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"Monetary Fund"
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The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality
2021
Does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increase inequality? To answer this question, this article introduces a new empirical strategy for determining the effects of IMF programs that exploits the heterogeneous effect of IMF liquidity on loan allocation based on a difference-in-differences logic. The results show that IMF programs increase income inequality. An analysis of decile-specific income data shows that this effect is driven by absolute income losses for the poor and not by income gains for the rich. The effect persists for up to 5 years, and is stronger for IMF programs in democracies, and when policy conditions, particularly those that demand social-spending cuts and labor-market reforms, are more extensive. These results suggest that IMF programs can constrain government responsiveness to domestic distributional preferences.
Journal Article
The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries
2014
The global financial crisis has transformed the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced 'Washington Consensus'-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree of an organisation's autonomy from its members depends on the interpretation of its mandate. IMF staff viewed the Fund's technical mandate as an opportunity to react rather flexibly to the challenges of the latest crisis. By contrast, European Commission, as well as European Central Bank (ECB), staff interpreted the vast body of supranational rules as necessitating stricter adherence to economic orthodoxy. Thus, IMF lending policies were more flexible and, at least on fiscal issues, also less contractionary.
Journal Article
Who Elected the Bankers?
2018,1998,1997
A former banker and staff member of the International Monetary Fund, Louis W. Pauly explains why people are deeply concerned about the emergence of a global economy and the increasingly integrated capital markets at its heart. In nations as diverse as France, Canada, Russia, and Mexico, the lives of citizens are disrupted when national policy falls out of line with the expectations of international financiers. Such dilemmas, ever more conspicuous around the world, arise from the disjuncture between a rapidly changing international economic system and a political order still constituted by sovereign states. The evolution of global capital markets inspires an understandable fear among people that the governing authorities accountable to them are losing the power to make substantive decisions affecting their own material prospects and those of their children. Pauly points out that today's capital markets resulted from decisions taken over many years by sovereign states, and particularly by the leading industrial democracies, who simultaneously crafted the instrument of multilateral economic surveillance. The effort to build adequate political foundations for global capital markets spans the twentieth century and links the histories of such institutions as the League of Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the Group of Seven.
When rules started to rule: the IMF, neo-liberal economic ideas and economic policy change in Britain
2012
This article reassesses the neo-liberal shift within British economic policy-making and the international political economy, focusing especially the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1960s. The IMF has always used the conditions attached to its lending to try and shape borrower's policy; here we explore the evolving content of that conditionality and the economic ideas underpinning it. Using recently released IMF records, as well as other archives, we argue that the negotiations between the IMF and the UK Government in the 1960s can be seen as part of the Fund's drive towards a crucial change from discretionary to rules-based approaches to macroeconomic policy making. This drive took place within a struggle over a specific policy instrument, domestic credit expansion (DCE), at that time regarded as an important measure of monetary policy. The article locates the IMF advocacy of DCE within an attempt by the Fund to constrain discretionary policy-making through increasingly specific and binding rules. In response, UK Government officials began to pre-empt and even deceive the Fund to avoid being tied down. Our analysis unpacks which neo-liberal economic ideas the Fund embraced, noting its rejection of monetarism. In the period charted here (1965-69), the rules-based regime remained compatible with Keynesianism. However, the UK Government's grudging acceptance of this approach provided a crucial condition of possibility for a significant qualitative shift in macroeconomic policy-making when rules later became infused with an increasingly neo-liberal character.
Journal Article
Capital ideas
by
Jeffrey M. Chwieroth
in
1997 Asian financial crisis
,
A Monetary History of the United States
,
Adjustable Peg
2010,2009
The right of governments to employ capital controls has always been the official orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund, and the organization's formal rules providing this right have not changed significantly since the IMF was founded in 1945. But informally, among the staff inside the IMF, these controls became heresy in the 1980s and 1990s, prompting critics to accuse the IMF of indiscriminately encouraging the liberalization of controls and precipitating a wave of financial crises in emerging markets in the late 1990s. In Capital Ideas, Jeffrey Chwieroth explores the inner workings of the IMF to understand how its staff's thinking about capital controls changed so radically. In doing so, he also provides an important case study of how international organizations work and evolve.