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The monopolists : obsession, fury, and the scandal behind the world's favorite board game
\"The Monopolists reveals the unknown story of how Monopoly came into existence, the reinvention of its history by Parker Brothers and multiple media outlets, the lost female originator of the game, and one man's lifelong obsession to tell the true story about the game's questionable origins. Most think it was invented by an unemployed Pennsylvanian who sold his game to Parker Brothers during the Great Depression in 1935 and lived happily--and richly--ever after. That story, however, is not exactly true\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
RANT ARAMA VE X ETKİNSİZLİĞİ
This paper discusses the social çost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. in particular the paper addresses a problem of measure Identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.
Journal Article
STRONG DUALITY FOR A MULTIPLE-GOOD MONOPOLIST
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived. As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c, c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for two items Pavlov (2011). At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c, c + 1] is not a grand-bundling mechanism.
Journal Article
The Limits of Price Discrimination
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out \"third degree price discrimination.\" We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade.
Journal Article
STRONG DUALITY IN MONOPOLY PRICING
The main result in Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and Tzamos (2017) establishes strong duality in the monopoly problem with an argument based on transportation theory. We provide a short, alternative proof using linear programming.
Journal Article
Doubling Back on Double Marginalization
“Double marginalization” and “Elimination of Double marginalization” are catch-phrases commonly used in the IO literature. In this article, I trace back the origin of the idea to Cournot (1838, Ch. IX) on complementary goods monopolies. Through the years Cournot’s contribution remained a reference but ended being viewed as a special case of the bilateral monopoly model. Yet, it is worth wondering why the most cited paper on this issue is nowadays (Spengler in J Polit Econ 58(4):347–352, 1950) which contains only an informal treatment of the question. In addition to retracing the origin of the idea, I emphasize the elegant proof of Cournot for the simultaneous game and extend it to the sequential game. I also show that prices are usually higher in the sequential game but that they could be lower if demand is very convex.
Journal Article
Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning
A monopolist offers a product to a market of consumers with heterogeneous quality preferences. Although initially uninformed about the product quality, they learn by observing past purchase decisions and reviews of other consumers. Our goal is to analyze the social learning mechanism and its effect on the seller’s pricing decision. Consumers follow an intuitive, non-Bayesian decision rule. Under conditions that we identify, we show that consumers eventually learn the product’s quality. We show how the learning trajectory can be approximated in settings with high demand intensity via a mean-field approximation that highlights the dynamics of this learning process, its dependence on the price, and the market heterogeneity with respect to quality preferences. Two pricing policies are studied: a static price and one with a single price change. Finally, numerical experiments suggest that pricing policies that account for social learning may increase revenues considerably relative to policies that do not.
This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management
.
Journal Article
Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly
The paper analyzes a durable goods monopoly problem in which multiple varieties can be sold. A robust Coase conjecture establishes that the market eventually clears, with profits exceeding static optimal market-clearing profits and converging to this lower bound in all stationary equilibria with instantaneous price revisions. Pricing need not be efficient, nor is it minimal (equal to the maximum of marginal cost and minimal value), and can lead to cross-subsidization. Conclusions nest both classical Coasian insights and modern Coasian failures. The option to scrap products does not affect results qualitatively, but delivers a novel motive for selling high cost products.
Journal Article
The least monopoly energy of fuzzy graph
In this paper, we present least monopoly energy of fuzzy graph and also computed lower and upper bound. Some examples have been illustrated.
Journal Article
Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions
We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry.
Journal Article