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An important human capacity is the ability to imagine performing an action, and its consequences, without actually executing it. Here we seek neural representations of specific manual actions that are common across visuo-motor performance and imagery. Participants were scanned with fMRI while they performed and observed themselves performing two different manual actions during some trials, and imagined performing and observing themselves performing the same actions during other trials. We used multi-variate pattern analysis to identify areas where representations of specific actions generalize across imagined and performed actions. The left anterior parietal cortex showed this property. In this region, we also found that activity patterns for imagined actions generalize better to performed actions than vice versa, and we provide simulation results that can explain this asymmetry. The present results are the first demonstration of action-specific representations that are similar irrespective of whether actions are actively performed or covertly imagined. Further, they demonstrate concretely how the apparent cross-modal visuo-motor coding of actions identified in studies of a human “mirror neuron system” could, at least partially, reflect imagery. ► We applied fMRI with MVPA to investigate coding of imagined and performed actions. ► Left anterior parietal cortex showed common imagined-performed coding for specific actions. ► Action-specific representations can be elicited by imagery alone. ► Apparent visuo-motor coding–by a human ‘mirror neuron system’–may partially be driven by imagery.

Mirror neuron system can be activated by observation and execution of an action. It has an important function of action understanding. We investigated brain activations in humans by observing the strength of a hand grasp using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty right-handed healthy individuals, consisting of 10 males and 10 females, aged 22.40 ± 2.04 years, were recruited into this study from September to November 2017 via posters. Light hand grasp task video showed a hand lightly grasping and releasing a ball repeatedly. Powerful hand grasp task video showed a hand tightly grasping and releasing a ball repeatedly. Functional magnetic resonance imaging block design paradigm comprised five stimulation blocks alternating with five baseline blocks. Stimulation blocks were presented with two stimulus tasks, consisting of a light grasp and a powerful grasp. Region of interest was defined around the inferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal gyrus, and superior temporal sulcus which have been called mirror neuron system. The inferior parietal lobule, fusiform, postcentral, occipital, temporal, and frontal gyri were activated during light and powerful grasp tasks. The BOLD signal response of a powerful grasp was stronger than that of a light grasp. These results suggest that brain activation of the inferior parietal lobule, which is the core brain region of the mirror neuron system, was stronger in the powerful grasp task than in the light grasp task. We believe that our results might be helpful for instructing rehabilitation of brain injury. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of Daegu Oriental Hospital of Daegu Haany University on September 8, 2017 (approval No. DHUMC-D-17020-PRO-01).

Decision-making is strongly influenced by the counterfactual anticipation of personal regret and relief, through a learning process involving the ventromedial-prefrontal cortex. We previously reported that observing the regretful outcomes of another's choices reactivates the regret-network. Here we extend those findings by investigating whether this resonant mechanism also underpins interactive-learning from others' previous outcomes. In this functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging study 24 subjects either played a gambling task or observed another player's risky/non-risky choices and resulting outcomes, thus experiencing personal or shared regret/relief for risky/non-risky decisions. Subjects' risk-aptitude in subsequent choices was significantly influenced by both their and the other's previous outcomes. This influence reflected in cerebral regions specifically coding the effect of previously experienced regret/relief, as indexed by the difference between factual and counterfactual outcomes in the last trial, when making a new choice. The subgenual cortex and caudate nucleus tracked the outcomes that increased risk-seeking (relief for a risky choice, and regret for a non-risky choice), while activity in the ventromedial-prefrontal cortex, amygdala and periaqueductal gray-matter reflected those reducing risk-seeking (relief for a non-risky choice, and regret for a risky choice). Crucially, a subset of the involved regions was also activated when subjects chose after observing the other player's outcomes, leading to the same behavioural change as in a first person experience. This resonant neural mechanism at choice may subserve interactive-learning in decision-making. ►Risk-aptitude is influenced by both 1st and 3rd-person previous regret and relief ►Specific brain regions track previous regret and relief outcomes at the next choice ►Distinct regions track the previous outcomes that increase or decrease risk-seeking ►The regions tracking past outcomes are also active after observing others' outcomes ►A resonant neural mechanism may subserve interactive-learning in decision-making

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.

This review focuses on a novel rehabilitation approach known as action observation treatment (AOT). It is now a well-accepted notion in neurophysiology that the observation of actions performed by others activates in the perceiver the same neural structures responsible for the actual execution of those same actions. Areas endowed with this action observation–action execution matching mechanism are defined as the mirror neuron system. AOT exploits this neurophysiological mechanism for the recovery of motor impairment. During one typical session, patients observe a daily action and afterwards execute it in context. So far, this approach has been successfully applied in the rehabilitation of upper limb motor functions in chronic stroke patients, in motor recovery of Parkinson's disease patients, including those presenting with freezing of gait, and in children with cerebral palsy. Interestingly, this approach also improved lower limb motor functions in post-surgical orthopaedic patients. AOT is well grounded in basic neuroscience, thus representing a valid model of translational medicine in the field of neurorehabilitation. Moreover, the results concerning its effectiveness have been collected in randomized controlled studies, thus being an example of evidence-based clinical practice.

The intuitiveness of tangible user interface (TUI) is not only for its operator. It is quite possible that this type of user interface (UI) can also have an effect on the experience and learning of observers who are just watching the operator using it. To understand the possible effect of TUI, the present study focused on the mu rhythm suppression in the sensorimotor area reflecting execution and observation of action, and investigated the brain activity both in its operator and observer. In the observer experiment, the effect of TUI on its observers was demonstrated through the brain activity. Although the effect of the grasping action itself was uncertain, the unpredictability of the result of the action seemed to have some effect on the mirror neuron system (MNS)-related brain activity. In the operator experiment, in spite of the same grasping action, the brain activity was activated in the sensorimotor area when UI functions were included (TUI). Such activation of the brain activity was not found with a graphical user interface (GUI) that has UI functions without grasping action. These results suggest that the MNS-related brain activity is involved in the effect of TUI, indicating the possibility of UI evaluation based on brain activity.

Theories of empathy suggest that an accurate understanding of another's emotions should depend on affective, motor, and/or higher cognitive brain regions, but until recently no experimental method has been available to directly test these possibilities. Here, we present a functional imaging paradigm that allowed us to address this issue. We found that empathically accurate, as compared with inaccurate, judgments depended on (i) structures within the human mirror neuron system thought to be involved in shared sensorimotor representations, and (ii) regions implicated in mental state attribution, the superior temporal sulcus and medial prefrontal cortex. These data demostrate that activity in these 2 sets of brain regions tracks with the accuracy of attributions made about another's internal emotional state. Taken together, these results provide both an experimental approach and theoretical insights for studying empathy and its dysfunction.

It is the aim of this article to present an empirically justified hypothesis about the functional roles of the two social neural systems, namely the so-called ‘mirror neuron system’ (MNS) and the ‘mentalizing system’ (MENT, also ‘theory of mind network’ or ‘social neural network’). Both systems are recruited during cognitive processes that are either related to interaction or communication with other conspecifics, thereby constituting intersubjectivity. The hypothesis is developed in the following steps: first, the fundamental distinction that we make between persons and things is introduced; second, communication is presented as the key process that allows us to interact with others; third, the capacity to ‘mentalize’ or to understand the inner experience of others is emphasized as the fundamental cognitive capacity required to establish successful communication. On this background, it is proposed that MNS serves comparably early stages of social information processing related to the ‘detection’ of spatial or bodily signals, whereas MENT is recruited during comparably late stages of social information processing related to the ‘evaluation’ of emotional and psychological states of others. This hypothesis of MNS as a social detection system and MENT as a social evaluation system is illustrated by findings in the field of psychopathology. Finally, new research questions that can be derived from this hypothesis are discussed. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Physiological determinants of social behaviour in animals’.

We have suggested that the mirror-neuron system might be usefully understood as implementing Bayes-optimal perception of actions emitted by oneself or others. To substantiate this claim, we present neuronal simulations that show the same representations can prescribe motor behavior and encode motor intentions during action–observation. These simulations are based on the free-energy formulation of active inference, which is formally related to predictive coding. In this scheme, (generalised) states of the world are represented as trajectories. When these states include motor trajectories they implicitly entail intentions (future motor states). Optimizing the representation of these intentions enables predictive coding in a prospective sense. Crucially, the same generative models used to make predictions can be deployed to predict the actions of self or others by simply changing the bias or precision (i.e. attention) afforded to proprioceptive signals. We illustrate these points using simulations of handwriting to illustrate neuronally plausible generation and recognition of itinerant (wandering) motor trajectories. We then use the same simulations to produce synthetic electrophysiological responses to violations of intentional expectations. Our results affirm that a Bayes-optimal approach provides a principled framework, which accommodates current thinking about the mirror-neuron system. Furthermore, it endorses the general formulation of action as active inference.