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What happens if an employer cuts wages by one cent? Much of labor economics is built on the assumption that all the workers will quit immediately. Here, Alan Manning mounts a systematic challenge to the standard model of perfect competition.Monopsony in Motionstands apart by analyzing labor markets from the real-world perspective that employers have significant market (or monopsony) power over their workers. Arguing that this power derives from frictions in the labor market that make it time-consuming and costly for workers to change jobs, Manning re-examines much of labor economics based on this alternative and equally plausible assumption. The book addresses the theoretical implications of monopsony and presents a wealth of empirical evidence. Our understanding of the distribution of wages, unemployment, and human capital can all be improved by recognizing that employers have some monopsony power over their workers. Also considered are policy issues including the minimum wage, equal pay legislation, and caps on working hours. In a monopsonistic labor market, concludes Manning, the \"free\" market can no longer be sustained as an ideal and labor economists need to be more open-minded in their evaluation of labor market policies.Monopsony in Motionwill represent for some a new fundamental text in the advanced study of labor economics, and for others, an invaluable alternative perspective that henceforth must be taken into account in any serious consideration of the subject.

When jobs offered by different employers are not perfect substitutes, employers gain wage-setting power; the extent of this power can be captured by the elasticity of labor supply to the firm. The authors collect 1,320 estimates of this parameter from 53 studies. Findings show a prominent discrepancy between estimates of direct elasticity of labor supply to changes in wage (smaller) and the estimates converted from inverse elasticities (larger), suggesting that labor market institutions may rein in a substantial amount of firm wage-setting power. This gap remains after they control for 22 additional variables and use Bayesian Model Averaging and LASSO to address model uncertainty; however, it is less pronounced for studies employing an identification strategy. Furthermore, the authors find strong evidence that implies the literature on direct estimates is prone to selective reporting: Negative estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the firm tend to be discarded, leading to upward bias in the mean reported estimate. Additionally, they point out several socioeconomic factors that seem to affect the degree of monopsony power.

Researchers’ interest in monopsony has increased in recent years. This article reviews the accumulating evidence that employers have considerable monopsony power. It summarizes the application of this idea to explaining the impact of minimum wages and immigration, in anti-trust, and in understanding how to model the determinants of earnings in matched employer–employee data sets and the implications for inequality and the labor share.

This paper quantifies employer market power in US manufacturing and how it has changed over time. Using administrative data, we estimate plant-level markdowns—the ratio between a plant’s marginal revenue product of labor and its wage. We find most manufacturing plants operate in a monopsonistic environment, with an average markdown of 1.53, implying a worker earning only 65 cents on the marginal dollar generated. To investigate long-term trends for the entire sector, we propose a novel, theoretically grounded measure for the aggregate markdown. We find that it decreased between the late 1970s and the early 2000s, but has been sharply increasing since.

We analyze how separations responded to arbitrary differences in own and peer wages at a large US retailer. Regression-discontinuity estimates imply large causal effects of own-wages on separations, and on quits in particular. However, this own-wage response could reflect comparisons either to market wages or to peer wages. Estimates using peer-wage discontinuities show large peer-wage effects and imply the own-wage separation response mostly reflects peer comparisons. The peer effect is driven by comparisons with higher-paid peers—suggesting concerns about fairness. Separations appear fairly insensitive when raises are similar across peers—suggesting search frictions and monopsony are relevant in this low-wage sector.

This article confronts monopsony theory’s predictions regarding workers’ wages with observed wage patterns over the business cycle. Using German administrative data for the years 1985 to 2010 and an estimation framework based on duration models, the authors construct a time series of the labor supply elasticity to the firm and estimate its relationship to the unemployment rate. They find that firms possess more monopsony power during economic downturns. Half of this cyclicality stems from workers’ job separations being less wage driven when unemployment rises, and the other half mirrors that firms find it relatively easier to poach workers. Results show that the cyclicality is more pronounced in tight labor markets with low unemployment, and that the findings are robust to controlling for time-invariant unobserved worker or plant heterogeneity. The authors further document that cyclical changes in workers’ entry wages are of similar magnitude as those predicted under pure monopsonistic wage setting.

This paper studies the role of private sector companies in the development of local amenities. We use evidence from one of the largest multinationals of the 20th century: the United Fruit Company (UFCo). The firm was given a large land concession in Costa Rica—one of the so-called “Banana Republics”—from 1899 to 1984. Using administrative census data with census-block geo-references from 1973 to 2011, we implement a geographic regression discontinuity design that exploits a land assignment that is orthogonal to our outcomes of interest. We find that the firm had a positive and persistent effect on living standards. Company documents explain that a key concern at the time was to attract and maintain a sizable workforce, which induced the firm to invest heavily in local amenities—like the development of education and health infrastructure—that can account for our result. Consistent with this mechanism, we show, empirically and through a proposed model, that the firm’s investment efforts increase with worker mobility.

In this paper, we study whether or not transportation infrastructure disrupts local monopsony power in labor markets using an expansion of the national highway system in India. Using panel data on manufacturing firms, we find that monopsony power in labor markets is reduced among firms near newly constructed highways relative to firms that remain far from highways. We estimate that the highways reduce labor markdowns significantly. We use changes in the composition of inputs to identify these effects separately from the reduction in output markups that occurs simultaneously. The impacts of highway construction are therefore pro-competitive in both output and input markets and act to increase the share of income that labor receives by 1.8–2.3 percentage points.

We test whether wage growth slows following employer consolidation by examining hospital mergers. We find evidence of reduced wage growth in cases where both (i) the increase in concentration induced by the merger is large and (ii) workers’ skills are industry-specific. In all other cases, we fail to reject zero wage effects. We consider alternative explanations and find that the observed patterns are unlikely to be explained by merger-related changes besides labor market power. Wage growth slowdowns are attenuated in markets with strong labor unions, and wage growth does not decline after out-of-market mergers that leave local employer concentration unchanged.

We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013.