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result(s) for
"Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty"
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Banning the bang or the bomb? : negotiating the nuclear test ban regime
\"The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated between 1994 and 1996, is the latest development in the nuclear arms control regime. It continues to serve a vital role in preserving the privileged status of the nuclear weapons states and barring the way to proliferation. Banning the Bang or the Bomb? brings together a team of leading international experts who together analyse its negotiation as a model of regime creation, examining collective dynamics, the behaviour of individual countries, and the nature of specific issues. The book offers practical guidance and training for members of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization future inspectorate to help negotiate their way during an on-site inspection (OSI) in an inspected state. This is a valuable resource for researchers and professionals alike that turns an analysis of what has happened into a manual for what is about to happen\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.
Journal Article
Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation
When and why do states transfer nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge to other states for peaceful purposes? This question is important given the recent finding that countries receiving nuclear aid are more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. I argue that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationship with these countries (if the supplier is also a democracy). I test these arguments using statistical analysis and a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000. The findings offer robust empirical support for my argument and very little support for the competing explanation rooted in norms and nonproliferation. This article enhances scholarly understanding of how and why nuclear weapons spread and encourages further research on the supply side of nuclear proliferation. It also has broad implications for the literatures on norms and international cooperation.
Journal Article
State behavior and the nuclear nonproliferation regime
\"This is an edited collection of essays that asks--and attempts to answer--a series of questions about global efforts of nuclear nonproliferation. Though there is almost universal membership in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), why is there reluctance on the part of some countries to support measures to strengthen the regime through other means Various tools and instruments used to bolster the NPT--such as sanctions on resistant states, robust export controls, and anti-smuggling efforts--are resisted by some states, who often simultaneously argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread of its technology is undesirable. Indeed, many member states pursue policies that are directly counterproductive to strengthening the NPT. For example, the United States has signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India, a nuclear weapons-producing country that has not signed the NPT\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons: Past Scholarly Successes, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Research Opportunities
Scholars interested in researching nuclear security are increasingly expressing the fear that the \"important questions\" have already been answered. At the same time, recent studies highlight the potential for major limitations on the ability to conduct casual inference on nuclear proliferation in particular, suggesting perhaps that we know much less than was previously believed. Although recognizing these challenges, this article argues that there remain ample opportunities to conduct innovative scholarship on questions of nuclear security. New nuclear challenges bring fresh opportunities for the next generation of research on topics including limited nuclear war; nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, emerging technology, weapons proliferation and strategic stability; nuclear modernization and arms races; and many other issues. More precise theory, new data, and improved methods of inference also allow researchers to revisit and possibly resolve persistent debates. Although the problems confronting research on nuclear security are serious, they can be addressed. In sum, the questions in this field are so consequential that they deserve the best available analytical attention, even if the resulting answers are not perfect.
Journal Article
Disaggregating Noncompliance: Abstention versus Predation in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Why do states make disingenuous treaty commitments? Under what conditions will countries refrain from entering cooperative agreements with which they do not expect to comply? This article addresses these questions by analyzing how states that are pursuing nuclear weapons treat the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The authors develop a distinction between two types of noncooperative behavior. The first is cheating while part of the NPT (predation) and the second is pursuing nuclear weapons outside of the treaty (abstention). The authors' argument is that democratic proliferators are more likely to abstain because executives in democracies are domestically constrained to a greater degree than authoritarian leaders. Statistical tests in a sample of all countries with active nuclear weapons programs from 1968 to 2004 provide evidence in favor of our argument. Controlling for confounding variables and the factors that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, the results show that states with greater constraints on executive authority are less likely to choose predation. Yet, electoral mandates do not appear to dissuade governments from making disingenuous treaty commitments. These findings have important implications for nuclear proliferation, the credibility of international commitments, and efforts to link domestic political institutions with international outcomes.
Journal Article
Deutschland, die nukleare Abrüstung und der Atomwaffenverbotsvertrag
Durch die kategorische Ablehnung des Vertrags über das Verbot von Atomwaffen (Atomwaffenverbotsvertrag, AVV) vergibt Deutschland Chancen, nukleare Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle voranzubringen. Deutschland lehnt den AVV aus sicherheitspolitischen Gründen ab. Das Abkommen stehe im Widerspruch zur nuklearen Abschreckung durch die NATO. Rüstungskontrollpolitische Positionierungen der Bundesregierungen gegenüber dem AVV haben sich im Laufe der letzten zehn Jahre verändert. Insbesondere die Rüstungskontrolle bietet Räume für eine konstruktive Auseinandersetzung Deutschlands mit dem AVV. Eine offenere Position der NATO, eine gemeinsame Position der EU und eine proaktive Politik von Gruppen gleichgesinnter Staaten gegenüber dem AVV wären wichtig, um bei Fragen der Verifikation, der nuklearen Risikoreduzierung und einer Stärkung des humanitären Völkerrechts in der nuklearen Ordnung Fortschritte zu erreichen. International ist eine Teilnahme Deutschland an Treffen der AVV-Vertragsstaaten wichtig. Innenpolitisch wäre ein ergebnisoffener, inklusiver Dialog über die Folgen von Atomwaffen für die deutsche und internationale Sicherheit, etwa in einer Enquête-Kommission des Deutschen Bundestags, zielführend.
In categorically rejecting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), Germany is forfeiting opportunities to advance nuclear disarmament and arms control. Germany is opposed to the TPNW based on security policy concerns. The treaty is at odds with NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. Arms control policy positions of the Federal Government vis-à-vis the TPNW have changed over the decade. Arms control in particular offers some room for Germany to engage constructively with the TPNW. A more open position by NATO, a common position by the EU, and a proactive policy by groups of like-minded states towards the TPNW would be important to achieve progress on questions regarding verification, nuclear risk reduction, and on strengthening international humanitarian law in the nuclear order. Internationally, German participation in TPNW meetings of states parties is important. Domestically, an open-ended, inclusive dialogue on the consequences of nuclear weapons for German and international security, possibly within an Enquête Commission of the German Bundestag would be conducive to constructive engagement.
Journal Article
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
Reports on U.S. and other countries' compliance with bilateral and international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements.
Government Document
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
Reports on U.S. and other countries' compliance with international and bilateral arms control and nonproliferation agreements.
Government Document