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"Nuclear arms control Soviet Union History."
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The Control Agenda
2018
The Control Agenda is a sweeping account of the history
of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), their rise in the
Nixon and Ford administrations, their downfall under President
Carter, and their powerful legacies in the Reagan years and
beyond.
Matthew Ambrose pays close attention to the interplay of
diplomacy, domestic politics, and technology, and finds that the
SALT process was a key point of reference for arguments regarding
all forms of Cold War decision making. Ambrose argues elite U.S.
decision makers used SALT to better manage their restive domestic
populations and to exert greater control over the shape, structure,
and direction of their nuclear arsenals.
Ambrose also asserts that prolonged engagement with arms control
issues introduced dynamic effects into nuclear policy. Arms control
considerations came to influence most areas of defense decision
making, while the measure of stability SALT provided allowed the
examination of new and potentially dangerous nuclear doctrines.
The Control Agenda makes clear that verification and
compliance concerns by the United States prompted continuous
reassessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions; assessments
that later undergirded key U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet
Union. Through SALT's many twists and turns, accusations and
countercharges, secret backchannels and propaganda campaigns the
specter of nuclear conflict loomed large.
Containing Russia's nuclear firebirds : harmony and change at the International Science and Technology Center
Schweitzer examines the impact and effectiveness of the ISTC and emphasizes opportunites for the internal community to draw on its legacy.
Unraveling the Gray Area Problem
2023
In Unraveling the Gray Area
Problem , Luke Griffith examines the US role
in why the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty took
almost a decade to negotiate and then failed in just thirty
years. The INF Treaty enhanced Western security by
prohibiting US and Russian ground-based missiles with maximum
ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Significantly, it eliminated
hundreds of Soviet SS-20 missiles, which could annihilate targets
throughout Eurasia in minutes. Through close scrutiny of US theater
nuclear policy from 1977 to 1987, Griffith describes the Carter
administration's masterminding of the dual-track decision of
December 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
initiative that led to the INF Treaty. The Reagan administration,
in turn, overcame bureaucratic infighting, Soviet intransigence,
and political obstacles at home and abroad to achieve a
satisfactory outcome in the INF negotiations.
Disagreements between the US and Russia undermined the INF
Treaty and led to its dissolution in 2019. Meanwhile, the US is
developing a new generation of ground-based, INF-type missiles that
will have an operational value on the battlefield. Griffith urges
policymakers to consider the utility of INF-type missiles in new
arms control negotiations. Understanding the scope and consistency
of US arms control policy across the Carter and Reagan
administrations offers important lessons for policymakers in the
twenty-first century.
Fallout : conspiracy, cover-up, and the deceitful case for the atomic bomb
\"The justification for the atomic bomb was simple: it would defeat Hitler and end the Second World War faster, saving lives. The reality was different. [This book] dismantles the conventional story of why the atom bomb was built. Peter Watson has found new documents showing that long before the Allied bomb was operational, it was clear that Germany had no atomic weapons of its own and was not likely to. The British knew this, but didn't share their knowledge with the Americans, who in turn deceived the British about the extent to which the Soviets had penetrated their plans to build and deploy the bomb. The dark secret was that the bomb was dropped not to decisively end the war in the Pacific but to warn off Stalin's Russia, still in principle a military ally of the US and Britain. It did not bring a hot war to an abrupt end; instead it set up the terms for a Cold one to begin. Moreover, none of the scientists recruited to build the bomb had any idea that the purpose of the bomb had been secretly changed and that Russian deterrence was its new objective. Fallout vividly reveals the story of the unnecessary building of the atomic bomb, the most destructive weapon in the world, and the long-term consequences that are still playing out to this day.\"--Dust jacket.
The last battle of the Cold War : an inside account of negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
by
Glitman, Maynard W.
,
Burns, William F.
in
1987 Dec. 8
,
History
,
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles
2006
A fascinating, first-hand account of the bureaucratic and public struggles that lead to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, Glitman focuses on debates among American negotiators and between them and the Europeans and Soviets. This is an important look at policy making and negotiations all the more relevant in an age of proliferation.
Euromissiles
2022
In Euromissile
s, Susan Colbourn tells the story of the height of nuclear
crisis and the remarkable waning of the fear that gripped the
globe. In the Cold War conflict that pitted nuclear
superpowers against one another, Europe was the principal
battleground. Washington and Moscow had troops on the ground and
missiles in the fields of their respective allies, the NATO nations
and the states of the Warsaw Pact. Euromissiles-intermediate-range
nuclear weapons to be used exclusively in the regional theater of
war-highlighted how the peoples of Europe were dangerously placed
between hammer and anvil. That made European leaders uncomfortable
and pushed fearful masses into the streets demanding peace in their
time. At the center of the story is NATO. Colbourn highlights the
weakness of the alliance seen by many as the most effective bulwark
against Soviet aggression. Divided among themselves and uncertain
about the depth of US support, the member states were riven by the
missile issue. This strategic crisis was, as much as any summit
meeting between US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet general
secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the hinge on which the Cold War
turned. Euromissiles is a history of diplomacy and
alliances, social movements and strategy, nuclear weapons and
nagging fears, and politics. To tell that history, Colbourn takes a
long view of the strategic crisis-from the emerging dilemmas of
allied defense in the early 1950s through the aftermath of the INF
Treaty thirty-five years later. The result is a dramatic and
sweeping tale that changes the way we think about the Cold War and
its culmination.
Competitive Arms Control
by
JOHN D. MAURER
in
American Studies
,
Arms control -- Soviet Union -- History
,
Arms control -- United States -- History
2022
The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did
Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic
nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most
successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly
opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central
purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel
nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just
international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative
motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped
negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with
proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent
rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American
leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms
control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to
sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail
in the Cold War.
To Kill Nations
2015
\"Edward Kaplan's To Kill Nations is a
fascinating work that packs a thermonuclear punch of ideas and
arguments... The work is suitable for anyone from advanced
undergraduates to experts in the field.\" ― Strategy
Bridge
In To Kill Nations , Edward Kaplan
traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation
for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period
(1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability,
accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made
American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined
air-atomic strategy.
Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and
preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the
process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about
MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between
generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold
institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also
offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy
to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military
power even in an era of ballistic missiles.
Emergency War Plan
2021
emEmergency War Plan/em examines the theory and practice of American nuclear deterrence and its evolution during the Cold War. Previous examinations of nuclear strategy during this time have, for the most part, categorized American efforts as \"massive retaliation\" and \"mutually assured destruction,\" blunt instruments to be casually dismissed in favor of more flexible approaches or summed up in inflammatory and judgmental terms like \"MAD.\" These descriptors evolved into slogans, and any nuanced discussion of the efficacy of the actual strategies withered due to a variety of political and social factors. Drawing on newly released weapons effects information along with new information about Soviet capabilities as well as risky and covert espionage missions, emEmergency War Plan/em provides a completely new examination of American nuclear deterrence strategy during the first fifteen years of the Cold War, the first such study since the 1980s. Ultimately what emerges is a picture of a gargantuan and potentially devastating enterprise that was understood at the time by the public in only the vaguest terms but that was not as out of control as has been alleged and was more nuanced than previously understood.