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6,211 result(s) for "Nuclear deterrence"
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RUSSO-AMERICAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
This article considers whether the temporarily iced New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) can continue to serve as a fulcrum for the renewal of Russo-American strategic nuclear arms control. Going forward, the political and military-technical challenges to rebooting the New START and/or leapfrogging over it are formidable but not insurmountable. The article first considers the existing status of New START and both Russian and American strategic nuclear forces. Second, it discusses the fivefold context of challenges that face decisionmakers and negotiators in Washington and Moscow, and, although unlikely, Beijing. Third, the article analyzes the adequacy of New START-compatible forces to provide for surety in deterrence, crisis, and arms race stability, allowing for various levels of performance under exigent conditions.
India and nuclear Asia : forces, doctrine, and dangers
India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country's nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. This book will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Joshi and O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The book argues that doctrinal and posturing developments in India, China, and Pakistan are elevating inadvertent and accidental escalation risks. As nuclear South Asia continues to attract global concern, this book provides an indispensable and timely guide to its challenges and offers potential solutions to them. Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of India's international relations and security as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences outside of India.
TEN PROPOSITIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE
All progress toward a more peaceful, nuclear-free world made both during and since the Cold War seems to be receding. The United States is returning to a strategic situation not seen since the 1950s, and yet one that is also far more complex. The need to understand nuclear weapons and their deterrent value has never been higher. Given this era of unbalanced nuclear multipolarity, ten propositions can help guide leaders, strategists, and planners as they establish and execute policy overseeing the most important deterrent effort of humankind, that of nuclear war.
Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation
As Iran continues its apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons breakout capability and North Korea resists efforts to roll back its proliferation, policy makers in Washington eager to prevent further proliferation in both regions regard security guarantees to allies as crucial tools. But recent scholarship calls into question whether security guarantees ameliorate proliferation risks. Relying on a combination of large-N quantitative analysis and a case study of South Korea from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, this article argues that, consistent with policy makers' conventional wisdom, security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.
France’s Nuclear Defence Strategy towards the Prospects for European Nuclear Deterrence
The crisis of multilateralism and the growing strategic and military rivalry between superpowers is changing the stability and balance of forces in the world. The war in Ukraine has put nuclear weapons and their role in Europe’s defence back at the centre of the security debate. To maintain its international position and effectively protect its interests, France cannot afford to weaken its main asset – nuclear deterrence forces. That is why President Emmanuel Macron has announced the maintenance of strategic autonomy and has also offered dialogue for a greater role and participation of Europeans in common defence. The article focuses on France as a case study and examines the motivations of the French authorities to formulate a strong push for the Europeanisation of nuclear deterrence based on French capabilities. The employment of historical and comparative methodology, comprising the analysis of document content, statements and official reports, augmented by interviews with experts and key policymakers, has permitted the tracing of the evolution of the French nuclear deterrent. This provides a research context for President Emmanuel Macron’s current policy and his proposals relating to the role of French nuclear deterrence in Europe. The aim of this study is to analyse and explain the role of French nuclear deterrence forces in creating a nuclear deterrent at a European level and promoting a nuclear culture among European allies. This article, which explores how the French nuclear strategy is shaped by historical circumstances and current geopolitical needs, makes a threefold contribution to the literature: firstly, it discusses the historical background to the development of the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence; secondly, it presents the main principles of the French nuclear deterrent; and thirdly, it demonstrates that France is not in a  position to rapidly provide an extended nuclear deterrent for Europe but can make a significant contribution to the collective security of European Union states.
Behavioral economics and nuclear weapons
\"Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences\"-- Provided by publisher.
Do Alliances Really Deter?
The scholarly literature is still divided on the relationship between defensive alliances and interstate conflict. While some scholars argue that defensive alliances can deter conflict, others posit that alliances accelerate its approach. This article seeks to make headway in the debate by using a research design that examines whether the recent formation of defensive alliances leads to increases or reductions in militarized disputes and war. We find that this relationship differs in the pre and post-nuclear era. In the prenuclear era, alliance formation is positively associated with both the initiation of militarized disputes and war onset. In the nuclear era, however, forming certain types of alliances reduces the likelihood of militarized dispute initiation, but has no effect on whether war occurs. This suggests assertions that defensive alliances will consistently deter conflict should be tempered and that alliance formation can sometimes undermine efforts to preserve peace.