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Qualitative empirical studies of the illicit antiquities trade have tended to focus either on the supply end, through interviews with looters, or on the demand end, through interviews with dealers, museums and collectors. Trafficking of artefacts across borders from source to market has until now been something of an evidential black hole. Here, we present the first empirical study of a statue trafficking network, using oral history interviews conducted during ethnographic criminology fieldwork in Cambodia and Thailand. The data begin to answer many of the pressing but unresolved questions in academic studies of this particular criminal market, such as whether organized crime is involved in antiquities looting and trafficking (yes), whether the traffic in looted artefacts overlaps with the insertion of fakes into the market (yes) and how many stages there are between looting at source and the placing of objects for public sale in internationally respected venues (surprisingly few).

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation, and quantify consumers' valuations for dealer proximity and dealer exclusivity. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and possible entrydeterring effects of exclusive dealing. We find that there are no unilateral incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, but there is a collective incentive for the industry as a whole. Furthermore, a ban on exclusive dealing would raise the smaller entrants' market share. But more importantly, consumers would gain, not so much because of increased price competition, but rather because of the increased spatial availability, which compensates for the demand inefficiency from a loss of dealer exclusivity.

This article shows how reserve prices can be used to control for unobserved object heterogeneity to identify and estimate the distribution of bidder values in auctions. Reserve prices are assumed to be monotonic in the realization of unobserved heterogeneity, but not necessarily set optimally. The model is estimated using transaction prices from a used car auction platform to show that the platform enables sellers to capture a large fraction of the potential value from selling their vehicle. Individual sellers benefit mostly from access to a large set of buyers, but the magnitude depends on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.

Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and enforcement of government regulation. In this paper, we argue that the considerable moral hazard associated with private regulatory monitoring can be mitigated by understanding conflicts of interest in the monitoring organizations’ product/service portfolios and by the effects of their private governance mechanisms. These organizational characteristics affect the stringency of monitoring through reputation, customer loyalty, differential impacts of government sanctions, and the standardization and internal monitoring of operations. We test our theory in the context of vehicle emissions testing in a state in which the government has outsourced these inspections to the private sector. Analyzing millions of emissions tests, we find empirical support for our hypotheses that particular product portfolios and forms of governance can mitigate moral hazard. Our results have broad implications for regulation, financial auditing, and private credit and quality rating agencies in financial markets.

Although commitment is one of the attributes of family firms of continuing interest to researchers, they almost always study it from the perspective of the owning family. In the current work, we analyze the commitment of the non-family employees. We propose a model of commitment, with the aim of studying the implications that this variable may have for family businesses. We study both the aspects on the basis of the approaches of Meyer and Allen's three-component model of organizational commitment and stewardship theory. Results show that the identification level of non-family employees positively and significantly influences the profitability and the survival or continuity of familyowned businesses. At the same time that their involvement level positively and significantly influences the survival or continuity of family-owned businesses.

The goal of this paper is to study the behavior of consumers, dealers, and manufacturers in the car sector and present an approach that can be used by managers and policy makers to investigate the impact of significant demand shocks on profits, prices, and dealer networks. More specifically, we investigate consumer demand, substitution patterns, and price decisions across different cars and dealer locations to identify dealerships with low margins or high fixed costs and measure the value of closing down dealerships for manufacturers. We apply our model empirically to the San Diego area using a transactional data set with information about the locations of dealers and consumers, as well as manufacturer and retail prices. We find strong consumer disutility for travel and find that dealers have local demand areas that are shared with a small set of competitors. We show that a reduction of market demand by 30% over two years, similar to the economic crisis of 2008-2009, results in an annual drop in prices of approximately 11%. We discuss this price drop in the context of the 2009 federal policy measure known as the Car Allowance Rebate System program. We compare predictions and actual dealership closings in the General Motors and Chrysler dealer networks as an application of our approach.

In fall 2008, General Motors and Chrysler were both on the brink of bankruptcy, and Ford was not far behind. As the government stepped in and restructuring began, GM and Chrysler announced their plan to terminate about 2,200 dealerships. In this paper, we first provide an overview of franchising in car distribution, how it came about, and the legal framework within which it functions. States earn about 20 percent of all state sales taxes from auto dealers. As a result, new car dealerships, and especially local or state car dealership associations, have been able to exert influence over local legislatures. This has led to a set of state laws that almost guarantee dealership profitability and survival—albeit at the expense of manufacturer profits. Available evidence and theory suggests that as a result of these laws, distribution costs and retail prices are higher than they otherwise would be; and this is particularly true for Detroit's Big Three car manufacturers—which is likely a factor contributing to their losses in market share vis-à-vis other manufacturers. After discussing the evidence on the effects of the car franchise laws on dealer profit and car prices, we turn to the interaction of the franchise laws and manufacturers' response to the auto crisis. Last, we consider what car distribution might be like if there were no constraints on organization. We conclude that although the state-level franchise laws came about for a reason, the current crisis perhaps provides an opportunity to reconsider the kind of regulatory framework that would best serve consumers, rather than carmakers or car dealers.

For the distribution of spare parts to car dealers, many automotive companies use a transport network of intermediate hubs or transport platforms, operated by a set of third-party logistics (3PL) partners. The optimization of this network, particularly the selection of 3PL providers and corresponding transport platforms, is a complex decision that needs to be supported by appropriate software tools. In this paper, we develop such a tool, implement it, and show its results on a real-life case study provided by Toyota. The tool is currently in active use at Toyota to study and improve the distribution of spare parts in Germany. Using a tabu search metaheuristic, the developed tool essentially solves a large location-routing problem, but has several innovative features to increase its usefulness. First, the tool generates a set of high-quality but structurally different solutions, rather than a single one. This increases Toyota's negotiating power, increases its ability to analyze its current transport network against possible alternatives, and allows it to quickly switch between different transport networks if unexpected events occur. Second, a commercial vehicle-routing solver is integrated into the tool, to allow for a far more realistic modeling of the vehicle-routing decision.

This series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from Albuquerque and Bronnenberg [Albuquerque, P., B. J. Bronnenberg. 2012. Measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks. Marketing Sci. 31(1) 4–23].

People consult various sources, including the Internet, to search for information before purchasing an automobile. We develop an econometric model for a consumer's time allocation over multiple information sources. The process of searching is viewed as a formal choice problem in which the consumer attempts to choose the amount of search from multiple sources to maximize the benefit of purchase net of search cost. Observed data on time allocation over representative sources are postulated to arise from this optimizing behavior, and the proposed econometric model is calibrated to four waves of survey data from buyers of new automobiles, covering purchases made in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. Consistent with the requirement that buyers must complete the transaction and obtain delivery at dealerships, we find that, on average, the baseline preference for sources is the highest for dealer-related activities. However, we also find that the share of time devoted to the Internet increases considerably with overall search time. In particular, we find that more educated buyers under age 40 who search extensively are likely to rely heavily on the Internet in their search. This indicates that the Internet has become the key medium for manufacturers and dealers who are targeting younger, more educated buyers.