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Stroll through any public park in Brooklyn on a weekday afternoon and you will see black women with white children at every turn. Many of these women are of Caribbean descent, and they have long been a crucial component of New York's economy, providing childcare for white middle- and upper-middleclass families. Raising Brooklyn offers an in-depth look at the daily lives of these childcare providers, examining the important roles they play in the families whose children they help to raise. Tamara Mose Brown spent three years immersed in these Brooklyn communities: in public parks, public libraries, and living as a fellow resident among their employers, and her intimate tour of the public spaces of gentrified Brooklyn deepens our understanding of how these women use their collective lives to combat the isolation felt during the workday as a domestic worker.Though at first glance these childcare providers appear isolated and exploited - and this is the case for many - Mose Brown shows that their daily interactions in the social spaces they create allow their collective lives and cultural identities to flourish. Raising Brooklyn demonstrates how these daily interactions form a continuous expression of cultural preservation as a weapon against difficult working conditions, examining how this process unfolds through the use of cell phones, food sharing, and informal economic systems. Ultimately, Raising Brooklyn places the organization of domestic workers within the framework of a social justice movement, creating a dialogue between workers who don't believe their exploitative work conditions will change and an organization whose members believe change can come about through public displays of solidarity.

Background A nanny state imposes restrictions on people’s liberty and freedom of action in order to advance their interest and welfare. The extent to which this is desirable, or even ethically acceptable, is debated in the literature. This paper formulates and tests the following hypothesis: the more of a nanny a state has been in the past, the more likely it is that the incumbent government will respond to a new, unknown threat with interventions of a paternalist nature, irrespective of other factors that might contribute to shaping government’s response. This hypothesis is then taken to the data using the first wave of COVID-19 as an empirical test. Methods Data are collected from secondary sources for a sample of 99 countries. Nanny statism is measured by the number of paternalist laws and regulations adopted by a country in the past. The response to COVID is proxied by the time of adoption of control and containment measures and their stringency. The public health outcome is measured by the COVID-19 death toll at the end of June 2020. These variables, plus several controls, are then used to estimate a set of linear and probit regressions and a proportional hazard model of the timing of adoption of control and containment measures. Results An increase in nanny statism by 0.1 (on a scale from 0 to 10) on average increases the probability of adoption of control and containment measures by 0.077 (i.e. 7.7 percentage points). The central tenement of the hypothesis is therefore consistent with the empirical evidence. The linear and probit regressions also show that there is no evidence of a significant effect of nanny statism on the stringency of the measures adopted. Irrespective of stringency, however, early adoption of control and containment measures is found to reduce the death toll of COVID-19 in the first half of 2020: an increase in nanny statism by 0.1 reduces the COVID death toll by approximately 7%. Conclusions A tradition of nanny statism potentially leads to a more timely and effective public policy response to a new, unknown crisis. Further tests of the hypothesis should look at the relationship between nanny statism and public health outcomes from natural disasters.

To examine public submissions to a parliamentary inquiry on personal choice and community safety, exploring framing used to support or oppose current public health regulatory approaches. Descriptive content analysis summarised the characteristics of electronic submissions. Framing analysis examined submissions according to the devices: problem and causes; principles and values; recommendations; data and evidence; and salience. We categorised one hundred and five (n=105) submissions by source as Individual, Industry, Public Health and Other. Individuals made more than half the submissions. Overarching frames were choice and rights (Individuals); progress and freedom (Industry); protection and responsibility (Public Health). Most submissions opposed current regulations. Cycling, including mandatory helmet legislation, was most cited, with three‐quarters of submissions opposing current legislation. Framing analysis provided insights into policy actor agendas concerning government regulation. We found a high degree of resistance to public health regulation that curtails individual autonomy across various health issues. Investigating the influence of different frames on community perception of public health regulation is warranted. Action is required to counteract ‘nanny state’ framing by industry and to problematise community understanding of the ‘nanny state’ in the context of balancing the public's liberties and the public's health.

The automotive industry is used as a case study to examine why the attempts by the post-apartheid state to channel private investment along the lines of developmental states under conditions of globalisation have been not successful. Instead of building a developmental state, the post-apartheid state elite has built a nanny state which simply provides handouts to transnational companies.

Ideally, the goals a society pursues are predicated on a voluntary consensus of the citenzenry who through their actions in the private and public spheres develop an approximation of the good or just society. However, just like bad-tasting medicine which may have to be force fed in order to get the patient well, the achievement of some elements of the good society seem to involve a group of experts, often far removed from popular sentiment or opinion, who must go behind the backs of citizens in order to move them toward the better life. But instead of the ham-fisted interventions of a nanny state which often lead to overt resistance and public ridicule, governments can use social marketing and the more subtle principles of behavioral economics to nudge a wary and reluctant public toward valued ends. I argue that although such obfuscation and sugarcoating may work over the short term, in the long run nudging may do more harm than good.

In this article, I argue that public health regulations are a necessary component of changing the culture of health in the US. After considering libertarian critiques of public health interventions, I maintain that many of the interventions critiqued are not in fact coercive. Looking forward, I do not envision an either/or between the nanny state vs. a libertarian polity. Instead, a middle ground will emerge that respects individual choice and personal responsibility while accepting that government has a legitimate interest in securing the population’s health. Better health helps people make better choices and enjoy freedom; being free from poor health status is as important to liberty as free choice.

According to Judith Baer, feminist legal scholarship today does not effectively address the harsh realities of women's lives. Feminists have marginalized themselves, she argues, by withdrawing from mainstream intellectual discourse. InOur Lives Before the Law, Baer thus presents the framework for a new feminist jurisprudence--one that would return feminism to relevance by connecting it in fresh and creative ways with liberalism. Baer starts from the traditional feminist premise that the legal system has a male bias and must do more to help women combat violence and overcome political, economic, and social disadvantages. She argues, however, that feminist scholarship has over-corrected for this bias. By emphasizing the ways in which the system fails women, feminists have lost sight of how it can be used to promote women's interests and have made it easy for conventional scholars to ignore legitimate feminist concerns. In particular, feminists have wrongly linked the genuine flaws of conventional legal theory to its basis in liberalism, arguing that liberalism focuses too heavily on individual freedom and not enough on individual responsibility. In fact, Baer contends, liberalism rests on a presumption of personal responsibility and can be used as a powerful intellectual foundation for holding men and male institutions more accountable for their actions. The traditional feminist approach, Baer writes, has led to endless debates about such abstract matters as character differences between men and women, and has failed to deal sufficiently with concrete problems with the legal system. She thus constructs a new feminist interpretation of three central components of conventional theory--equality, rights, and responsibility--through analysis of such pressing legal issues as constitutional interpretation, reproductive choice, and fetal protection. Baer concludes by presenting the outline of what she calls \"feminist post-liberalism\": an approach to jurisprudence that not only values individual freedoms but also recognizes our responsibility for addressing individuals' needs, however different those may be for men and women. Powerfully and passionately written,Our Lives Before the Lawwill have a major impact on the future course of feminist legal scholarship.

Le New Labour a rejeté l'État fort de la vieille gauche et l'État minimal de la nouvelle droite pour leur préférer l'État facilitateur. Au dire de Tony Blair, ce troisième modèle trouve une excellente illustration dans la politique suivie par le gouvernement sur la question de la vie saine, et plus particulièrement dans ses choix en matière de lutte contre l'alcoolisme et l'obésité. Trois instruments ont été privilégiés, l'autolimitation des industries, le partenariat avec ces dernières et les campagnes publiques d'information. Or ce répertoire apparaît dans toutes les enquêtes scientifiques comme le moins efficace, alors que le New Labour se flatte de ne choisir que des solutions qui marchent. Ce paradoxe s'explique notamment par la priorité accordée aux bonnes relations avec le monde de l'économie, principe fondateur du New Labour (Tony Blair), et par la crainte électoraliste d'être accusé de vouloir mettre en place un « État-nounou ». Reproduced by permission of Bibliothèque de Sciences Po

[David Harsanyi] begins his book, \"Nanny State,\" with a libertarian fairy tale that goes like this: Once upon a time, Americans were free. We were allowed to abuse ourselves, take unreasonable risks and offend people. We enjoyed a glorious right \"to be unhealthy, unsafe, immoral, and politically incorrect.\" But along came meddlesome politicians, bureaucrats and activists who put an end to all that. Self-righteous \"wardens of well-being\" mistook free adults for helpless children. Beginning more than 20 years ago with mandatory-seat-belt laws designed \"to save citizens from their own self-destructive stupidity,\" the \"nannies\" next went after our booze and cigarettes. Lately, they have attempted to put the nation on a low-sugar, no-trans-fat, small-portion diet. Americans were never as free as Harsanyi imagines, and we are not now the \"children\" he peevishly fears we have become. Harsanyi finds it \"inexplicable\" that Americans have \"allowed . . . worrywarts\" to be their \"parents.\" It seems to me, however, that Americans have historically accepted what he calls \"overreaching government\" as often as we've rejected it. Certainly measures aimed at improving character or public health and safety are nothing new to American society. To make this book work, it helps to read Harsanyi as a 21st-century John Stuart Mill. In \"On Liberty\" (1859), Mill condemned laws prohibiting gambling, polygamy and the use of drugs and alcohol. The \"only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,\" Mill wrote. \"His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.\" Lacking Mill's philosophical nuance, this is Harsanyi's message, too.