Explore the vast range of titles available.

Comparative philosophy is an important site for the study of non-Western philosophical traditions, but it has long been associated with “East-West” dialogue. Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies shifts this trajectory to focus on cross-cultural conversations across Asia and Latin America. A team of international contributors discuss subjects ranging from Orientalism in early Latin American studies of Asian thought to liberatory politics in today’s globalized world. They bring together resources including Latin American feminism, Aztec teachings on ethics, Buddhist critiques of essentialism, and Confucian morality. Chapters address topics such as educational reform, the social practices surrounding breastfeeding, martial arts as political resistance, and the construction of race and identity. Together the essays reflect the philosophical diversity of Asia and Latin America while foregrounding their shared concerns on issues of Eurocentrism and coloniality. By bringing these critical perspectives to bear on the theories and methods of cross-cultural philosophy, Comparative Studies in Asian and Latin American Philosophies offers new insights into the nature and practice of philosophical comparison.

The Sāṃkhyakārikā  repeatedly emphasizes that prakṛti  (material nature) and her constituents exist solely for the sake of the puruṣa (the self). And yet, since she is blind, she needs puruṣa  to see her full glory, and he needs to witness her actions to become liberated (21). Gauḍapāda explains their connection in terms of a pitcher filled with hot or cold liquid, which takes on that property, temporarily, through association. This article looks closely at commentarial passages to explore both the nature of their conjunction and codependence ( saṃyoga ), which leads to mistaken identification, as well as the method given in the Sāṃkhyakārikā for their ultimate separation and independence ( kaivalya ) through the practice of negation of the twenty-five true principles ( tattvābhyāsa ), which evolve from this association of puruṣa and prakṛti , comparing this with similar ideas in the Pātañjalayogaśāstra . While these concepts have been examined before, it has generally been from a rationalistic, masculine, and linear viewpoint that reduces prakṛti to mere matter or one that goes to the other extreme, reading later concepts backward and glorifying her as a Tantric goddess. In a world of shifting gender paradigms, this article seeks to re-examine their entanglement through the perspective of prakṛti , to understand how this intimate union is of benefit to her too, and, in turn, what we can learn through understanding the world from this angle.

This paper examines whether Mādhyamikas meditate, or if their insight into reality is purely a theoretical one. While traditional scholarship in India and Tibet is of a single voice in considering Madhyamaka fundamentally a meditative tradition, contemporary interpretations frequently neglect its meditative dimension by getting embroiled in its metaphysical aspects, via the lenses of various western philosophical traditions. This paper attempts to underscore that meditation ( bhāvanā ) is an essential and inseparable component of Madhyamaka discourse and that since Mādhyamikas’ insight into emptiness ( śūnyatā ) is unique, it requires a distinct method of meditative cultivation. This was the unquestioned understanding of Tibetan interpreters. To illustrate the inseparable and symbiotic connection between Madhyamaka philosophy and meditation the paper surveys salient features from the sparsely studied Tibetan genre of dbu ma’i lta khrid (Guides to the Madhyamaka View). Such works by Réndawa (1349–1412), Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), Baso Chökyi Gyeltsen (1402–1473), Shakya Chokden (1428–1507), Jamyang Zhépa (1648–1721), and Ju Mipham (1846–1912) are discussed as they offer specific meditative instructions on how to embody their author’s particular interpretation of Madhyamaka in meditation. The analysis thus brings into relief Madhyamaka phenomenology and attempts to extend the methodology for interpreting this tradition.

This study addresses doctrinal inconsistencies arising from inconsistent statements within Yogācāra literature regarding the cessation or non-cessation of ālayavijñāna upon achieving nirvāṇa . In Yogācārabhūmi , ālayavijñāna is defined as a type of consciousness that supports and conceals itself within the practitioner’s body, serving as a foundational consciousness for the continuity of life during nirodhasamāpatti . As the doctrine evolves, ālayavijñāna is understood as inherently polluted, and it is proposed that arhatship, signifying the eradication of all defilements, leads to its cessation. However, two key doctrinal inconsistencies arise: the first concerns how an arhat, whose ālayavijñāna has ceased, can still possess a living body during nirodhasamāpatti in nirvāṇa with remainder ( sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa ); the second pertains to how jñeyāvaraṇa (the hindrance regarding what is to be known) —which renders the nirvāṇa of arhats and pratyekabuddhas inferior to Buddhahood—can persist while they no longer possess either bodies nor minds in nirvāṇa without remainder ( nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa ) . This study examines these doctrinal challenges by analyzing various Yogācāra texts, including the Yogācārabhūmi , Mahāyānasaṃgraha , Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā , as well as the commentaries of the latter two, and Laṅkāvatārasūtra , offering a comparative analysis of how these texts attempt to resolve the tensions surrounding nirvāṇa and the ontological implications of the cessation of ālayavijñāna .

One of the central concepts in understanding the spiritual goal of Pātañjala Yoga is pratiprasava, which means a process of reversal. Yet disagreements persist over how pratiprasava and kaivalya (liberation) are to be interpreted. Two main lines of interpretation may be identified as the ‘ontological’ and ‘epistemological’ approaches. According to the first interpretation, pratiprasava means the literal dissolution of the empirical world, including one’s physical body and mind. According to the second, it means undoing of the misidentification of puruṣa with prakṛti . I will defend an interpretation that combines aspects of both of these approaches. I suggest that pratiprasava has two sequential stages: the epistemological stage and the ontological stage. In the epistemological stage, pratiprasava is the first stage of freedom ( kaivalya ) from all sorts of physical and mental bondages. This type of freedom is attained when all negative and positive effects of prakṛti’s manifestation no longer affect the yogin while living in this physical body. In the subsequent ontological stage, pratiprasava is final freedom from existence altogether, including the body and mind. Based on this understanding of the two stages of pratiprasava , I will contend that there are correspondingly two types of kaivalya : embodied and disembodied.

The concept of  śīla-pāramitā  (Pali.  sīlapāramī ), “the perfection of morality” is one of a collection of spiritual virtues accomplished by a bodhisattva for achieving Buddhahood. This paper explores the origin and development of  śīla-pāramitā  by tracing its roots from early Buddhist scriptures to its later articulations in the  Cariyāpiṭaka  and early Mahāyāna texts. In early Buddhist texts like the Nikāyas and Āgamas,  śīla  primarily refers to moral discipline, encompassing rules for both laypeople and monastics. The paper then analyzes how  śīla , originally linked to the ethical conduct of monastics and lay followers alike, gradually evolved into a perfection ( pāramitā ) in Mahāyāna Buddhism, acquiring a central role in the Bodhisattva’s cultivation of virtues. In this process, the meaning and scope of  śīla-pāramitā  underwent significant changes. By analyzing these developments, we gain a deeper understanding of the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism and provides valuable insights into its ethical and doctrinal progression.

According to the post-Śaṅkara commentators of Advaita Vedānta—and modern scholars alike—the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta (reflection analogy) is a metaphor/model that illustrates the nature and the relation between the singular brahman and the multitude of jīvas . Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) hermeneutics contests the employment of the dṛṣṭānta as an “explanatory device” on the grounds that it (a) reifies the dṛṣṭānta , and (b) contradicts the basic task of Upaniṣads as a pramāṇa (instrument/ means) to know brahman : that of negation of ignorance. Contrarily, his hermeneutics demonstrates—through a rigorous application of the method of adhyāropa (deliberate superimposition) and apavāda (subsequent retraction)—that within Śaṅkarācārya’s prasthānatrayabhāṣya , the dṛṣṭānta serves ( solely ) to counter the erroneous notion that brahman suffers/transmigrates, and in his Upadeśasāhasrī , it is used to carefully distinguish the Self and not-Self. In both cases, its purpose fulfilled, it stands rescinded. Adhyāropāpavāda has hitherto not been recognized/employed as a method of hermeneutical analysis; it is SSS’ unique and important contribution. In this article, I use the pratibimba-dṛṣṭānta as an exemplar to demonstrate how any—and every—construct of Advaita Vedānta can—and according to SSS, must—be read/analyzed according to the method of adhyāropāpavāda to preclude its reification.

The disagreement between sākārajñānavādin s, followers of the theory that cognitions are endowed with a form, and nirākārajñānavādin s, who advocate the theory of formless cognitions, is one of the central disagreements in Indian epistemology. This study focuses on the heretofore understudied position of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya. The view that can be termed representational realism has been traced by me in all extant classical Sāṃkhya texts. According to these texts, the cognitive subject, be it puruṣa or the intellect ( buddhi ), experiences the object not directly but through the object’s form assumed by the cognitive faculties. The main evidence is found in the Yuktidīpikā . It explicitly states that all cognitive organs — the senses ( buddhīndriya ), manas , ahaṃkāra , and buddhi— sequentially, one after another — take on the form ( ākāra , rūpa ) of the cognitive object; that puruṣa experiences the world through the buddhi ’s forms; and that these forms can only figuratively be ascribed to changeless puruṣa . Also noteworthy is that within Brahmanical darśana s, the Yuktidīpikā is one of the earliest texts that shows familiarity with the nirākāra – sākāra problem; that the Yuktidīpikā mentions the Buddhist opponent’s view that cognitions have the form of their object without trying to refute it; and that this commentary incites the Naiyāyika Bhaṭṭa Jayanta to say that the Sāṃkhya standpoint does not differ much from the sākārajñānavāda of the Buddhists. Though it is hardly possible to definitely identify the Sāṃkhyas as sākāravādin s or nirākāravādin s, their strong inclination towards the sākāravāda is conspicuous. According to Sāṃkhya, the buddhi ’s forms ( ākāra , rūpa ) become conscious cognitions due to the proximity of puruṣa , from which it follows that cognitions are endowed with a form. The postclassical Sāṃkhyasūtra and Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti , which aimed to revive the classical Sāṃkhya system of thought, confirm that the view that cognitions have a form is Sāṃkhyan.

In their respective works, Bhāviveka and Vinītadeva both refute the concepts of ārambha(ka) and the samavāya in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. The idea of ārambha asserts that a new whole is created ( ā-√rabh ) from its parts, namely, the creative elements ( ārambhaka ); but the whole is a simple substance that is distinct from those parts. The relation of inherence ( samavāya ) is introduced to establish a connection between the whole and its parts, indicating that the whole resides in its parts, and the parts serve as inherent causes for the whole (i.e., the effect). Vinītadeva argues that a whole cannot reside within its parts, either in their totality or through one of its aspects, as either case would negate its status as a simple substance. It is worth noting that similar arguments have been documented in the Nyāya-sūtra and its commentaries, and these debates also resonate in the Tattva-saṅgraha - pañjikā . The Naiyāyikas reject Buddhists’ arguments due to their divergent mereological perspective on the nature of a composite whole. The Naiyāyikas argue that using terms like ‘entirety’ or ‘partly’ to describe a unitary entity is semantically incorrect. Bhāviveka’s main arguments are also rooted in the Buddhist viewpoint, asserting that a composite object is nothing but an assemblage of its components and therefore cannot be a real and simple substance. Additionally, he questions the transitivity of parthood in a composite whole. This argument, I propose, reveals a mereological problem within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.