays have structure that provides higher-order constraints on the items to be remembered. Even in the case of a display of simple colored circles, observers can compute statistics, such as mean circle size, to obtain an overall summary of the display. We examined the influence of such an ensemble statistic on visual working memory. We report evidence that the remembered size of each individual item in a display is biased toward the mean size of the set of items in the same color and the mean size of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory is constructive, encoding displays at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating across these levels, rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item independently.

Reports in a visual working memory(WM) task exhibit biases related to the categorical structure of the stimulus space (e.g., cardinal bias) as well as biases related to previously seen stumuli (e.g., serial bias). While these biases are common and can occur simultaneously, the extent to which they interact in WM remains unknown. In the present study, I used orientation delayed estimation tasks known to produce both cardinal and serial biases and found that the serial bias systematically varied based on the relative positions of the cardinal axis and the preceding stimulus in orientation space. When they were positioned in a way that generated cardinal and serial biases in the same direction (i.e., on the same side of the target orientation), reports for the target orientation exhibited a regular repulsive serial bias. However, when their positions resulted in the biases in the opposite directions (i.e., on the opposite side of the target orientation), no serial bias occurred. This absence of serial bias was replicated in a follow-up experiment where the locations of the stimulus orientation and the response probe were completely randomized, suggesting that the interaction occurs independently from location-based response preparation processes. Together, these results demonstrate that the prior stimulus and the cardinal axis impose interactive impact on the processing of new stimulus, producing differential patterns of serial bias depending on the specific stimulus being processed. These findings place significant implications on computational models addressing the nature of the stimulus history effect and its underlying mechanisms.

Background and ObjectivesAutobiographical memories have been found to be related to one’s current psychological state. Biases in autobiographical memories in terms of valence, content, and specificity are thought to be related to one’s well-being and mental health. Previous studies have shown that by using cognitive bias modification techniques that aim to alter one’s interpretation bias, memory valence bias could also be altered. The goal of the current study was to investigate if these techniques can also alter overgenerality of autobiographical memory, a phenomenon strongly associated with different psychopathologies. We hypothesized that creating a positive interpretation would decrease overgenerality of autobiographical memories while a negative interpretation bias would increase overgenerality.MethodsSixty participants were recruited and divided into two groups, positive vs. negative imagery Cognitive Bias Modification (i-CBM). Both groups completed an Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) before and after undergoing one i-CBM session (positive or negative).Resultspositive i-CBM reduced overgenerality of autobiographical memories, while negative i-CBM increased it.ConclusionsThese results suggest that changing one’s cognitive interpretation bias also changes one’s memory bias. Thus, the same task that reduces negative bias from autobiographical memories also reduces overgenerality of autobiographical memories. In addition, the results strengthen the suggestion that the use of imagery and the ability to generate specific autobiographical memories are related. These findings hold great potential for our understanding of the interconnection between the different cognitive memory biases that lay at the base of several psychopathologies.

PurposeThis study delves into the combined cognitive bias hypothesis in depression, exploring the interaction between negative attention, interpretation and memory biases. We aimed to assess whether modifying attention and interpretation bias would lead to congruent changes in memory bias, and to what extend and depth this causal effect can be.MethodNinety-nine undergraduates underwent either a positive (PT) or negative (NT) four-day attention and interpretation bias training. A set of well-established post-training assessments including free recall, recognition, autobiographic memory, and self-reference encoding tasks were used to evaluate memory bias. Affective states were measured pre- and post-training.ResultsCompared to PT, participants in NT correctly retrieved more negative trained stimuli, and falsely recognized more negative synonyms of trained terms. NT also exhibited an enhanced retrieval of negative autobiographical memory. No significant differences were found between NT and PT in self-referential encoding and retrieval bias, or affective states.DiscussionThe results suggested an extensive and strong transfer effect from attention and interpretation bias modification to different facets of memory bias, being found in retrieving trained emotional stimuli, in memory intrusion of negative synonyms, and in autobiographic memory recall. The findings underscored the causality between three biases, supporting the combined cognitive bias hypothesis. It might also suggest an effective new approach to modify memory bias via attention and interpretation bias training.

This study aimed to investigate the role of emotion and working memory capacity (WMC) on false memory by measuring memory sensitivity independently of response bias. We used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm in which arousal levels were kept constant across positive, negative, and neutral word lists associated with unstudied critical lures. Participants’ WMC was measured by the Operation Span Task. Although negative critical lures generated significantly more false recognition (i.e., false-alarm rates) compared to positive or neutral ones, Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis based on signal detection theory showed that this effect could be ascribed to shifts in bias rather than actual memory sensitivity. Data revealed that the DRM effect is a robust illusion influenced by neither emotion nor WMC in terms of memory sensitivity. However, negative words led to a prominent increase in liberal bias to say “old” for both critical and noncritical lures. Furthermore, reaction time (RT) data suggested that mentally activated but actually unstudied critical lures were monitored as old words and that participants were faster to accept negative critical lures than positive or neutral ones, suggesting that the DRM illusion was clearly reflected on the RT data as well. These results were discussed emphasizing the role of negative emotion on response bias in recognition memory.

Although it is not typically assumed in influential models of visual working memory (WM), representations in WM are systematically biased by multiple factors. Orientation representations are biased away from the cardinal axis (i.e., cardinal bias) and they are biased away from or toward the other orientation simultaneously held in WM (i.e., interitem interaction). The present study investigated the extent to which these two bias mechanisms interact in WM. In Experiment 1, participants remembered two sequentially presented orientations and reproduced both orientations after a short delay. Cardinal biases were assessed separately for the trials where the two mechanisms produce biases in the same direction (i.e., congruent trials) and the trials where they produce biases in the opposite direction (i.e., incongruent trials). Whereas congruent trials exhibited a typical cardinal bias, incongruent trials exhibited no cardinal bias, demonstrating that the cardinal bias was canceled out by the interitem interaction. Follow-up experiments extended these results by manipulating attentional priority for the two orientations by means of precue (Experiment 2) and postcue (Experiment 3). In both experiments, attentionally prioritized items exhibited a typical cardinal bias irrespective of the congruency whereas attentionally unprioritized items exhibited a reversal of the cardinal bias in the incongruent trials, demonstrating that selective attention modulates the influence of the interitem interaction. Together, these results suggest that WM leverages information about specific stimuli and their relationship to support a given behavioral goal.

A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states such as moods, action capabilities, and categorical knowledge can literally and directly affect how things look. Are these truly effects on perception, or might some instead reflect influences on judgment, memory, or response bias? Here, we exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called \"El Greco fallacy\") to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception. We suggest that this error may also contaminate several other varieties of top-down effects and that this discovery has implications for debates over the continuity (or lack thereof) of perception and cognition.