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"Monopoly"
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The monopolists : obsession, fury, and the scandal behind the world's favorite board game
\"The Monopolists reveals the unknown story of how Monopoly came into existence, the reinvention of its history by Parker Brothers and multiple media outlets, the lost female originator of the game, and one man's lifelong obsession to tell the true story about the game's questionable origins. Most think it was invented by an unemployed Pennsylvanian who sold his game to Parker Brothers during the Great Depression in 1935 and lived happily--and richly--ever after. That story, however, is not exactly true\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Monopoly without a Monopolist
Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
Journal Article
Monopoly X : how a top-secret World War II operation used the game of Monopoly to help Allied POWs escape, conceal spies, and send secret codes
\"The incredible true story of how Monopoly games were used to smuggle escape aids to Allied servicemen in German P.O.W. camps...and more\"-- Provided by publisher.
BOOK
Correction: Emergence of monopoly–Copper exchange networks during the Late Bronze Age in the western and central Balkans
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0263823.].
Journal Article
The Limits of Price Discrimination
We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out \"third degree price discrimination.\" We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade.
Journal Article
Intellectual monopoly in global value chains
This paper analyses the role of intangibles in global value chains (GVCs). We find that the intensification of the use of intangible assets within these chains has created new sources of market power. The analysis builds the notion of Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism, where government protections of intellectual property have the effect of locking in the monopoly power from intangible asset creation. We extend it to 'information rents' arising from the presence of scale economies and network externalities associated with the production of intangible assets. GVC integration requires a dense circulation of information flows to communicate specifications, standards, technical know-how in addition to costs and other operational details. The expansion of GVC trade is thus linked to a rising mobilization and circulation of intangibles and the monopoly dynamics arising from intangibles need to be assessed in this context.
Journal Article
Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's expected payoff. We identify a buyer-optimal signal structure which generates (i) efficient trade and (ii) a unitelastic demand. Furthermore, we show that every other buyer-optimal signal structure yields the same outcome as the one we identify: in particular, the same price.
Journal Article
STRONG DUALITY FOR A MULTIPLE-GOOD MONOPOLIST
We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived. As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c, c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for two items Pavlov (2011). At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c, c + 1] is not a grand-bundling mechanism.
Journal Article
ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКИЙ ДОСВІД ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ ЗАХИСТУ ДАНИХ
Метою yiei cmammi e euceimnenHa европейського doceidy iHcmumyyioHanizayii захисту даних, анал! особливостей правозастосування окремих норм Загального регламенту про захист даних, Ha ili основ! - характеристика ефективност! европейського правового поля. Результати docniдження показали, що створення умов для ефективного правозастосування законодавства щодо захисту даних залежить eid багатьох фактоpie геоеконом!чного, геопол!тичного ma incmumyuiüHo2o характеру. Ha сьогодн! правозастосування € обмежено ефективним через укор!нення глобально-монопол!стично! !нформац!йно acumempii, - !нформац!ного дом!нування корпораций над ix користувачами внасл!док використання переваг волод!ння передовими технологиями 360py, систематизацй !нформацй 8 економ!чних та cOYio2ymaHIMAPHUX uinax корпорац!й. Умови глобально-монопол/стично! 1нформац!й но! acumempii створюватимуть додатковий muck Ha dianbHicmo пересмних cy6'ekmis 1нформац! ного простору через зростання невизначеност!. У cmammi пдкреслено Heobxiduicmo innnemenmayii европейського законодавства в украйнських правових координатах, формування eidnosidHUX наглядових структур. Водночас показано, що захист даних прийматиме dedani конфлктн!ший характер, що зумовлено особливостями форм enacHocmi у цифров!й економ!ц!. На цьому mai необхдною € правова воля piuyuicme держави diamu у контекст! захисту прав найуразлив!шо! частини cy6'ekmis !нформац!йного простору - користувач.
Journal Article
Competing data intermediaries
I study a model of competition between data intermediaries, which collect personal data from consumers and sell them to downstream firms. Competition has a limited impact on benefiting consumers: If intermediaries offer high compensation for data, consumers share data with multiple intermediaries, which lowers the downstream price of data and hurts intermediaries. Anticipating this, intermediaries offer low compensation for data. Although consumers are exclusive suppliers of data, the nonrivalry of data can lead to concentration and high intermediary profits in data markets. In particular, if downstream firms use data to extract surplus from consumers, competing intermediaries sustain a monopoly outcome.
Journal Article