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Blunder : Britain's War in Iraq
Why did Britain go to war in Iraq in 2003? Existing accounts stress dodgy dossiers, intelligence failures, and the flaws of individual leaders. Deploying the large number of primary documents now available, this book puts ideas at the centre of the story. As the book argues, Britain's war in Iraq was caused by bad ideas that were dogmatically held and widely accepted. Three ideas in particular formed the war's intellectual foundations: the notion of the undeterrable, fanatical rogue state; the vision that the West's path to security is to break and remake states; and the conceit that by paying the 'blood price', Britain could secure influence in Washington DC. These issues matter, because although the Iraq War happened fifteen years ago, it is still with us. As well as its severe consequences for regional and international security, the ideas that powered the war persist in Western security debate. If all wars are fought twice, first on the battlefield and the second time in memory, this book enters the battle over what Iraq means now, and what we should learn.-- Publisher.
Counterinsurgency in Crisis
by
DAVID H. UCKO
,
ROBERT EGNELL
in
21st century
,
Afghan War, 2001
,
Afghan War, 2001- -- Participation, British
2013
Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence.
By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
High Command
2014,2015
From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. \"Victory\" in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defense ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.
Losing small wars : British military failure in the 9/11 Wars
This new edition of Frank Ledwidge's eye-opening analysis of British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan unpicks the causes and enormous costs of military failure. Updated throughout, and with fresh chapters assessing and enumerating the overall military performance since 2011-including Libya, ISIS, and the Chilcot findings-Ledwidge shows how lessons continue to go unlearned.
An Intimate War
2014
An Intimate War tells the story of the last thirty-four years of conflict in Helmand Province, Afghani- stan as seen through the eyes of the Helmandis. In the West, this period is often defined through different lenses - the Soviet intervention, the civil war, the Taliban, and the post-2001 nation-building era. Yet, as experienced by local inhabitants, the Helmand conflict is a perennial one, involving the same individuals, families and groups, and driven by the same arguments over land, water and power. This book - based on both military and re- search experience in Helmand and 150 inter- views in Pashto - offers a very different view of Helmand from those in the media. It demonstrates how outsiders have most often misunderstood the ongoing struggle in Helmand and how, in doing so, they have exacerbated the conflict, perpetuated it and made it more violent - precisely the opposite of what was intended when their interventions were launched. Mike Martin's oral history of Helmand under- scores the absolute imperative of understanding the highly local, personal, and non-ideological nature of internal conflict in much of the 'third' world.
Nelson's Refuge
2011
Since its capture from Spain in 1704, Gibraltar has been one of Great Britain's most legendary citadels. As the gatekeeper of the Mediterranean Sea, its commanding position has shaped the history of the region and surrounding nations, including modern Britain. The fortress, its garrison, and its leaders were witness to and participant in both the rise and the fall of the first emperor of France, whose attempt at European conquest gave birth to the ascendancy of Gibraltar's true importance and its position in world affairs. However, despite its 2,500 year old history, no study has existed that examines the role of the fortress during the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815). It was during that important period that the well-known defensive might of Gibraltar was converted to offensive potential for the British army and was united with the previously under appreciated strategic value of the Rock for the Royal Navy. That combination of military and naval might transformed Gibraltar into a base capable of meeting the various demands in the Mediterranean for many years to come. Nelson's Refuge examines Gibraltar's growth during the two decade struggle with Napoleonic France. As a forward base for the operations of the Royal Navy and Army, the peninsula allowed Horatio Nelson to achieve his victories at the Nile and at Trafalgar. The book also describes how Gibraltar served as the base of secret negotiations that brought Spain to the British side during the Peninsular War and further served as the most forward operations base for the British in that war.
The men who lost America : British leadership, the American Revolution, and the fate of the empire
by
O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson
in
Great Britain -- Army -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
,
Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1760-1820
,
Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815
2013
A unique account of the American Revolution, told from the perspective of the leaders who conducted the British war effort.