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"Mind-brain identity theory."
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New conversations on the problems of identity, consciousness and mind
This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. 0The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. 0The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. 0The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.
Book
Reassessing Kripke’s Anti-Materialism and Almog’s Challenge
In this text, we point out some obvious commitments of the identity theory of mind which allow the identity theorist to sidestep Saul Kripke’s famous anti-materialist argument. We also argue that a recent paper by Joseph Almog fails to undermine Kripke’s internalism about sensations.
Journal Article
Mind–brain identity theory confirmed?
Presented here is a novel graphical, structural, and functional model of the embodied mind. Despite strictly adhering to a physicalistic and reductionist approach, this model successfully resolves the apparent contradiction between the thesis regarding the causal closure of the physical realm and the widely held common-sense belief that the mental realm can influence physical behavior. Furthermore, it substantiates the theory of mind-brain identity while shedding light on its neural foundation. Consciousness, viewed as an epiphenomenon in certain respects, simultaneously possesses causal potency. These two aspects operate concurrently through distinct brain processes. Within the paper, particular emphasis is placed on the significance of qualia and emotions, accompanied by an explanation of their phenomenal nature grounded in the perceptual theory of emotions. The proposed model elucidates how autonomous agents can deliberate on various action scenarios and consciously select the most optimal ones for themselves, considering their knowledge of the world, motivations, preferences, and emotions.
Journal Article
Outer and Inner Dimensions of Brain and Consciousness--Refining and Integrating the Phenomenal Layers
In view of the unresolved mind-brain problem, we examine a number of prototypical research attitudes regarding the question, how the mental and the neuronal realms are related to each other, both functionally and ontologically. By discussing neurophilosophical and neuropsychological positions, the mind-brain problem can be recast in terms of a structural relation between methodological and content-related aspects. Although this reformulation does not immediately lead to a solution, it draws attention to the necessity of searching for a new way of balancing separating and integrating elements regarding content as well as method. As a relatively unknown alternative in this context we investigate an approach by the philosopher Rudolf Steiner. It comprises a first-person method, along with the theoretical background of what has come to be known as the mirror metaphor--an analogy for the brain as a necessary but not a sufficient basis for mental activity. Through a first-person study, this approach is scrutinized using volitionally controlled perceptual reversals. The results allow for a phenomenological distinction of processual phases which can be summarized as engaging and disengaging forms of mental activity. Finally, we initiate a discussion in view of related philosophical concepts and give an outlook on the next possible research steps.KEYWORDSmind-brain-relation, mirror-metaphor, first-person method, functional layer theory
Journal Article
Multiple realization and compositional variation
It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in
The Multiple Realization Book
, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive consequences implies that compositional variation is far less significant for the multiple realization of special science kinds than many have supposed. I argue, in contrast, that even on this demanding account, lower-level compositional variation may frequently support the multiple realization of special science kinds across the systems of interest, and that there is a good explanation for where Polger and Shapiro go wrong in drawing the contrary conclusion. I consider but reject Carl Gillett’s claim that different views about the significance of compositional variation for multiple realization phenomena should be traced to implicit disagreement about the metaphysics of realization.
Journal Article
Gödel, Putnam, and functionalism : a new reading of representation and reality
In the early 1970s, Hilary Putnam began to have doubts about functionalism, and in his masterwork 'Representation and Reality' (1988) he advanced four powerful arguments against his own doctrine of computational functionalism. In this book, Jeff Buechner systematically examines Putnam's arguments against functionalism.
eBook
The brain-shaped mind: what the brain can tell us about the mind
Will brain scientists ever be able to read our minds? Why are some things harder to remember than others? Based on recent brain research and neural network modelling, The Brain-Shaped Mind addresses these, and other, questions, and provides a clear account of how the structure of the brain influences the workings of the mind. Neuroscientists are now learning about our minds by examining how the neurones in the brain are connected with one another and the surrounding environment. This book explores how neural networks enable us to recognise objects and learn new things, and what happens when things go wrong. The reader is taken on a fascinating journey into what is arguably one of the most complicated and remarkable aspects of our lives.
eBook