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This article investigates the motivations underlying Canada and Italy’s military support for Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian War, offering a comparative analysis of these two middle powers’ divergent strategic approaches. While both nations are geographically distant from the conflict and do not face an immediate threat from Russia, each has committed military aid to Ukraine, shaped by distinct strategic cultures. Canada’s consistent support is deeply rooted in its Atlanticist and internationalist orientation, reflecting a long-standing alignment with the USA and NATO allies and the safeguard of liberal norms. This stance, largely uncontested within Canadian political and public spheres, serves to uphold international norms and sustain Canada’s international reputation with relatively modest costs. Italy’s response, however, is marked by a more nuanced strategic culture, balancing its Euro-Atlantic commitments with a pacifist tradition and a pragmatic history of engagement with Russia. While populist factions in Italy have at times advocated for a more pro-Russian stance, these pressures are tempered by institutional structures and Italy’s commitment to NATO and the European Union. This study demonstrates how domestic political dynamics and international constraints interact to reinforce prevailing strategic cultures, establishing a path dependency that limits the emergence of alternative perspectives. This comparative analysis illuminates the role of strategic culture in shaping military engagement, emphasising how domestic and international systemic frameworks facilitate or constrain specific behavioural patterns. It highlights, in particular, the deeply embedded institutional commitment to NATO and the role of institutional continuity in navigating the complexities of the geopolitical landscape.

PurposeThis study seeks to explore the powerful role(s) of institutionalised performance measurement systems or metrics in smart city governance in a politically and militarily sensitive developing country.Design/methodology/approachThis study extends the application and contribution of a multi-level institutional framework to previous management accounting literature on the potential relationship between performance measurement and smart city governance. The value of utilising a multi-level framework is to broaden and deepen theoretical analyses about this relationship to include the effect of political pressure from the military regime at the macro level on the institutionalisation of a performance measurement system at the micro-organisational level. Taking the New Cairo city council smart electricity networks project (Egypt) as an interpretive qualitative single-case study, data collection methods included semi-structured interviews, direct observations and documentary readings.FindingsPerformance measurement systems or metrics, especially in politically and militarily sensitive smart cities, constitutes a process of cascading (macro-micro) institutionalisation that is closely linked to sustainable developments taking place in the wider arena of urban policies. Going a step further, accounting-based performance metrics, arising from political and military pressures towards public-private collaborations, contribute to smart city management and accountability (governance). Institutionalised measurement systems or performance metrics play a powerful accounting role(s) in shaping and reshaping political decisions and military actions in the city council.Originality/valueTheoretically, this study goes beyond the cascading institutionalisation process by arguing for the powerful role(s) of institutionalised accounting and performance measurement systems in smart city decision-making and governance. Empirically, it enriches previous literature with a case study of a developing Arab Spring country, characterised by an emerging economy, political sensitivity and military engagement, rather than developed and more stable countries that have been thoroughly investigated. It is also among the first politically engaged accounting case studies to highlight public-private collaborations as a recent reform in public sector governance and accountability.

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have “the right to be wrong” about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans’ trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans’ views of civil-military relations. We report and analyze the results of a June 2019 survey that yields two important, and troubling, findings. First, Americans do not accept the basic premises of democratic civil-military relations. They are extraordinarily deferential to the military’s judgment regarding when to use military force, and they are comfortable with high-ranking officers intervening in public debates over policy. Second, in this polarized age, Americans’ views of civil-military relations are not immune to partisanship. Consequently, with their man in the Oval Office in June 2019, Republicans—who, as political conservatives, might be expected to be more deferential to the military—were actually less so. And Democrats, similarly putting ideology aside, wanted the military to act as a check on a president they abhorred. The stakes are high: democracy is weakened when civilians relinquish their “right to be wrong.”

Many countries show a growing willingness to use militaries in support of global health efforts. This Series paper summarises the varied roles, responsibilities, and approaches of militaries in global health, drawing on examples and case studies across peacetime, conflict, and disaster response environments. Militaries have many capabilities applicable to global health, ranging from research, surveillance, and medical expertise to rapidly deployable, large-scale assets for logistics, transportation, and security. Despite this large range of capabilities, militaries also have limitations when engaging in global health activities. Militaries focus on strategic, operational, and tactical objectives that support their security and defence missions, which can conflict with humanitarian and global health equity objectives. Guidelines—both within and outside militaries—for military engagement in global health are often lacking, as are structured opportunities for military and civilian organisations to engage one another. We summarise policies that can help close the gap between military and civilian actors to catalyse the contributions of all participants to enhance global health.

BackgroundPost-traumatic growth is defined as positive psychological, social or spiritual growth after a trauma.ObjectivesThis systematic review aimed to identify studies that quantitatively measured post-traumatic growth among (ex-) military personnel, to determine whether there is evidence of growth in this context and whether such growth is associated with any sociodemographic, military, trauma or mental health factors.Data sourcesThe electronic databases PsycInfo, OVIDmedline and Embase were searched for studies published between 2001 and 2017.Study eligibility criteria and participantsPapers were retained if they involved military or ex-military personnel, where some had been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.Study appraisalQuality assessment was conducted on all studies.Results21 studies were retained. The Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory was employed by 14 studies: means ranged from 32.60 (standard deviation = 14.88) to 59.07 (23.48). The Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory Short Form was used by five studies: means ranged from 17.11 (14.88) to 20.40 (11.88). These values suggest moderate growth. Higher levels of social support, spirituality and rumination and minority ethnicity were most frequently associated with more post-traumatic growth.LimitationsThe involved studies may lack generalisability and methodological quality.ConclusionsOverall, this paper confirms that negative reactions to trauma, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder, are not the only possible outcomes for service personnel, as moderate post-traumatic growth can also be observed.Implications of key findingsInterventions aimed at helping current and former armed forces personnel to identify and promote post-traumatic growth post-conflict may be beneficial for their well-being.

Our work examines the impact of country-dyadic military conflicts on market reaction to cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Building on intergroup relations research, we theorize that country-dyadic military conflicts, weighted by their severity, trigger intergroup conflicts between the merging firms and, in so doing, hamper market reaction to CBA. Drawing on a sample that comprises 7321 CBAs between 1988 and 2011, we find that country-dyadic military conflicts reduce acquirer returns following CBA announcements and that cultural similarity between acquirer and target countries weakens the relationship between military conflicts and market reaction to CBA while colonial ties between the countries, the target country’s national pride, and the target’s firm size reinforce the relationship. Our study contributes to an emerging body of work that examines the role of international politics/relations in international business.

The battle of Laffelt took place on 2nd July 1747 n.s. during the seventh year of the War of the Austrian Succession, and in the fourth year of campaigning in the Flanders' theatre of operations. The French army was led by Marsha! Saxe, an illegitimate son of the elector of Saxony and King of Poland, Augustus the Strong; and the Allied army by the Duke of Cumberland, third son of King George II of Great Britain. Much of Flanders (presently Belgium) was an Austrian possession at this time. The French army had moved its operations from Bohemia in 1741/2 to its traditional fighting ground along France's north-east frontier, the Austrian Netherlands in 1743. The Dutch Republic, since 1744, had joined with Austria and Great Britain in an alliance to protect its territory, threatened by large French forces in 1747, and was fully engaged in the struggle.

Despite the prevalence of anti-government rumors in authoritarian countries, little is currently known about their effects on citizens’ attitudes toward the government, and whether the authorities can effectively combat rumors. With an experimental procedure embedded in two surveys about Chinese internet users’ information exposure, this study finds that rumors decrease citizens’ trust in the government and support of the regime. Moreover, individuals from diverse socio-economic and political backgrounds are similarly susceptible to thinly evidenced rumors. Rebuttals generally reduce people’s belief in the specific content of rumors, but often do not recover political trust unless the government brings forth solid and vivid evidence to back its refutation or win the endorsement of public figures broadly perceived to be independent. But because such high-quality and strong rebuttals are hard to come by, rumors will erode political support in an authoritarian state. These findings have rich implications for studies of rumors and misinformation in general, and authoritarian information politics in particular.

BackgroundPost-traumatic growth (PTG) is a positive psychological consequence of trauma. The aims of this study were to investigate whether combat injury was associated with deployment-related PTG in a cohort of UK military personnel who were deployed to Afghanistan, and whether post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and pain mediate this relationship.Methods521 physically injured (n = 138 amputation; n = 383 non-amputation injury) and 514 frequency-matched uninjured personnel completed questionnaires including the deployment-related Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory (DPTGI). DPTGI scores were categorised into tertiles of: no/low (score 0–20), moderate (score 21–34) or a large (35–63) degree of deployment-related PTG. Analysis was completed using generalised structural equation modelling.ResultsA large degree of PTG was reported by 28.0% (n = 140) of the uninjured group, 36.9% (n = 196) of the overall injured group, 45.4% (n = 62) of amputee and 34.1% (n = 134) of the non-amputee injured subgroups. Combat injury had a direct effect on reporting a large degree of PTG [Relative risk ratio (RRR) 1.59 (95% confidence interval (CI) 1.17–2.17)] compared to sustaining no injury. Amputation injuries also had a significant direct effect [RRR 2.18 (95% CI 1.24–3.75)], but non-amputation injuries did not [RRR 1.35 (95% CI 0.92–1.93)]. PTSD, depression and pain partially mediate this relationship, though mediation differed depending on the injury subtype. PTSD had a curvilinear relationship with PTG, whilst depression had a negative association and pain had a positive association.ConclusionsCombat injury, in particular injury resulting in traumatic amputation, is associated with reporting a large degree of PTG.