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11 result(s) for "Nonexistent objects (Philosophy)"
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Objects and Pseudo-Objects
The development of science, logic, mathematics, and psychology in the 19th century made it necessary to introduce a growing number of new entities, of which classical empiricism and strong extensionalism were unable to give a wholly satisfying account. One of the major issues confronting the 20th century philosophers was to identify which of these entities should be rationally accepted as part of the furniture of the world and which should not, and to provide a general account of how the latter are nevertheless subject to true predication. The 13 original essays collected in this volume explore some of the main approaches to this issue in the 20th century, including Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Carnap, Frege, Twardowski, Kotarbinski, Nicolai Hartmann, and realist phenomenologists.
Reburial of nonexistents : reconsidering the Meinong-Russell debate
Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent \"facts\" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them. The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims - one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities.
Carrying wet laundry and starting fires
Carrying Wet Laundry & Starting Fires is a compilation of disparate writings which discuss the actualization of meaning in initial contexts of non-meaning as it relates to specific examples of contemporary visual art. Specifically, the writings address my ongoing production of nameless objects which require a rhetoric to further their critically ambiguous nature. This thesis advocates a discursive method of collecting and assessing information, not only in the example of the nameless objects, but in the structure of the paper itself. The structure consists of a juxtaposition of theoretical concepts, artist statements, and descriptions of visual work. Each section presents a text which discusses a form of de-stabilization, primarily in that of established structures of meaning and language. As a collection, the writings compose a subtext, indicating a method of communication through various resources and unconventional means. Their variety and multiplicity trace countless different \"informations\" which similarly surround us in the search for meaning. Key arguments are posed to what we, as a society, have articulated as meaningful and logical. Examples from semiotics, reception theory, post-structuralist thought, psychoanalysis, and Surrealism inform the discussion. Furthermore, the descriptions of the nameless objects and artist statements provide verbal illustrations of an ongoing artistic practice. In so doing, Carrying Wet Laundry & Starting Fires presents the potential for addressing the ineffable in visual art without drawing succinct conclusions, but considering the importance of a dialogue among its various components.
Ern Malley's Namesake
ERNST MALLY was an Austrian philosopher who, early in this century, helped to develop Alexius Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects. Ernest Malley, better known as Ern, was a nonexistent object. The coincidence of names, if coincidence it be, strains credulity.
Nonexistent Objects and Their Semantic and Ontological Dependence on Referential Acts
This paper argues for a distinction between fictional characters, as parts of intentionally created abstract artifacts, and intentional objects, as nonexistent objects generated by referential acts that fail to refer. It argues that intentional objects as the nonexistent objects of imagination and other objectual attitudes are well-reflected in natural language, though in a highly restricted way, reflecting their ontological dependence on referential acts. The paper elaborates how that ontological dependence can be understood.
Negative Properties—Negative Objects?
This paper starts with the presentation of an Aristotelian theory of negative properties. Against this backdrop, it then asks whether there could be objects that have solely negative properties, i.e., completely negative objects. This possibility is entertained by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The notion of a completely negative object is compared to the concepts of a nonexistent object, a nonconcrete (abstract) object, and a nonactual (merely possible) object. Ultimately, it is argued that there can be no completely negative objects, because all negative properties entail some positive properties.
Światy możliwe i inne przedmioty nieistniejące
The subject of the paper is the ontological status of actual and non-actual worlds. According to one version of contemporary Meinongianism, while the actual world exists, merely possible and impossible worlds are nonexistent objects. Moreover, they do not have any other form of being.The aim of the paper is to indicate some problematic consequences of this kind of Meinongianism, and to sketch an alternative view, which is based on ontological pluralism—the view according to which there are many kinds of being.