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Stress engendered by stereotype threatening situations may facilitate encoding of negative, stereotype confirming feedback received during a performance among women in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). It is unclear, however, whether this process is comprised of the same neurophysiological mechanisms evident in any emotional memory encoding context, or if this encoding bias directly undermines positive self-perceptions in the stigmatized domain. A total of 160 men and women completed a math test that provided veridical positive and negative feedback, a memory test for feedback, and math self-enhancing and valuing measures in a stereotype threatening or neutral context while continuous electroencephalography activity and startle probe responses to positive and negative feedback was recorded. Indexing amygdala activity to feedback via startle responses and emotional memory network connectivity elicited during accurate recognition of positive and negative feedback via graph analyses, only stereotype threatened women encoded negative feedback better when they exhibited increased amygdala activity and emotional memory network connectivity in response to said feedback. Emotional memory biases, in turn, predicted decreases in women's self-enhancing, math valuing and performance. Findings provide an emotional memory encoding-based mechanism for well-established findings indicating that women have more negative math self-perceptions compared with men regardless of actual performance.

Episodic memory describes the conscious reimagining of our memories and is often considered to be a uniquely human ability. As these phenomenological components are embedded within its definition, major issues arise when investigating the presence of episodic memory in non-human animals. Importantly, however, when we as humans recall a specific experience, we may remember details from that experience that were inconsequential to our needs, thoughts, or desires at that time. This 'incidental' information is nevertheless encoded automatically as part of the memory and is subsequently recalled within a holistic representation of the event. The incidental encoding and unexpected question paradigm represents this characteristic feature of human episodic memory and can be employed to investigate memory recall in non-human animals. However, without evidence for the associated phenomenology during recall, this type of memory is termed 'episodic-like memory'. Using this approach, we tested seven Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) on their ability to use incidental visual information (associated with observed experimenter made 'caches') to solve an unexpected memory test. The birds performed above chance levels, suggesting that Eurasian jays can encode, retain, recall, and access incidental visual information within a remembered event, which is an ability indicative of episodic memory in humans.

In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we evaluated the effect of self-relevance on cerebral activity and behavioral performance during an incidental encoding task. Recent findings suggest that pleasantness judgments reliably induce self-oriented (internal) thoughts and increase default mode network (DMN) activity. We hypothesized that this increase in DMN activity would relate to increased memory recognition for pleasantly-judged stimuli (which depend on internally-oriented attention) but decreased recognition for unpleasantly-judged items (which depend on externally-oriented attention). To test this hypothesis, brain activity was recorded from 21 healthy participants while they performed a pleasantness judgment requiring them to rate visual stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant. One hour later, participants performed a surprise memory recognition test outside of the scanner. Thus, we were able to evaluate the effects of pleasant and unpleasant judgments on cerebral activity and incidental encoding. The behavioral results showed that memory recognition was better for items rated as pleasant than items rated as unpleasant. The whole brain analysis indicated that successful encoding (SE) activates the inferior frontal and lateral temporal cortices, whereas unsuccessful encoding (UE) recruits two key medial posterior DMN regions, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus (PCU). A region of interest (ROI) analysis including classic DMN areas, revealed significantly greater involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in pleasant compared to unpleasant judgments, suggesting this region's involvement in self-referential (i.e., internal) processing. This area may be responsible for the greater recognition performance seen for pleasant stimuli. Furthermore, a significant interaction between the encoding performance (successful vs. unsuccessful) and pleasantness was observed for the PCC, PCU and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Overall, our results suggest the involvement of medial frontal and parietal DMN regions during the evaluation of self-referential pleasantness. We discuss these results in terms of the introspective referential of pleasantness judgments and the differential brain modulation based on internally- vs. externally-oriented attention during encoding.

A similar neural ensemble participates in the encoding of two distinct memories, resulting in the recall of one memory increasing the likelihood of recalling the other, but only if those memories occur very closely in time—within a day rather than across a week. Linkage of separate memories across time This paper tests and provides support for the emerging hypothesis that two distinct memories formed close in time may be linked, such that recall of one triggers recall of the other. Using a range of techniques including in vivo calcium imaging with miniature head-mounted fluorescent microscopes in freely behaving mice, Alcino Silva and colleagues show that learning-dependent changes in excitability can temporally and contextually link memories formed close in time. Interestingly the overlap between memory encoding ensembles and strengthening of the second memory within short periods of time do not occur in aged animals, which do not exhibit the increased hippocampal excitability necessary for such links to occur. Recent studies suggest that a shared neural ensemble may link distinct memories encoded close in time 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 . According to the memory allocation hypothesis 1 , 2 , learning triggers a temporary increase in neuronal excitability 13 , 14 , 15 that biases the representation of a subsequent memory to the neuronal ensemble encoding the first memory, such that recall of one memory increases the likelihood of recalling the other memory. Here we show in mice that the overlap between the hippocampal CA1 ensembles activated by two distinct contexts acquired within a day is higher than when they are separated by a week. Several findings indicate that this overlap of neuronal ensembles links two contextual memories. First, fear paired with one context is transferred to a neutral context when the two contexts are acquired within a day but not across a week. Second, the first memory strengthens the second memory within a day but not across a week. Older mice, known to have lower CA1 excitability 15 , 16 , do not show the overlap between ensembles, the transfer of fear between contexts, or the strengthening of the second memory. Finally, in aged mice, increasing cellular excitability and activating a common ensemble of CA1 neurons during two distinct context exposures rescued the deficit in linking memories. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that contextual memories encoded close in time are linked by directing storage into overlapping ensembles. Alteration of these processes by ageing could affect the temporal structure of memories, thus impairing efficient recall of related information.

Influential models of visual working memory treat each item to be stored as an independent unit and assume that there are no interactions between items. However, real-world displays have structure that provides higher-order constraints on the items to be remembered. Even in the case of a display of simple colored circles, observers can compute statistics, such as mean circle size, to obtain an overall summary of the display. We examined the influence of such an ensemble statistic on visual working memory. We report evidence that the remembered size of each individual item in a display is biased toward the mean size of the set of items in the same color and the mean size of all items in the display. This suggests that visual working memory is constructive, encoding displays at multiple levels of abstraction and integrating across these levels, rather than maintaining a veridical representation of each item independently.

Visual long-term memory can store thousands of objects with surprising visual detail, but just how detailed are these representations, and how can one quantify this fidelity? Using the property of color as a case study, we estimated the precision of visual information in long-term memory, and compared this with the precision of the same information in working memory. Observers were shown real-world objects in random colors and were asked to recall the colors after a delay. We quantified two parameters of performance: the variability of internal representations of color (fidelity) and the probability of forgetting an object's color altogether. Surprisingly, the fidelity of color information in long-term memory was comparable to the asymptotic precision of working memory. These results suggest that long-term memory and working memory may be constrained by a common limit, such as a bound on the fidelity required to retrieve a memory representation.

Theories stipulate that memories are encoded within networks of cortical projection neurons. Conversely, GABAergic interneurons are thought to function primarily to inhibit projection neurons and thereby impose network gain control, an important but purely modulatory role. Here we show in male mice that associative fear learning potentiates synaptic transmission and cue-specific activity of medial prefrontal cortex somatostatin (SST) interneurons and that activation of these cells controls both memory encoding and expression. Furthermore, the synaptic organization of SST and parvalbumin interneurons provides a potential circuit basis for SST interneuron-evoked disinhibition of medial prefrontal cortex output neurons and recruitment of remote brain regions associated with defensive behavior. These data suggest that, rather than constrain mnemonic processing, potentiation of SST interneuron activity represents an important causal mechanism for conditioned fear.

Research on episodic memory has established that spontaneous eye movements occur to spaces associated with retrieved information even if those spaces are blank at the time of retrieval. Although it has been claimed that such looks to \"nothing\" can function as facilitatory retrieval cues, there is currently no conclusive evidence for such an effect. In the present study, we addressed this fundamental issue using four direct eye manipulations in the retrieval phase of an episodic memory task: (a) free viewing on a blank screen, (b) maintaining central fixation, (c) looking inside a square congruent with the location of the to-be-recalled objects, and (d) looking inside a square incongruent with the location of the to-be-recalled objects. Our results provide novel evidence of an active and facilitatory role of gaze position during memory retrieval and demonstrate that memory for the spatial relationship between objects is more readily affected than memory for intrinsic object features.

It is commonly believed that visual short-term memory (VSTM) consists of a fixed number of \"slots\" in which items can be stored. An alternative theory in which memory resource is a continuous quantity distributed over all items seems to be refuted by the appearance of guessing in human responses. Here, we introduce a model in which resource is not only continuous but also variable across items and trials, causing random fluctuations in encoding precision. We tested this model against previous models using two VSTM paradigms and two feature dimensions. Our model accurately accounts for all aspects of the data, including apparent guessing, and outperforms slot models in formal model comparison. At the neural level, variability in precision might correspond to variability in neural population gain and doubly stochastic stimulus representation. Our results suggest that VSTM resource is continuous and variable rather than discrete and fixed and might explain why subjective experience of VSTM is not all or none.