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Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought new actors to the political arena. One of those which has attracted considerable attention in academic research is civil society or NGOs. Claudia Kissling addresses the topic of civil society participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The regime qualifies well for this objective since it features, given its characteristics as a treaty regime in the international security field, notable legal avenues for civil society participation. The study takes on a twofold perspective. It addresses the empirical question of whether civil society can contribute to the evolution of regimes in the security field, especially when it comes to security cooperation. It also questions whether civil society can, under certain conditions, contribute to the democratic quality of international decision-making. Here, empirical findings are used in order to test normative political theories on the legitimacy and democracy of global institutions.

In \"Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint,\" Gene Gerzhoy argues that the Lyndon Johnson administration used brute, coercive threats to obtain West Germany's signature to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). In particular, Gerzhoy asserts that in February 1968 the Johnson administration threatened to abandon West Germany militarily if it did not sign the NPT and, moreover, that these threats were instrumental in prodding German leaders toward accepting the treaty. Three pieces of evidence, however, show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the historical record.

From when it was reaccepted into the international community in the early 1990s, South Africa has made significant contributions towards the construction of new international regimes governing states’ interaction globally. South Africa’s global and regional governance advocacy for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ), the Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA), as well as other related nuclear disarmament conventions, remain notable. This article makes two claims: First, it accounts for the evolution of South Africa’s soft power by arguing that achievements such as the unprecedented and voluntary dismantling of its nuclear warheads inspired the Republic’s new international image as a global norm entrepreneur. More importantly, the study submits that South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy has evolved through two overlapping stages of norm promotion towards the establishment of regional/global multilateral frameworks and institutions on nuclear disarmament and niche construction in the global nuclear industry. The wider significance of South Africa’s participation in nuclear geopolitics is the attraction the country gains from international respect, recognition, acceptance, and legitimacy, both regionally and globally. A major conclusion reached is that the moral authority and middle power status that Pretoria enjoy internationally are partly attributed to its unique commitment to the global nuclear denuclearization regime.

The achievement of past international treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions showed that unpropitious political situations for dealing with the effects of problematic weapons could be transformed into concrete, legally binding actions through humanitarian-inspired initiatives. Although there is now renewed concern about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, some policy makers dispute the relevance of these past processes. This article examines how and why cluster munitions became widely reframed as unacceptable weapons, and the nature and significance of functional similarities with contemporary efforts of civil society activists to instigate humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and promote the logic of a ban treaty in view of its norm-setting value among states. In the case of cluster munitions, the weapon in question was signified as unacceptable in moral and humanitarian law terms because of its pattern of harm to civilians with reference to demonstrable evidence of the consequences of use. Ideational reframing was instigated by civil society actors, and introduced doubts into the minds of some policy-makers about weapons they had previously considered as unproblematic. This is relevant to the current discourse on managing and eliminating nuclear weapons in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which there is dissonance between the rhetoric of those states claiming to be responsible humanitarian powers and their continued dependence on nuclear weapons despite questions about the utility or acceptability of these arms.

Does the extent or lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament affect the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Commentators have long asserted both positive and negative responses to this question as if the answer were self-evident. Given that opposite positions have been advanced with equal conviction, a more systematic analysis is required. This analysis begins by attempting to identify all of the potential arguments that can be made both for and against the hypothesis of a disarmament-nonproliferation linkage. The arguments are grouped in terms of five broader sets of explanatory factors: security, institutions, norms, domestic politics, and psychology. This approach clarifies the various causal microfoundations that could underpin different arguments in the debate as well as the types of empirical tests that would be most relevant for evaluating the \"linkage hypothesis.\" Comparative assessment of the arguments on both sides suggests that signs of commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states will tend to enhance support for nonproliferation. Because of the multitude of other factors that affect state decisionmaking, however, progress on disarmament will not by itself address all of the challenges to making the nonproliferation regime effective.

Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.

Assessing its coercive diplomacy in retrospect, the United States should deal with the North Korean nuclear issue with a more sophisticated combination of coercive measures and positive inducements to overcome past failures. Simultaneously, based on an analysis of current challenges and opportunities, the United States should consider this nuclear agenda within its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) with a long-term regional vision. The active engagement of the United States in the North Korean nuclear issue can create opportunities for cooperation with China or provide the United States with the strategic means to influence China. In addition, the US–ROK alliance and US–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation could be a driving force in resolving the nuclear agenda of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and support the IPS of the United States. Ultimately, the linkage between the US' coercive approach to the DPRK and its IPS could help prevent regional tension and the possible demise of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which is threatened by North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

Since 1969 the Non-proliferation Treaty has been a key instrument in stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation. It has facilitated co-operation among its signatories, and has institutionalised the norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. The three pillars of the treaty, which provide its stability and are responsible for its endurance, are the commitment by nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament and by non-nuclear weapons states to abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons and the right of all countries to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. The United States and New Zealand have always been strong supporters of this regime.

India's nuclear test in May 1974 created a predicament for US nuclear diplomacy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's immediate response was low-key, but he became worried about the spread of nuclear capabilities to the 'next country'. Abandoning his previously dismissive stance toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Kissinger concluded that Washington had to work with allies and even cold-war adversaries to check proliferation. He approved a number of initiatives, one of which was to co-ordinate the nuclear-export policies of major states, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. To make that possible, during 1974-5, Kissinger supported a complex diplomatic effort to create what became a major institution in the non-proliferation regime, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), and a set of guidelines for regulating the export of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2017, has been met with mixed reactions. While supporters have described the Treaty as a watershed in the struggle for disarmament, others have expressed fervent opposition. One of the most serious charges levelled at the TPNW is that it will undermine the long-standing nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by many regarded as a cornerstone of the international security architecture. Critics have contended that the new agreement risks eroding the system of safeguards designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, derailing disarmament efforts within the NPT framework, and aggravating political division between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Investigating the legal and political cogency of these arguments, we argue that not only may the TPNW be reconciled with existing legal instruments, the new Treaty supports and reinforces key norms and institutions on which the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is based. Furthermore, any technical challenges that might arise in the future may be addressed at meetings of states party; the drafters envisioned a dynamic process of institutional adaptations and expansion. The main challenge facing advocates of the Treaty is political: convincing the nuclear-armed states to disarm.