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This paper examines the different policy rules proposed by Henry Simons, who, beginning in the mid-1930s, advocated a price-level stabilization rule, and by Milton Friedman, who, beginning in the late-1950s, advocated a rule that targeted a constant growth rate of the money supply. Although both rules shared the objective of eliminating the policy uncertainty emanating from discretion, they differed because of the different views of Simons and Friedman about the stability of secular relationships. Simons' rule relates to modern rules that emphasize the pursuit of price stability as representing optimal monetary policy.

I estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve for the periods before and after Paul Volcker's appointment as Chairman in 1979, using information that was available to the FOMC in real time from 1966 to 1995. The results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward-looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods. This contradicts the hypothesis, based on analysis with ex post constructed data, that the instability of the Great Inflation was the result of weak FOMC policy responses to expected inflation. A difference is that prior to Volcker's appointment, policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious. Drawing on contemporaneous accounts of FOMC policy, I discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the Great Inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then.

The Taylor rule incorporates several features of an optimal monetary policy, from the standpoint of at least one simple class of optimizing models. The response that it prescribes to fluctuations in inflation or the output gap tends to stabilize those variables, and stabilization of both variables in an appropriate goal, at least when the output gap is properly defined. Furthermore, the prescribed response to these variables counteracts instability due to self-fulfilling expectations. At the same time, the original formulation of the rule may be improved upon. Considerations call for further research to improve measurement of the natural rates of output and of interest, and to analyze the consequences of inertial rules in the context of more detailed models.

We show how monetary policy inertia can help alleviate problems of indeterminacy and non-existence of stationary equilibrium observed for some commonly studied monetary policy rules. We also find that inertia promotes learnability of equilibrium. The context is a simple, forward-looking model of the macroeconomy widely used in the rapidly expanding literature in this area. We conclude that this might be an important reason why central banks in the industrialized economies display considerable inertia when adjusting monetary policy in response to changing economic conditions.

I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on a rational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interest rates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. The optimal monetary policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper's main findings call into question the theoretical foundations of the case for \"leaning against the wind\" monetary policies.

Monetary policy in Yemen is largely rudimentary and ad hoc in nature. The Central Bank of Yemen's (CBY) approach has been based on discretionary targeting of broad money without any clear target to anchor inflation expectations. This paper argues in favor of a new formal monetary policy framework for Yemen emphasizing a proactive and rule-based approach with a greater direct focus on price stability in the context of a flexible management of the exchange rate. Although, as in many developing countries, institutional capacity is a concern, adopting a more formal framework could impel the kind of changes that are required to strengthen the ability of the CBY in achieving low and stable rates of inflation over the medium term.

We argue that a stronger emphasis on macrofinancial risk could provide stabilization benefits. Simulations results suggest that strong monetary reactions to accelerator mechanisms that push up credit growth and asset prices could help macroeconomic stability. In addition, using a macroprudential instrument designed specifically to dampen credit market cycles would also be useful. But invariant and rigid policy responses raise the risk of policy errors that could lower, not raise, macroeconomic stability. Hence, discretion would be required.

The recent global economic crisis originated in the midst of a commodity price boom that had triggered sharp increases in inflation in many world countries. The crisis also came in the context of a rally in asset prices and large domestic imbalances in the United States. This paper uses a small open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrum (DSGE) model to design the correct monetary policy response to a protracted supply shock, and examines how that response would change when many become credit constrained—like in a credit crunch—and when spending of those who can still borrow becomes very sensitive to the interest rates because of overleveraging. Using a version of the model with Kalman learning, the paper also evaluates the implications of a loss of target credibility, showing how rules must be adjusted when the authorities’ commitment to the inflation target has been eroded. The appropriate response to future evolutions of the price of oil, including to large downward corrections from the current level, is also evaluated.