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"Monopolies"
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RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ
This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.
Journal Article
STRONG DUALITY FOR A MULTIPLE-GOOD MONOPOLIST
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived. As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c, c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for two items Pavlov (2011). At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c, c + 1] is not a grand-bundling mechanism.
Journal Article
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The Limits of Price Discrimination
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out \"third degree price discrimination.\" We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade.
Journal Article
Doubling Back on Double Marginalization
“Double marginalization” and “Elimination of Double marginalization” are catch-phrases commonly used in the IO literature. In this article, I trace back the origin of the idea to Cournot (1838, Ch. IX) on complementary goods monopolies. Through the years Cournot’s contribution remained a reference but ended being viewed as a special case of the bilateral monopoly model. Yet, it is worth wondering why the most cited paper on this issue is nowadays (Spengler in J Polit Econ 58(4):347–352, 1950) which contains only an informal treatment of the question. In addition to retracing the origin of the idea, I emphasize the elegant proof of Cournot for the simultaneous game and extend it to the sequential game. I also show that prices are usually higher in the sequential game but that they could be lower if demand is very convex.
Journal Article
STRONG DUALITY IN MONOPOLY PRICING
The main result in Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017) establishes strong duality in the monopoly problem with an argument based on transportation theory. We provide a short, alternative proof using linear programming.
Journal Article