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Music is known to be capable of reducing perceived exertion during strenuous physical activity. The current interpretation of this modulating effect of music is that music may be perceived as a diversion from unpleasant proprioceptive sensations that go along with exhaustion. Here we investigated the effects of music on perceived exertion during a physically strenuous task, varying musical agency, a task that relies on the experience of body proprioception, rather than simply diverting from it. For this we measured psychologically indicated exertion during physical workout with and without musical agency while simultaneously acquiring metabolic values with spirometry. Results showed that musical agency significantly decreased perceived exertion during workout, indicating that musical agency may actually facilitate physically strenuous activities. This indicates that the positive effect of music on perceived exertion cannot always be explained by an effect of diversion from proprioceptive feedback. Furthermore, this finding suggests that the down-modulating effect of musical agency on perceived exertion may be a previously unacknowledged driving force for the development of music in humans: making music makes strenuous physical activities less exhausting.

In this article, we examine the empirical association between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement by investigating their causal effects. Employing a large and extensive US sample, we first find that while the lag of CSR does not affect CG variables, the lag of CG variables positively affects firms' CSR engagement, after controlling for various firm characteristics. In addition, to examine the relative importance of stakeholder theory and agency theory regarding the associations among CSR, CG, and corporate financial performance (CFP), we also examine the relation between CSR and CFP. After correcting for endogeneity bias, our results show that CSR engagement positively influences CFP, supporting the conflict-resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory, but not the CSR overinvestment argument based on agency theory. Furthermore, firms' CSR engagement with the community, environment, diversity, and employees plays a significantly positive role in enhancing CFP.

Most research linking compensation to strategy relies on agency theory economics and focuses on executive pay. We instead focus on the strategic compensation of nonexecutive employees, arguing that while agency theory provides a useful framework for analyzing compensation, it fails to consider several psychological factors that increase costs from performance-based pay. We examine how psychological costs from social comparison and overconfidence reduce the efficacy of individual performance-based compensation, building a theoretical framework predicting more prominent use of team-based, seniority-based, and flatter compensation. We argue that compensation is strategic not only in motivating and attracting the worker being compensated but also in its impact on peer workers and the firm's complementary activities. The paper discusses empirical implications and possible theoretical extensions of the proposed integrated theory.

This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand-collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact.

Much of the literature on corporate acquisitions has focused on managerial incentives for making acquisitions but has underemphasized the role played by the social context of major shareholders. This study of Fortune 1000 firms argues that the priorities and risk preferences of family owners can have important implications not only for the volume but also for the diversifying nature of their acquisitions. Agency and family business perspectives are used to derive expectations concerning the acquisitions behavior of family owners. Consistent with both perspectives, and owners' desire to reduce business risk, we find that family ownership is inversely related to the number and dollar volume of acquisitions. However, whereas agency theorists differ about how ownership concentration influences whether acquisitions are diversified, the family firm literature is more definitive. The latter suggests that given family owners' desire to retain control of their firms for offspring, their wealth must remain concentrated. Hence they can most easily reduce the risk of their wealth portfolio by diversifying the business—that is, through diversifying acquisitions. Consistent with this logic, we found the propensity to make diversifying acquisitions to increase with the level of family ownership.

Grounded in agency theory, this study examines how franchisors' ex ante contracts and extracontractual incentives influence their ex post monitoring and enforcement efforts and how combinations of the ex post governance mechanisms drive franchisee behavior. Integrating three archival data sources and a survey of 206 franchisees across eight automotive brands, the authors find that franchisor reliance on contractual completeness appears to result in reduced ex post behavior monitoring and enforcement efforts, while contractual one-sidedness is associated with higher levels of behavior monitoring but reduced enforcement. Extracontractual incentives, when offered to the franchisee, are associated with increases in monitoring and enforcement. In isolation, franchisor monitoring and enforcement efforts are ineffective in eliciting desired franchisee behaviors. However, different combinations of franchisor monitoring and enforcement efforts affect franchisee compliance and opportunism, sometimes with counterproductive results. The study provides an initial baseline of understanding on how ex ante governance characteristics and combinations of ex post governance mechanisms function to facilitate or deter franchisee compliance and opportunism.

Using agency and stewardship theories, this study examines how public administrators manage contracting relationships with nonprofit organizations. Interviews were conducted with public and nonprofit managers involved in social services contract relationships at the state and county level in New York State. The use of trust, reputation, and monitoring as well as other factors influence the manner in which contract relationships are managed. The findings suggest that the manner in which nonprofits are managed evolves over time from a principal-agent to a principal-steward relationship but with less variance than the theories would suggest. This results in part from the contextual conditions that include the type of service, lack of market competitiveness, and management capacity constraints. The intergovernmental environment in which social services are implemented and delivered presents complex challenges for public managers responsible for managing contract relationships. The findings from this study document those challenges and the corresponding management practices used with nonprofit contractors.

This paper introduces Causal Agency Theory, an extension of the functional model of self-determination. Causal Agency Theory addresses the need for interventions and assessments pertaining to self-determination for all students and incorporates the significant advances in understanding of disability and in the field of positive psychology since the introduction of the functional model of self-determination. Causal Agency Theory provides a theoretical framework for developing and enhancing supports to enable youth to engage in agentic action through instruction in goal setting and attainment strategies, to influence self-determination, causal agency, and overall well-being across diverse social-contextual contexts.

This interdisciplinary study examines how national culture affects corporate dividend policies. The dividend puzzle is one of the most studied, yet unresolved, issues in financial economics. Prior theoretical and empirical research has suggested several explanations of the dividend puzzle that are rooted mainly in agency, asymmetric information, \"bird in hand\", and pecking order theories. The main intuition behind our analysis is that dividend policy may be determined not only by an objective assessment of the severity of agency and asymmetric information problems within a firm, but also by management's and investors' subjective perceptions of these problems, which hinge on their national culture. Using Schwartz's national culture dimensions, Conservatism and Mastery, we find that Conservatism is positively related and Mastery negatively related to dividend payouts for a sample of 27,462 firm-years from 21 countries between 1995 and 2007. These effects are robust to controls for a wide variety of other determinants of dividend policy -including investor protection, stock market performance, financial system configuration, tax advantage, economic development, and dividend catering premium -and to alternative culture proxies and sub-period windows. Our findings that national culture affects perceptions of and responses to agency and information asymmetry have important implications for policymakers and multinational enterprises.

In an agency relationship, one party acts on behalf of another. It is curious that a concept that could not be more profoundly sociological does not have a niche in the sociological literature. This essay begins with the economics paradigm of agency theory, which casts a very long shadow over the social sciences, and then traces how these ideas diffuse to and are transformed (if at all) in the scholarship produced in business schools, political science, law, and sociology. I cut a swathe through the social fabric where agency relationships are especially prevalent and examine some of the institutions, roles, forms of social organization, deviance, and strategies of social control that deliver agency and respond to its vulnerabilities, and I consider their impact. Finally, I suggest how sociology might make better use of and contribute to agency theory.