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This paper holds that Laozi’s philosophy on softness is a topic that remains to be fully discussed. By distinguishing between the meanings of softness and weakness, this paper discusses how Wang Bi semantically integrated the two, presenting them as methods to attain the Dao. In this paper, the differences in Wang Bi’s usage of “柔弱” (softness and weakness) and “柔顺” (softness and compliance) in his annotations on the Daodejing and Yijing are noted, emphasizing the logical support and rational explanation that Wang Bi provided for the external behaviors of gentleness described in the hexagram lines. Wang Bi reconciled the contradictions between Confucian and Daoist views on valuing gentleness and balancing Yin–Yang. In the text, he elaborates on gentleness as both a personal moral requirement and a method of social governance, addressing the real-world issues of his time and thus greatly enhancing the practicality of Laozi’s philosophy of valuing softness.

This study examines the Laozi Zhigui—a key text of Han dynasty Huang-Lao thought—and reconstructs the categorical status of qi to reassess received primordial qi-centered cosmological interpretations and clarify the text’s distinctive worldview. The Laozi Zhigui explains the relation between Dao and the myriad entities through four stages of wu (nothingness)—Dao, De, Spirit-Illumination, and Great Harmony—and previous studies, working within inherited qi-centered cosmological frameworks, have generally assimilated these stages to qi. A contextual reading of key passages on cosmology, mind–nature, and self-cultivation clarifies that in the Laozi Zhigui, qi does not belong to the same ontological category as these four stages of wu. Instead, it functions as a mediating substance through which the order of wu is carried over into you (somethingness). Furthermore, the four stages of wu are likewise not as the internal differentiation of qi but as a non-substantialist account of the “generation of order.” On this basis, the worldview of the Laozi Zhigui can be reconstructed as a triadic schema of wu–qi–you (nothingness–qi–somethingness), which yields a distinctive model of qi cosmology that, unlike Han dynasty primordial qi-centered accounts, does not presuppose the generation and fission of a single primordial qi.

This paper focuses on a convergence of late Bion's (1970) and late Winnicott's (1969a, b) discovery and technique. Both authors describe a special state of mind which adds formlessness, un-differentiation to regression as a major mechanism of psychic change. Bion describes this state mainly in the analyst, while Winnicott focuses on this state of mind in the patient. The combination of both approaches brings us in contact with an essential phenomenon of psychoanalysis which seems difficult to reach and contain without the psychoanalytic frame and in which both analyst and patient play a complementary role.

The character “即 (jí)” in Chinese shares the meaning of “is”, indicating an identity or equivalence between two concepts. In this framework, one might expect the antecedent and the consequent of “即” to be identical in meaning, or at least for a term with a positive connotation not to be paired with one of negative connotation. However, in Tiantai Buddhism, many core propositions follow the structure “x 即 y”, where x is negative and y is positive, or vice versa. This suggests an identity between opposites, creating a paradoxical feature in the system. This essay argues that the paradox within Tiantai Buddhism is a veridical paradox, as defined by Quine, meaning it can be resolved in various ways and does not reflect a genuine contradiction in reality. While Western Buddhist philosophers and logicians have focused primarily on the paradoxes in Nāgārjuna’s thought, this essay demonstrates that Chinese Tiantai Buddhism offers practical resolutions to these paradoxes. The paper first explicates the paradox by examining its roots in Buddhist history, then explores responses to it. Finally, different methods for resolving the paradox are compared and evaluated.

The technique of transforming symptom's symbol into emptiness (TSSE) is a new mind–body treatment method proposed by Tianjun Liu in 2008. It integrates Qigong and concrete object‐image thinking rooted in traditional Chinese culture into modern psychotherapy and proposes that mental and physical problems can be alleviated or eliminated in the process of movement. Accordingly, the therapist needs to guide the client with various symptoms to psychological nothingness where the client cannot see or feel these symptoms, and the purpose of healing can be achieved through the experience of emptiness. TSSE is divided into static and dynamic operations and consists of 10 steps. The static operation includes trio relaxation exercises (the body, breath, and mind), identifying the target symptom, visualizing the target symptom as an object‐image, visualizing a symbolic carrier, and filling out record sheet A. The dynamic operation includes trio relaxation exercises again, moving the symbolic object into the carrier, moving the carrier with the symbolic object into psychological nothingness, moving back and assessment, and filling out record sheet B. The effectiveness of TSSE can be evaluated by the therapist's judgment based on the client's performance and by the difference between the symptom impact scores recorded in sheets A and B. TSSE has been proven to be an effective psychosomatic treatment solution by some empirical studies conducted in China. Future research can combine other technologies, such as fMRI and fNIRS, to further explore the potential effective mechanisms of TSSE.

Jizang (549–623) is regarded as a prominent figure in Sanlun Buddhism (三論宗) and a revitalizer of Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka tradition in China. In this essay, I argue that Jizang’s concept of non-empty Buddha-nature is compatible with the idea of universal emptiness. My argument unfolds in three steps. First, I argue that, for Jizang, Buddha-nature is the Middle Way (zhongdao 中道), which signifies a spiritual state that avoids the extremes of both emptiness and non-emptiness. Next, I explore how and why Jizang believes that Buddha-nature is eternal. I examine Jizang’s notions of intrinsic eternality (dingxing chang 定性常) and conditional eternality (yinyuan chang 因緣常), aiming to demonstrate that his understanding of Buddha-nature as eternal can be framed within the concept of conditional eternality, where Buddha-nature is seen as the objective manifestation of the dharma body. Since this type of eternality aligns with the principle of universal emptiness, Jizang’s assertion that Buddha-nature is eternal is thus compatible with the notion of universal emptiness. Furthermore, I illustrate that Jizang’s theory of eternal Buddha-nature carries practical implications, suggesting that this assertion serves as encouragement rather than being merely an ontological claim.

Roman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness.

I describe a distinctive kind of fear that is generated by a vivid recognition of one’s mortal nature. I name it ‘existential shock’. This special fear does not take our future annihilation as any kind of harm, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. One puzzling feature of existential shock is that it is experienced as disclosing an important truth, yet attempts to specify this revelatory content bring us back to familiar facts about one’s inevitable death. But how can I discover something that I already knew? I argue that in our everyday lives, we are in the grip of deeply entrenched patterns of thought and feeling that prevent the knowledge of our mortality from being fully assimilated. Rather, we merely ‘pay lip service’ to the facts of our mortality. I propose that existential shock involves a distinctive mode of presentation of oneself as a mortal being, in a way that cuts through subtle layers of denial that govern our lives. I develop this thesis by utilizing and synthesizing ideas from several traditions, including the work of Samuel Scheffler, Mark Johnston, Martin Heidegger, and Jay L. Garfield.

The concepts of emptiness and nothingness are extremely important in Eastern as well as Western spiritual traditions. In East Asia, they are relevant in Daoism, Confucianism (in the context of integrating Daoist ideas) and Buddhism (in Śūnyatā), while in the European Christian discourse they are significant in the context of creatio ex nihilo, kenotic theories, individual self-emptying out of humility and Nihilianism. These concepts have formed and continue to form the basis of important intercultural interactions, influencing philosophical and scholarly discourse in both the “East” and “West” to the present day. This article compares the perception of emptiness/nothingness from two representatives of Protestantism: the Korean Christian philosopher Ryu Yongmo (1890–1981, pen name Tasŏk) and the Moravian missionary Isaac Jacob Schmidt (1779–1847), who was a pioneer of Buddhist studies in Europe. A comparison between Schmidt and Tasŏk is important, because tracing the evolution of the worldview of both thinkers reveals a great similarity in how they reconciled the spiritual heritage of Asia with the principles of Western Protestant Christianity despite their different backgrounds. It also could shed new light on the possibility of dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism, especially in the context of two major philosophical systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, which were once so important in East Asia. In addition, it is exactly the interpretation of emptiness/nothingness that forms the cornerstone of the analogy of the religious–philosophical ideas of the two thinkers compared in the article.