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Perhaps no kind of regulation is more common or less useful than mandated disclosure-requiring one party to a transaction to give the other information. It is the iTunes terms you assent to, the doctor's consent form you sign, the pile of papers you get with your mortgage. Reading the terms, the form, and the papers is supposed to equip you to choose your purchase, your treatment, and your loan well.More Than You Wanted to Knowsurveys the evidence and finds that mandated disclosure rarely works. But how could it? Who reads these disclosures? Who understands them? Who uses them to make better choices? Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider put the regulatory problem in human terms. Most people find disclosures complex, obscure, and dull. Most people make choices by stripping information away, not layering it on. Most people find they can safely ignore most disclosures and that they lack the literacy to analyze them anyway. And so many disclosures are mandated that nobody could heed them all. Nor can all this be changed by simpler forms in plainer English, since complex things cannot be made simple by better writing. Furthermore, disclosure is a lawmakers' panacea, so they keep issuing new mandates and expanding old ones, often instead of taking on the hard work of writing regulations with bite. Timely and provocative,More Than You Wanted to Knowtakes on the form of regulation we encounter daily and asks why we must encounter it at all.

Abstract Miranda warnings are remarkably heterogeneous in their language, length, and content. Past research has focused mostly on individual Miranda warnings. Lacking in generalizability, these studies have limited applicability to both public policy and professional practice. A large-scale survey by R. Rogers et al. [ 2007b , Law and Human Behavior, 31, 177-192] examined Miranda warnings from across the United States and documented striking differences in the length, content, and reading comprehension. In moving from single jurisdiction studies to nationally representative research, the replication of the Rogers et al. survey is essential. With an additional 385 general Miranda warnings, most of the original findings were confirmed; this replication allows Miranda researchers to use findings based upon nationally-representative warnings for their subsequent research. Beyond reading comprehension, the study makes an original contribution to the understanding of Miranda vocabulary that is often infused with abstruse words and legalistic terms. It provides the first analysis of sentence complexity, which affects both Miranda comprehension and retention. As a result of these analyses, preliminary guidelines are provided for increasing the comprehension and understanding of Miranda warnings.

Programmatic research has made important advances during the last decade in understanding how cognitive and psychological variables affect Miranda comprehension and reasoning. However, the effects of situational stressors are largely overlooked in determining the validity of Miranda waivers. As the first systematic investigation, this study uses a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design on 123 undergraduate participants to examine the effects of being apprehended via a mock crime (i.e., stealing a watch from a Plexiglas case) paradigm on Miranda comprehension and reasoning. Besides the mock-crime condition, the mode of advisement (oral or written) and the length of the warning (124 vs. 228 words) were also investigated. When compared to controls, the mock-crime scenario produced moderate to large effects (ds from .58 to .75) on both Miranda recall and subsequent reasoning. In addition, oral advisements resulted in non-significant trend for decrements in Miranda recall. No main effects were observed for length and no significant interactions were found. Interestingly, specific components (e.g., right to counsel and free legal services) were generally more affected than the more familiar first two components (i.e., right to silence and evidence against you). Within the crime-scenario condition, participants with substantially increased state anxiety predictably performed more poorly than those participants whose state anxiety remained relatively stable. Directions for future research and the implications of these findings on our understanding of Miranda abilities are discussed.

This article defends the meta-right to know your rights, asserting that the moral right to know legal rights should be enforced by the law. All too often, state agents and private actors deceive individuals or exploit their ignorance to prevent their exercise of rights. While this injustice is familiar, the right to know your rights has not received adequate analytical attention. Here, I show that this right can be defended by many moral theories, including deontology, consequentialism, and social contract theory. While the right to know is categorical, it imposes different duties (to inform and/or not deceive) on different parties, depending upon the situation; hence, redress should vary by situation. For instance, Miranda warnings may best convey Fourth Amendment knowledge, while public service announcements may best correct voter deception and mandated disclaimers may best prevent deceptive crisis pregnancy counseling.

\"Where's the rest of the opinion?\" That was my immediate reaction to reading the Supreme Court's terse decision in Dickerson, delivered to me via email from the clerk's office a few minutes after its release. Surely, I thought, some glitch in the transmission had eliminated the pages of discussion on the critical issues in the case. Yet, as it became clear that I had received all of the Court's opinion, my incredulity grew.

Lower courts disagree about whether and when the Fifth Amendment permits prosecutors to raise an adverse inference of guilt from a criminal suspect's silence. In Salinas v. Texas, the Supreme Court introduced a new wrinkle into the constitutional analysis: Suspects must first expressly invoke their right to remain silent during police questioning in order to later claim protection for that silence at trial. Significantly, silence alone does not constitute proper invocation and instead forfeits the ability to challenge an adverse inference offered by the prosecution. This Note explores the outer limits of the express invocation requirement and focuses on its application to an area of the criminal investigation process left unaddressed by Salinas: the \"postarrest setting,\" defined as the period after a suspect's arrest but before receipt of Miranda warnings. This Note examines the implications of requiring express invocation in the postarrest setting and identifies features that distinguish that setting from other scenarios considered by the Supreme Court in its prior invocation cases, which used law enforcement interests specific to police interrogations to justify their holdings. This Note concludes that an express invocation requirement should not apply to the postarrest setting, where this interrogation rationale is absent.

Spanish-translated Miranda warnings are administered annually to thousands of Hispanic custodial suspects. In examining 121 Spanish translations and their English counterparts from 33 states, the lengths of Miranda warnings were generally comparable but marked differences were observed in the reading levels for individual Miranda components. The adequacy of Miranda translations varies markedly from minor variations to substantive errors. The most serious problems involved the entire omission of Miranda components; several omissions were observed in the Spanish translations for even the basic rights to silence and counsel. More commonly, Miranda discrepancies involved dissimilar content with a substantial trend toward more information in English than Spanish versions. Findings related to the Miranda translations, different word lengths, and varied reading levels are discussed using the totality of circumstances as its framework.

This study examines whether parents have the prerequisite knowledge about police interrogation that would allow them to compensate for youths’ knowledge deficits, protect their interests, and buffer against their vulnerability to coercion. A racially diverse urban/suburban convenience sample of 77 11- to 13-year-olds, 46 14- to 15-year-olds, and 47 16- to 17-year-olds and their parents completed a semi-structured interview on knowledge of legal rights and police practices. Results show that parents know more than younger adolescents about components of the Miranda warning and its behavioral implications but do not necessarily know more about police strategy or the parameters of parental protection. Age and socioeconomic status were associated with youths’ risk for poor knowledge. Among parents, IQ, race, and the child’s age predicted risk classification. Parent IQ, socioeconomic status, and youths’ justice experience, race, and age predicted whether families were classified as at risk for poor knowledge. The results question legal assumptions about parents’ capacity for protecting youths’ interests without intervention.

Seventy-five psychiatric inpatients were evaluated with respect to their Miranda-related abilities using Grisso's (1998, Instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights. Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press) instruments and Goldstein's (2002, Revised instruments for assessing understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights) revision to determine: whether different versions of Miranda warnings translate into differences in understanding; the influence of psychiatric symptoms, diagnostic categories, and IQ upon Miranda comprehension; and the relative performance of persons with psychiatric impairment on Miranda-relevant abilities. Results indicated that although the Miranda language used in Goldstein's revision generally showed lower grade reading levels and higher reading ease scores than Grisso's original instruments, this did not translate into improved understanding. In addition, psychiatric symptoms were negatively correlated with Miranda comprehension, even after controlling for IQ. Finally, results revealed that psychiatric patients' understanding and appreciation was substantially impaired compared to Grisso's adult validation samples, and was roughly comparable to Grisso's juvenile validation sample. Implications of these results for policy reform are discussed.

As part of the global \"War on Terror,\" federal agents intentionally delay issuing Miranda warnings to terrorism suspects during custodial interrogations. They delay the warnings presuming that unwarned suspects will more freely offer vital national security intelligence. After a suspect offers the information he has, agents administer Miranda warnings and attempt to elicit confessions that prosecutors can use at the suspect's trial. No court has ruled on the constitutionality of this two-step national security interrogation process to determine whether admitting the second, warned confession is allowed under Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny. A fragmented Supreme Court examined two-step interrogations generally in Missouri v. Seibert but offered no clear holding. This Note argues that while confessions derived from two-step national security interrogations are admissible under Justice Kennedy's Seibert test, courts should instead apply Justice Souter's Seibert test to limit the use of such interrogations. This Note further contends that permitting two-step national security interrogations contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fifth Amendment as well as decades of Miranda jurisprudence.