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Does attachment to a nation enhance or dampen support for the European Union (EU)? Using the 2003 and 2013 ISSP national-identity modules, we isolate and provide multi-item measures of two distinct types of national attachment—nationalism and patriotism. We find that they are positively related yet have divergent effects. We validate the measures showing that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, support for nationalistic policies (anti-immigration and protectionism) as expected. We then test the effects of nationalism and patriotism on EU attitudes and find that nationalism increases, and patriotism decreases, opposition to the EU. The presence of a neo-nationalist political party enhanced the effects of nationalism on opposition to the EU, underscoring the importance of political rhetoric in shaping nationalistic EU opposition. In further support of the rhetoric hypothesis, the most-educated nationalists are most likely to oppose the EU in countries with a neo-nationalist political party and vote for such parties when present.

This article proposes a measure of the social structuration of political parties. The measure has some distinctive virtues. It assesses the social bases of partisanship from the standpoint of the political party, and it provides a simple and transparent method for assessing the relative weight of social-structural and behavioral factors for party composition. We illustrate the power of this measure through a comparison of political parties in 30 European countries since 1975.

What motivates parties to change their positions? Earlier studies demonstrate that parties change their position in response to environmental incentives, such as voter shifts. Yet, this work also suggests that parties differ in their responses. What accounts for this variation? We argue and empirically substantiate that differences in party organization explain the divergent responses of parties to environmental incentives. By means of a pooled time-series analysis of 55 parties in 10 European democracies between 1977 and 2003, this study demonstrates how the party organizational balance-of-power between party activists and party leaders conditions the extent to which environmental incentives (mean voter change, party voter change, and office exclusion) drive party-position change. The study’s findings have important implications for our understanding of parties’ electoral strategies as well as for models of representation.

The Scottish Labour Party is at an unprecedented crossroads. Though it had been the leading party in Scotland for fifty years, it has now lost the election and office to the SNP. This book addresses, examines, and analyzes the last thirty years of Scottish Labour, from the arrival of Thatcherism in 1979 to the aftermath of the party's defeat in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. It asks fundamental questions about the nature of Scottish Labour, its dominance of Scottish politics, the wider politics of Scotland, and whether its decline is irreversible. Surveying both contemporary events and recent history, the volume draws on extensive research in archival sources and interviews significant members of Scottish Labour.

Do \"niche\" parties-such as Communist, Green, and extreme nationalist parties-adjust their policies in response to shifts in public opinion? Would such policy responsiveness enhance these parties' electoral support? We report the results of statistical analyses of the relationship between parties' policy positions, voters' policy preferences, and election outcomes in eight Western European democracies from 1976 to 1998 that suggest that the answer to both questions is no. Specifically, we find no evidence that niche parties responded to shifts in public opinion, while mainstream parties displayed consistent tendencies to respond to public opinion shifts. Furthermore, we find that in situations where niche parties moderated their policy positions they were systematically punished at the polls (a result consistent with the hypothesis that such parties represent extreme or noncentrist ideological clienteles), while mainstream parties did not pay similar electoral penalties. Our findings have important implications for political representation, for spatial models of elections, and for political parties' election strategies.

This article inquires into how contemporary populist radical right parties relate to environmental issues of countryside and climate protection, by analyzing relevant discourses of the British National Party (BNP) and the Danish People’s Party (DPP). It does so by looking at party materials along three dimensions: the aesthetic, the symbolic, and the material. The article discusses to what extent the parties’ political stances on environmental issues are conditioned by deeper structures of nationalist ideology and the understandings of nature embedded therein. It illustrates a fundamental difference between the way nationalist actors engage in, on the one hand, the protection of nature as national countryside and landscape, epitomizing the nation’s beauty, harmony and purity over which the people are sovereign. On the other hand, they deny or cast doubt on environmental risks located at a transnational level, such as those that relate to climate. The article argues that this apparent inconsistency is rooted in the ideological tenets of nationalism as the transnational undermines the nationalist ideal of sovereignty.

The electoral rise of unorthodox parties (UOPs) in recent East European elections raises some puzzling questions about electoral dynamics in new democracies. Why did the power alternation of the mid-1990s not result in party-system consolidation, as suggested by some earlier studies, but instead give way to a much more chaotic environment in which established mainstream political parties lost considerable ground to new political formations based on personalist and populist appeals? Why did this reversal in Eastern Europe happen during a period of economic recovery, remarkable Western integration progress, and a broad acceptance of electoral democracy as the only game in town? This article suggests that these electoral dynamics can be explained by focusing on the interaction between protest voting and election sequence. While protest voting to punish unpopular incumbents has been a widespread but understudied practice since the collapse of communism, the beneficiaries of these protest votes have changed in recent elections. Whereas in the first two generations of postcommunist elections, disgruntled voters could opt for untried mainstream alternatives, in third-generation elections (defined as elections taking place after at least two different ideological camps have governed in the postcommunist period) voters had fewer untried mainstream alternatives, and therefore opted in greater number for unorthodox parties. This explanation receives strong empirical support from statistical tests using aggregate data from seventy-six parliamentary elections in fourteen East European countries from 1990 to 2006, survey evidence from twelve postcommunist elections from 1996 to 2004, and a survey experiment in Bulgaria in 2008.

How do nationalistic media affect animosity between ethnic groups? We consider one of Europe's deadliest conflicts since WWII, the Serbo-Croatian conflict We show that, after a decade of peace, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers ethnic hatred toward Serbs in Croatia. Mostly attracted by nonpolitical content, many Croats listen to Serbian public radio (intended for Serbs in Serbia) whenever signal is available. As a result, the vote for extreme nationalist parties is higher and ethnically offensive graffiti are more common in Croatian villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats.

Scholarship on East European politics expects that party competition in the region is determined by various communist legacies, juxtaposing state-centric authoritarianism to a liberal market economy. Recent empirical evidence, however, uncovers significant variance of party competition patterns across East European countries. To explain this variance, this article argues that an interaction between communist institutional framework and partisan responses to ethnic minorities determines party competition structure in the region. While experience with communist federalism determines partisan affinities with ethnic minorities, tolerance or support for ethnic minorities leads the political actors associated with those minorities to general socially liberal positions. Consequently—and contrary to received knowledge—ethnic politics influence the ideological content of party competition and structure party systems in Eastern Europe.

This article introduces a framework for analysing multimodal legitimation. Building upon work on legitimation by Van Leeuwen and Van Dijk, a six-layer framework is proposed. This framework pulls together the main aspects of legitimation – seen as a complex and multifaceted concept and practice – which need to be looked into if we are to fully appreciate its functioning in general or any specific instance of its deployment. Using the proposed framework, a video, produced by the Scottish National Party (SNP) encouraging a ‘Yes’ vote in the Scottish referendum on independence, is analysed.