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Since the Nuremberg Trials of 1945, lawful nations have struggled to impose justice around the world, especially when confronted by tyrannical and genocidal regimes. But in Cambodia, the USSR, China, Bosnia, Rwanda, and beyond, justice has been served haltingly if at all in the face of colossal inhumanity. International Courts are not recognized worldwide. There is not a global consensus on how to punish transgressors. The war against Al Qaeda is a war like no other. Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda's founder, was killed in Pakistan by Navy Seals. Few people in America felt anything other than that justice had been served. But what about the man who conceived and executed the 9/11 attacks on the US, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed? What kind of justice does he deserve? The U.S. has tried to find the high ground by offering KSM a trial albeit in the form of military tribunal. But is this hypocritical? Indecisive? Half-hearted? Or merely the best application of justice possible for a man who is implacably opposed to the civilization that the justice system supports and is derived from? In this book, William Shawcross explores the visceral debate that these questions have provoked over the proper application of democratic values in a time of war, and the enduring dilemma posed to all victors in war: how to treat the worst of your enemies.

According to the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, medical professionals at secret CIA prisons cleared terrorist suspects for torture, monitored torture to prevent death and treat injuries, developed novel torture methods, and tortured prisoners. In December 2014, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee's report on torture was released to the public. The 600-page report (a redacted summary of the still-classified 6000-page report) documents in disturbing detail the use by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of physicians, lawyers, and psychologists in its post-9/11 torture program at more than a dozen “black sites,” or secret prisons, around the world. 1 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, has called the report “courageous and commendable,” while condemning the torture program it details and noting that “torture cannot be amnestied” and should not be permitted to . . .

The same thick, cement-brick walls, a badly washed brown blood stain on one of them; a handful of hair; a transom facing the road and closed by a metal shutter that was then boarded over; a wooden door without keyhole or handle, barred with a beam slid through padlocked iron rings; construction material in a corner; fishing nets; clumps of straw mixed with mud; mattress stuffing with spider webs; old clay pots thrown in a corner under the transom; colonies of red ants; cockroaches; two discarded spoons and a plate; a candy-pink alarm clock with just one hand; crumpled cigrette packs; a cold brazier; a bed made of cords. [...]his odyssey walks him through the same impasses we travel today. What follows supports the State Department's understanding of the abductors' aims, their desire for \"exposure and to make a point\": We Americans cannot continue to bear the consequences of our government's actions...Such as the unconditional support given to the state of Israel...Twenty-four abuses of the veto power to justify the massacre of children...And the support for the dictatorial regimes in the Arab and Muslim world...And also the continued American military presence in Afghanistan. In a final chapter, Lévy speculates on the startling possibilities of Pearl's knowledge of nuclear weapon exchanges with al-Qaida, but also the author underlines the journalist's more general quest for a \"gentle Islam\"; Lévy wonders, Who will prevail: the heirs of this ancient commerce of men and cultures that stretches from Avicenne to Mahfouz by way of the sages of Cordoba-or the madmen of the Peshawar camps who call for jihad and, belly strapped with explosives, aspire to die as martyrs? (454) We remember Pearl's expectant smile in captivity, the enigmatic smile of a man observing those he most wanted to understand.

\"We have been unable to identify any parallel... in the history of our nation in which Congress has intervened to prohibit the prosecution of particular persons or crimes.\" So wrote Attorney General Eric Holder in a December 2010 letter addressed to the leadership of the Senate, in response to proposed congressional funding restrictions that would have forbidden the executive branch from using any appropriated funds to transfer non-American Guantanamo detainees held by the Department of Defense—Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in particular—to the United States. Those funding restrictions have since been signed into law on multiple occasions. There is little doubt that these restrictions destroyed any hope the Obama Administration had of prosecuting the alleged 9/11 plotters in federal civilian court. What is in doubt, however, is whether Congress had the power to enact these restrictions in the first place. Congress's actions have been labeled by the Attorney General as \"dangerous precedent\" and by the President as a \"violat[ion] of separation of powers principles\" under certain circumstances. Yet no legal scholarship has been published that analyzes whether Congress's exercise of its purse power unconstitutionally infringed on either the President's authority as commander-in-chief or the executive's monopoly over the federal prosecution of named individuals. This Note aims to be the first voice on the issue. Using both a separation of powers balancing analysis and a tripartite framework that builds on the work of Charles Tiefer, this Note concludes that while Congress has indeed stretched the permissible limits of its purse power in this instance, the legislature has not violated the Constitution. The analysis reveals, moreover, that Congress's funding restrictions infringed less on the President's military authority as commander-in-chief than on his prosecutorial authority. Ultimately, this Note also raises the question of whether Congress's actions to effectively forbid the prosecution of named individuals in federal court, even if constitutional, are still bad policy.