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Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.
Book
Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Nuclear weapons proliferation is a topic of intense interest and concern among both academics and policy makers. Diverse opinions exist about the determinants of proliferation and the policy options to alter proliferation incentives. We evaluate a variety of explanations in two stages of nuclear proliferation, the presence of nuclear weapons production programs and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. We examine proliferation quantitatively, using data collected by the authors on national latent nuclear weapons production capability and several other variables, while controlling for the conditionality of nuclear weapons possession based on the presence of a nuclear weapons program. We find that security concerns and technological capabilities are important determinants of whether states form nuclear weapons programs, while security concerns, economic capabilities, and domestic politics help to explain the possession of nuclear weapons. Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but the NPT has not deterred proliferation at the system level.
Journal Article
India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb
Why did India merely flirt with nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s only to emerge as a nuclear power in the 1990s? Although a variety of factors informed India's prolonged restraint and subsequent breakthrough, new evidence indicates that India's \"nuclear Odyssey\" can be understood as a function of Indian leaders' ability to secure their country through nonmilitary means, particularly implicit nuclear umbrellas and international institutions. In the 1960s and 1970s, India was relatively successful in this regard as it sought and received implicit support from the superpowers against China. This success, in turn, made acquiring the bomb a less pressing question. At the end of the Cold War, however, nonmilitary measures ceased to be viable for India. In the late 1980s, waning Soviet support and the failure of Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic initiatives led to the creation of India's de facto nuclear arsenal. In the 1990s, India developed a more overt capability, not simply because the pro-bomb Bharatiya Janata Party came to power, but also because its external backing had vanished and because its efforts to improve its security through diplomacy proved unsuccessful.
Journal Article
Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.
Journal Article
Stop North Korea! : a radical new approach to the North Korea standoff
\"This radical new approach to dealing with North Korea offers a refreshing perspective on an intransigent and deadly situation. Imagine you control a multi-billion dollar capital fund, and North Korea is an underperforming corporation. You see it is undervalued and want to take it over, but it is controlled by an old-fashioned board of directors--the Kim family and a small number of ultra elites--who will not negotiate a deal. In this regressive situation it is logical to offer its shareholders--the political and military elites, government managers and bureaucrats, and the general population--a higher price for their shares to convince them to overrule their board of directors. Stop North Korea! A Radical New Approach to the North Korea Standoff applies this basic scenario to a situation that has become dire, and for which a strong positive solution is crucial. This book shows how investment rather than constraint--the carrot rather than the stick--will not only deter the North Korea threat, but enhance the global community in ways perhaps unimagined in the past\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation
Our main goal is to offer a systematic account of the causes & consequences of nuclear proliferation. We explore-theoretically & empirically-our basic assumptions that nuclear weapons, on average & across a broad variety of indicators, have beneficial effects for their possessors & that, partly for this reason, supply-side factors are among the most important causes of nuclear proliferation. For all of the articles in this issue, a key variable will be the same: nuclear weapons possession. Two of the articles in this issue treat nuclear weapons possession as a dependent variable & seek to explain the factors that lead states to acquire nuclear weapons. For others, nuclear weapons possession is a key independent variable. These articles seek to understand how the possession of nuclear weapons influences state behavior. Because of its centrality to this issue, it is necessary to define & measure nuclear proliferation carefully. We examine horizontal, as opposed to vertical, nuclear proliferation. That is, we analyze the spread of nuclear weapons to new states. We do not focus on increases in the number of nuclear warheads within nuclear-armed states. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2009.]
Journal Article
Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations
Varied diplomatic approaches by multiple negotiators over the past several years have failed to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran. Mutual hostility, misperception, and flawed diplomacy may be responsible. Yet, more fundamentally, no mutually acceptable deal may exist. To assess this possibility, a \"negotiation analytic\" framework conceptually disentangles two issues: (1) whether a feasible deal exists; and (2) how to design the most promising process to achieve one. Focusing on whether a \"zone of possible agreement\" exists, a graphical negotiation analysis precisely relates input assumptions about the parties' interests, their no-deal options, and possible deals. Under a plausible, mainstream set of such assumptions, the Iranian regime's no-deal options, at least through the fall of 2012, appear superior to potential nuclear agreements. If so, purely tactical and process-oriented initiatives will fail. Opening space for a mutually acceptable nuclear deal—one that avoids both military conflict and a nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable Iran—requires relentlessly and creatively worsening Iran's no-deal options while enhancing the value of a deal to the Iranian regime. Downplaying both coercive options and upside potential, as international negotiators have often done, works against this integrated strategy. If this approach opens a zone of possible agreement, sophisticated negotiation will be key to reaching a worthwhile agreement.
Journal Article
Lessons Learned from the North Korean Nuclear Crises
[...] it is important to get accurate, publically available technical assessments of nuclear capabilities. Nuclear tests strengthened the country's hands and tied the hands of the international community. [...] it is crucial to stop aspiring programs short of demonstrating their capabilities.
Journal Article