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Why do states form non-aggression pacts? Non-aggression pacts are different from typical alliances because the latter tend to be focused on relationships between members of the alliance and other states, such as by deterring external threats or mediating the resolution of conflicts between an alliance member and a third-party challenger. We offer two contributions that build on existing work. First, we provide a theory that explains why leaders use non-aggression pacts as information mechanisms. Leaders of states that have recently emerged from a rivalry seek to overcome an important information asymmetry: they know the probability of future conflict among the former rivals has decreased, but other actors may fear a resumption of hostilities. Such leaders use non-aggression pacts to signal that the rivalry has truly ended and that future relations are likely to remain peaceful. Second, our analysis recognizes the often multilateral nature of the non-aggression pact formation process. We use the 'k'-adic statistical procedure to model non-aggression pact formation as a multilateral process. To operationalize recent rivalry cessation within a group, we use a network analytic density measure. Consistent with our theory, we find that groups of states with greater densities of recently ended rivalries are significantly more likely to form non-aggression pacts. These results hold across a series of model specifications.

The Berlin crisis, the Suez intervention, the Cyprus problem, and other differences among the NATO powers have tended to weaken the alliance in the face of constant Soviet pressure. Emphasizing the 1960's, a group of experts here examines the future of NATO and American security: military strategy for limited and large scale war, the problem of deterrence, nuclear sharing, surprise attack and disarmament, the special positions of England and Germany, and alternatives to NATO. The contributors are: Klaus Knorr, Roger Hilsman, C. E. Black, F. J. Yeager, G. W. Rathjens Jr., Malcolm Hoag, M. A. Kaplan, A. L. Burns, T. C. Schelling-, Denis Healey, G. A. Craig, and P. H. Nitze. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assesses the Iran-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Pact of 1959

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency expects Soviet influence and pressures to push Iran further toward the United States; Iran possible termination of talks regarding Iran-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Pact of 1959 and signing agreement with United States would intensify Soviet Union pressure according to assessment by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency surmises that military Takeovers of Iran. Imperial Government would result in either continued pro-Western stance or Neutrality; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency suspects Mohammad Reza Pahlavi may be unlikely to maintain Political power in the long term; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency believes Mohammad Reza Pahlavi should be able to maintain his position in the short term

Walt W. Rostow recommends that the U.S. assert that the presence of Western armed forces in Berlin is non-negotiable, and that an agreement based on the Four Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin Report of 23 April 1959. Solution C be discussed with the Soviets followed by Western summit meetings to review progress on a Berlin and German settlement as well as the possibility of Non-aggression treaties between the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Pact]

James M. Gavin is asked to clarify the misconceptions held by Charles de Gaulle about the United States Proposed Five Point Plan (March 1962) including the U.S. position on [Nuclear non-proliferation; Western proposed Mixed German Committee] and Non-aggression treaties between the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Pact]

Andrei A. Gromyko presents proposals for a Berlin settlement including Non-aggression treaties between the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Pact] and recognition of the existing Germany (Democratic Republic)-Germany (Federal Republic) Border; Andrei A. Gromyko hands a memorandum to Dean Rusk outlining the general \"principles\" for a Berlin settlement by declaring it to be a demilitarized city under the Free city proposal and terminating western Occupation rights as well as ensuring Access to West Berlin under the aegis of the Proposed International Access Authority

United States Intelligence Board subcommittee on the Berlin situation concludes that the removal of the deadline for signing the Soviet proposed peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic indicates that the Soviets are willing to discuss Soviet negotiating positions and that an agreement on the Status of West Berlin is not contingent on Non-aggression treaties between the [Warsaw Pact; North Atlantic Treaty Organization]

Nikita S. Khrushchev writes to John F. Kennedy outlining a proposal to terminate western Occupation rights in West Berlin and substituting the Western armed forces with forces under the supervision of the United Nations; Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts that a Berlin settlement along the lines of the Free city proposal can be followed by a peaceful settlement of the German problem including defining the Germany (Democratic Republic)-Germany (Federal Republic) Border and Recognition of the German Democratic Republic as well as concluding Non-aggression treaties between the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Warsaw Pact]