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Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In the current situation of war conflicts, but also as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemics, the economic crisis caused by the lack of goods, primarily food, energy sources, weapons and military equipment and multiple other products and services, has induced price increases and inflation. In this regard, there are substantial challenges present in the field of procurement of agricultural products. In that sense, we methodologically included analysis and synthesis, compilations, inductions and deductions of “military budgets”, GDP and some other indicators in several currently most significant countries and in the Republic of Serbia, in the context of compromised global security. The aim is to attain relevant indicators and conclusions which will provide certain guidelines for improvement of procurement of agricultural products for the needs of the defense system in the future.

This research analyses and establishes linkages between the frequently disregarded economic theories that drive military spending. This paper's analysis methodically goes over pertinent material, offering a thorough timeline that identifies significant moments that shaped the evolution of modern economic theories about military spending. Our analysis spans from the medieval period to the post-cold war times. Most of the analysis concentrates on conventional economic theories and their role in shaping military spending philosophies in Europe. We find that historical perspectives and theoretical underpinnings contribute to nuanced and informed debates, ensuring that the economic implications of defence investments are thoroughly understood. The ongoing discourse on military spending benefits from acknowledging the diverse roots and evolving theoretical perspectives, fostering a holistic understanding of the economic intricacies associated with defence expenditures, thus further emphasising the importance of this paper during such times.

Why have Russian generals acquired an important political position since the Soviet Union's collapse while at the same time the effectiveness of their forces has deteriorated? Why have there been no radical defense reforms in Russia since the end of the cold war, even though they were high on the agenda of the country's new president in 2000? Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military explains these puzzles as it paints a comprehensive portrait of Russian military politics.

China's limited transparency concerning its defence spending harms strategic trust, but foreign analysts often lose sight of important realities. Specific details remain unclear, but China's defence spending overall is no mystery – it supports PLA modernization and personnel development as well as its announced objectives of securing China's homeland and asserting control over contested territorial and maritime claims, with a focus on the Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South China seas). This article offers greater context and perspective for Chinese and Western discussions of China's rise and concomitant military build-up through a nuanced and comprehensive assessment of its defence spending and military transparency.

The Berlin crisis, the Suez intervention, the Cyprus problem, and other differences among the NATO powers have tended to weaken the alliance in the face of constant Soviet pressure. Emphasizing the 1960's, a group of experts here examines the future of NATO and American security: military strategy for limited and large scale war, the problem of deterrence, nuclear sharing, surprise attack and disarmament, the special positions of England and Germany, and alternatives to NATO. The contributors are: Klaus Knorr, Roger Hilsman, C. E. Black, F. J. Yeager, G. W. Rathjens Jr., Malcolm Hoag, M. A. Kaplan, A. L. Burns, T. C. Schelling-, Denis Healey, G. A. Craig, and P. H. Nitze. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In the audience today is Gen William Shelton, USAF, retired, and Lt Gen Sam Greaves, USAF -- both are great Americans who helped the author make a lot of progress in preparing for a contested space environment. Looking out five or 10 years from now, a question he should ask themselves is, who will be the next Willie Shelton and Sam Greaves? Well, on Mar 14, 2017, the Department of Defense published the Air Force list of colonels being nominated to become one-star generals. There are 37 nominees on that list. He had be remiss if he didn't say that Americans have the world's best military and the world's best Air Force. For instance, in Iraq and Syria, the Air Force has led 65% of the more than 17,000 coalition airstrikes since 2014. They delivered firepower in partnership with joint, special operations, and coalition ground forces to defeat and degrade ISIS and regain critical territory.

U.S. defense spending isn't excessive and, in fact, should continue to grow because it's both affordable and necessary in today's challenging world. The United States spends a lot of money on defense $607 billion in the current fiscal year. But Brookings national security scholar Michael O'Hanlon argues that is roughly the right amount given the overall size of the national economy and continuing U.S. responsibilities around the world. If anything, he says spending should increase modestly under the next president, remaining near 3 percent of gross domestic product. Recommendations in this book differ from the president's budget plan in two key ways. First, the author sees a mismatch in the Pentagon's current plans between ends and means. The country needs to spend enough money to carry out its military missions and commitments. Second, O'Hanlon recommends dropping a plan to cut the size of the Army from the current 475,000 active-duty soldiers to 450,000. The U.S. national defense budget is entirely affordable relative to the size of the economy, relative to past levels of effort by this country in the national security domain, and relative, especially, to the costs of failing to uphold a stable international order. Even at a modestly higher price, it will be the best $650 billion bargain going, and a worthy investment in this country's security and its long-term national power.

Conventional wisdom holds that the American military is overwhelmingly conservative and Republican, and extremely political. Our Army paints a more complex picture, demonstrating that while army officers are likely to be more conservative, rank-and-file soldiers hold political views that mirror those of the American public as a whole, and army personnel are less partisan and politically engaged than most civilians.

During his first term as first sea lord (1904–10), Admiral Sir John Fisher set in motion the intellectual, organizational, and technological forces that, in very rapid order, combined and recombined to generate new approaches to British naval policy. Like most if not all 'revolutions' in technology and warfare, this one did not start and end neatly under one man's control, but took on a life of its own. Not all elements of his original vision advanced as far as others. Yet, however variable the direction and extent of the revolution at particular times, in retrospect we can say indubitably that it was Fisher who launched it. This essay is a response to Professor Christopher Bell's July 2011 article: 'Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914'.