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The 1990s saw a systemic shift from the liberal post–World War II international order of liberal multilateralism (LIO I) to a post–Cold War international order of postnational liberalism (LIO II). LIO II has not been only rule-based but has openly pursued a liberal social purpose with a significant amount of authority beyond the nation-state. While postnational liberal institutions helped increase overall well-being globally, they were criticized for using double standards and institutionalizing state inequality. We argue that these institutional features of the postnational LIO II led to legitimation problems, which explain both the current wave of contestations and the strategies chosen by different contestants. We develop our argument first by mapping the growing liberal intrusiveness of international institutions. Second, we demonstrate the increased level and variety of contestations in international security and international refugee law. We show that increased liberal intrusiveness has led to a variety of contestation strategies, the choice of which is affected by the preference of a contestant regarding postnational liberalism and its power within the contested institution.

Research summary: The recent surge of interest in \"ecosystems\" in strategy research and practice has mainly focused on what ecosystems are and how they operate. We complement this literature by considering when and why ecosystems emerge, and what makes them distinct from other governance forms. We argue that modularity enables ecosystem emergence as it allows a set of distinct yet interdependent organizations to coordinate without full hierarchical fiat. We show how ecosystems address multilateral dependences based on various types of complementarities—supermodular or unique, unidirectional or bidirectional—which determine the ecosystem's value-add. We argue that at the core of ecosystems lie nongeneric complementarities, and the creation of sets of roles that face similar rules. We conclude with implications for mainstream strategy and suggestions for future research. Managerial summary: We consider what makes ecosystems different from other business constellations, including markets, alliances, or hierarchically managed supply chains. Ecosystems, we posit, are interacting organizations, enabled by modularity, not hierarchically managed, bound together by the nonredeployability of their collective investment elsewhere. Ecosystems add value as they allow managers to coordinate their multilateral dependence through sets of roles that face similar rules, thus obviating the need to enter into customized contractual agreements with each partner. We explain how different types of complementarities (unique or supermodular, generic or specific, uni- or bi-directional) shape ecosystems and offer a \"theory of ecosystems\" that can explain what they are, when they emerge, and why alignment occurs. Finally, we outline the critical factors affecting ecosystem emergence, evolution, and success—or failure.

As International Organization commemorates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the Liberal International Order (LIO) that authors in this journal have long analyzed is under challenge, perhaps as never before. The articles in this issue explore the nature of these challenges by examining how the Westphalian order and the LIO have co-constituted one another over time; how both political and economic dynamics internal to the LIO threaten its core aspects; and how external threats combine with these internal dynamics to render the LIO more fragile than ever before. This introduction begins by defining and clarifying what is “liberal,” “international,” and “orderly” about the LIO. It then discusses some central challenges to the LIO, illustrated by the contributors to this issue as well as other sources. Finally, we reflect on the analytical lessons we have learned—or should learn—as the study of the LIO, represented by scholarship in International Organization, has sometimes overlooked or marginalized dynamics that now appear central to the functioning, and dysfunction, of the order itself.

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States’ apparent preference to balance China and Trump’s disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN’s ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries’ (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington’s ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.

Growing techno-geopolitical uncertainty affects international business in many ways, calling for more scholarly attention to its causes and multinational enterprise (MNE) responses. The United States CHIPS and Science Act epitomizes the country’s recent embrace of techno-nationalism in its economic rivalry with China, which has major implications for IB scholarship and management practice. The Act exhibits two features that fly against America’s traditional liberal policy stance of championing an open and rules-based multilateral system. First, its reliance on subsidies, export control, and investment screening signifies departure from free trade and from market-based industrial policies. Second, its use of guardrail provisions pursues the weaponization of global value chains for geopolitical and geo-economic purposes. We view the Act as a showcase of a paradigm shift from market-oriented liberalism to intervention-oriented techno-nationalism, heralding a new era of zero-sum thinking and geopolitical prioritization. By examining the broader trend of techno-nationalism, we explore the distinct features of the Act and analyze the geo-strategies that MNEs need to adopt in response to the resulting techno-geopolitical uncertainty. Our analysis highlights the paradigm shift in policymaking, identifies the root causes of this shift, and examines the potential pitfalls it may create. To navigate this uncertain landscape, we suggest four strategic responses for MNEs: geo-strategies, reconfiguration, resilience, and corporate diplomacy.

This article examines the coalition-building efforts of the Quad and AUKUS through the lens of strategic signaling, arguing that minilateral coalitions employ signaling tactics through various means to achieve a common goal. The case studies of Quad and AUKUS demonstrated differences in their strategic signaling. However, their goals are carefully formulated. This article uses discourse analysis to find that the Quad signaled an ambitious “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as a positive force for the region’s security and prosperity. AUKUS, on the other hand, signaled military cooperation as a balance of power amidst an assertive China. While minilateralism is growing in the 21st-century multipolar world, this article examines how these emerging trends of issue-based coalitions, flexible alignments, and informal alliances create avenues for like-minded countries to strengthen capacity-building measures.