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233 result(s) for "Military art and science Decision making."
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Cheap threats : why the United States struggles to coerce weak states
The United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of \"cheap\" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.
The Art of Military Coercion
The United States spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined, and Western nations in general spend far more than developing nations around the globe. Yet when Western nations have found themselves in conflicts in recent decades, their military performance has been mixed at best. In this fully updated new edition ofThe Art of Military Coercion, Rob de Wijk explains this discrepancy through a theory on the use of force. He argues that the key is a failure to use force decisively and to understand properly the dynamics of conflict and balance, means and ends. Without that ability, even a superiority of dollars, numbers, and weaponry will not necessarily translate to victory.
Red teaming : how your business can conquer the competition by challenging everything
\"Describes the concepts behind \"Red Teaming,\" a critical and contrarian thinking process that shows businesses how to overcome mental blind spots and better plan for uncertainties when addressing complex problems to lay the foundation for success.\" -- Provided by the publisher.
Military Operations Research
Operations Research (OR) emerged in an effort to improve the effectiveness of newly inducted weapons and equipment during World War II. While rapid growth ofOR led to its becoming an important aid to decision making in all sectors including defense, its contribution in defense remained largely confined to classified reports. Very few books dealing with applications of quantitative decision making techniques in military have been published presumably due to limited availability ofrelevant information. The situation changed rapidly during the last few years. The recognition of the subject of Military Operations Research (MOR) gave tremendous boost to its development. Books and journals on MOR started appearing. The number of sessions on MOR at national and international conferences also registered an increase. The volume of teaching, training and research activities in the field of MOR at military schools and non-military schools enhanced considerably. Military executives and commanders started taking increasing interest in getting scientific answers to questions pertaining to weapon acquisition, threat perception and quantification, assessment of damage or casualties, evaluation of chance of winning a battle, force mix, deployment and targeting of weapons against enemy targets, war games and scenario evaluation. Most of these problems were being tackled on the basis of intuition, judgment and experience or analysis under very simple assumptions. In an increasingly sophisticated and complex defense scenario resulting in advances in equipment and communications, the need for supplementing these practices by scientific research in MOR became imperative.
Military adaptation in war : with fear of change
\"Military Adaptation in War addresses one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined, problems that military organizations confront: namely, the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. This work builds on the volume that Professor Williamson Murray edited with Allan Millett on military innovation (a quite different problem, though similar in some respects). In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, an interactive duel, which is of indeterminate length and presents a series of intractable problems at every level, from policy and strategy down to the tactical. Moreover, the fact that the enemy is adapting at the same time presents military organizations with an ever-changing set of conundrums that offer up no easy solutions. As the British general, James Wolfe, suggested before Quebec: \"War is an option of difficulties.\" Dr. Murray provides an in-depth analysis of the problems that military forces confront in adapting to these difficulties\"-- Provided by publisher.
Military Operations Research
MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH: Quantitative Decision Making -- Copyright -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- 1 OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN DEFENSE -- 2 SEARCH, DETECTION AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT -- 3 SIMULATION OF MILITARY SYSTEMS -- 4 WAR GAMES -- 5 COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS -- 6 OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS -- 7 HEURISTIC OPTIMIZATION -- 8 THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS -- 9 HOMOGENEOUS COMBAT MODELS -- 10 HETEROGENEOUS COMBAT MODELS -- 11 THREAT ASSESSMENT : STATIC AND DYNAMIC ANALYSES -- 12 ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY ISSUES -- AUTHOR INDEX -- SUBJECT INDEX.
The irresponsibility of not using AI in the military
The ongoing debate on the ethics of using artificial intelligence (AI) in military contexts has been negatively impacted by the predominant focus on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) in war. However, AI technologies have a considerably broader scope and present opportunities for decision support optimization across the entire spectrum of the military decision-making process (MDMP). These opportunities cannot be ignored. Instead of mainly focusing on the risks of the use of AI in target engagement, the debate about responsible AI should (i) concern each step in the MDMP, and (ii) take ethical considerations and enhanced performance in military operations into account. A characterization of the debate on responsible AI in the military, considering both machine and human weaknesses and strengths, is provided in this paper. We present inroads into the improvement of the MDMP, and thus military operations, through the use of AI for decision support, taking each quadrant of this characterization into account.
The Decision to Attack
The debate over cyber technology has resulted in new considerations for national security operations. States find themselves in an increasingly interconnected world with a diverse threat spectrum and little understanding of how decisions are made within this amorphous domain. With The Decision to Attack, Aaron Franklin Brantly investigates how states decide to employ cyber in military and intelligence operations against other states and how rational those decisions are. In his examination, Brantly contextualizes broader cyber decision-making processes into a systematic expected utility–rational choice approach to provide a mathematical understanding of the use of cyber weapons at the state level. Discussed: The Key Concepts of Cyber The Motivation and Utility for Covert Action Digital Power Anonymity and Attribution in Cyberspace Cyber and Conventional Operations: The Dynamics of Conflict Defining the Role of Intelligence in Cyberspace How Actors Decide to Use Cyber—a Rational Choice Approach Cognitive Processes and Decision-Making in Cyberspace Finding Meaning in the Expected Utility of International Cyber Conflict
Artificial Intelligence Applied to Drone Control: A State of the Art
The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools and techniques has provided a significant advance in drone technology. Besides the military applications, drones are being increasingly used for logistics and cargo transportation, agriculture, construction, security and surveillance, exploration, and mobile wireless communication. The synergy between drones and AI has led to notable progress in the autonomy of drones, which have become capable of completing complex missions without direct human supervision. This study of the state of the art examines the impact of AI on improving drone autonomous behavior, covering from automation to complex real-time decision making. The paper provides detailed examples of the latest developments and applications. Ethical and regulatory challenges are also considered for the future evolution of this field of research, because drones with AI have the potential to greatly change our socioeconomic landscape.
Operationalising responsible AI in the military domain: a context-specific assessment
Rapid integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into the military domain necessitates actionable strategies for translating high-level principles of responsible use into practical guidelines. However, there remains a problematic gap between these principles and the norms that govern the use of AI in military operations. Moreover, these norms are highly dependent on the particular context in which military AI is deployed. This leads to normative uncertainty; what is responsible use of AI in a specific military operation? Unclear practical guidelines pose challenges for technology developers and military operators involved in the deployment of military AI. This paper emphasises the need for a context-specific assessment of responsible use of military AI. Moving beyond a one-size-fits-all standard, we propose the Military AI Responsibility Contextualisation (MARC) framework; a structured approach that facilitates a context-specific assessment. In that way, this paper aims to contribute to bridging the gap between abstract principles and practical guidelines. We furthermore emphasise the need for interdisciplinary collaboration in further operationalizing responsible military AI to work towards the ethical and effective development and deployment of AI in military operations.