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In the current era of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), many countries are attempting to strengthen their health system and achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC). The Korean National Health Insurance (NHI) system functions as a core element of health financing, contributing to achieving UHC by promoting public health and social security through insurance benefits for prevention, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, childbirth, and health promotion. The Republic of Korea achieved 100% NHI coverage of the target population in 1989, 12 years after the introduction of the social insurance system. However, poor coverage of health services and lack of financial protection are major obstacles to achieving UHC. Therefore, the Korean government announced and implemented ‘Moon Jae-in Care’ in August 2017 to enhance the coverage rate of NHI by 70%. First, this study reviews the existing health insurance system in Korea from the perspective of health financing and UHC. Second, it analyses ‘Moon Jae-in Care’, based on the main framework of UHC. Third, it considers the ethical implications of these developments, with focus on the principles of equity, fairness, autonomy, and solidarity. Although the NHI reform is expected to propel Korean health care closer to UHC, many ethical, social, and political issues remain.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to present the North Korea policy pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration and discuss the possibility of a weakened alliance between South Korea and the USA.Design/methodology/approachThis paper compares the North Korean policies and the ROK–US alliance under the Moon administration, analyzing the recent inter-Korean and North Korea–US summits, with a focus on the issues of denuclearization and establishing a peace regime.FindingsThis paper reveals that the approach taken by the Moon administration regarding North Korea is similar to that of North Korea and China, and that the ROK–US alliance is likely to weaken should there be any change concerning the North Korean nuclear issue.Originality/valueDenuclearization takes place in accordance with the agreement between North Korea and the USA, there is a high likelihood of the ROK–US alliance weakening.

The two Koreas are leaving the dark days of war and hostility behind and moving toward a peaceful and denuclearised Korean peninsula based upon the vision of President Moon Jae-in. The Panmunjom Declaration of April 2018 and the June US–North Korea Singapore Statement will guide us as we navigate uncharted waters through a historic transformation on the Korean peninsula. As President Moon said, ‘there may be many difficulties ahead, but we will never give up this bold journey’. Koreans believe that New Zealand, their reliable partner, will go with them on this new journey.

Introduction India and South Korea, who were almost oblivious of each other during the Cold War era,1 have emerged as two natural partners in the 21st century. [...]it must also be underlined that, apart from the government and the private sector, other structural reasons - both domestic and external - have created a compelling context for both countries to find opportunities in each other.2 In the changed post-Cold War era, both countries find themselves to be natural partners. The final section concludes with overarching analyses of both the present status and the future directions of the India and South Korea partnership._ Trajectory of India and South Korea Relations The present section describes, and analyses at some length in five separate sub-sections, the trajectory and the state of the economic partnership between the two countries since the 1990s. Economic Exchanges in the 1990s In the post-Cold War era, the absence of structural constraints, the beginning of summit meetings, and India's Look East Policy led to India and South Korea to initiate cooperation in the economic domain. [...]South Korea is seeking to have more people-to-people connections with India.

How do China and South Korea see their relationship after 30 years of normalization, and why have views shifted since 2017? Research on perceptions and their foreign policy implications usually draws from offcial discourse and public opinion. This review essay assesses the nature and drivers of China-South Korea mutual perceptions by comparing their academic literature on bilateral relations. Scholarly accounts may offer longer-term interpretations of specialized interests, and a fuller picture of how and why views vary. On both sides of the China-South Korea academic debate, the quantitative volume of studies and qualitative appraisal of relations declined in the 2017???2021 Xi Jinping-Moon Jae-in period. Levels of optimism/pessimism vary by issue-area. Views of third-party constraints on security relations, and domestic political influences on societal relations, drive mutual pessimism. Koreans are more pessimistic about the economic partnership and reassess historical relations more unfavourably, which trace back to views of relative dependence and hierarchy. Three implications emerge for post-2022 relations in light of leadership transition in Beijing and Seoul. Enduring security priorities require minimum strategic interdependence and stronger trust-building mechanisms. Positive functional spillovers from economic and local/nonstate cooperation remain in question. And lasting cultural costs of political disputes compel joint efforts to enhance mutual understanding. Overall, shifts in structural and ideational factors that historically drove normalization are driving the current discord, and prompting both sides to lower future expectations of each other.

The Trump administration declared the Obama-era “strategic patience” toward North Korea a failure. As President Trump extols unpredictability as a virtue, the new U.S. policy of “maximum pressure and engagement” has become a factor of strategic uncertainty in Northeast Asia. However, the instrumental use of uncertainty has a narrow window of opportunity for frustrating North Korea’s nuclear missile development and raising international expectations for China holding Pyongyang accountable. This article considers the prospects of the United States in leveraging “all options on the table” while recognizing the contradictions in China’s role and in South Korea’s domestic politics. La administración de Trump declaró que la era de “paciencia estratégica” hacia Corea del Norte bajo la presidencia de Obama fue un fracaso. Mientras el Presidente Trump exalta la virtud de ser poco predecible, la nueva política estadounidense de “máxima presión y encaramiento” se ha convertido en un factor de incertidumbre estratégica en el noreste de Asia. Sin embargo, el uso de la incertidumbre tiene una pequeña ventana de oportunidad para frustrar el desarrollo de los misiles nucleares de Corea del Norte y elevar las expectativas internacionales contra China para mantener a Pyongyang responsable. Este artículo considera las perspectivas de los EE.UU. para aprovechar “todas opciones posibles,” reconociendo al mismo tiempo las contradicciones en las acciones de China y la política interna de Corea del Sur. 特朗普政府宣布’ 奥巴马时代对北韩的”战略耐心”已经失败。由于特朗普总统高度赞扬?不可测性 (unpredictability), 美国对北韩采取的“极度限施压并接触” (maximum pressure and engagement) 新政策已成为东北亚战略不确定性 (strategic uncertainty) 的某个因素。然而, 不确定性的工具性应用 (instrumental use) 有些许机会阻碍北韩发展核导弹, 并提高国际社会对中国掣肘平壤的期望。本文 考虑到美国”保留一切选项”的前景, 也承ｳ认 中国的角色矛盾和南韩国内政治矛盾有其影响。

This article aims at looking into the historical, political, social, and institutional considerations that may have influenced the suspension of President Moon Jae-In's proposal for constitutional amendment in 2018. Although broad factors and dimensions can be called upon in this regard, as far as institutional considerations are concerned, a focus will be given to the role of the judicial bodies in constitutional change.

Modelled on the Max Planck Society in Germany and RIKEN in Japan, the institutes mission is to foster blue-skies basic science in a country historically more focused on applied research. Since its inception, the IBS has had critics who think the institute swallows up too much of the nation's basic research budget. [...]the institute currently has administrative staff at each research centre, but he wants the five IBS centres at KAIST to share a centralized office that would be more powerful and relieve directors of some oftheir administrative burdens, such as approving all purchasing decisions, no matter how small.

On May 10 Yoon Suk Yeol took office as ROK president, and rapidly lost popularity. While talking tough on North Korea, he also offered aid to fight COVID-19-but was ignored. His \"audacious plan,\" wholly unoriginal, to reward Pyongyang materially if it denuclearizes, had very little detail. For months the DPRK did not even mention Yoon. In late July Kim Jong Un sharply warned him against any pre-emptive strike. In August, his sister Kim Yo Jong put the boot in: ludicrously blaming materials sent by ROK activists for bringing COVID-19 into the DPRK, savaging Yoon's proposal as insulting and unoriginal, and saying the North will never talk to him. At home, meanwhile, the new government chose to reopen two contentious inter-Korean episodes from the recent past, seemingly to punish its predecessor's policies. It was hard to see how good could come of that, or to hold out hope for any thaw on the peninsula.