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With nearly twenty-five million citizens, a secretive totalitarian dictatorship, and active nuclear and ballistic missile weapons programs, North Korea presents some of the world's most difficult foreign policy challenges. For decades, the United States and its partners have employed multiple strategies in an effort to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Washington has moved from the Agreed Framework under President Bill Clinton to George W. Bush's denunciation of the regime as part of the \"axis of evil\" to a posture of \"strategic patience\" under Barack Obama. Given that a new president will soon occupy the White House, policy expert Walter C. Clemens Jr. argues that now is the time to reconsider US diplomatic efforts in North Korea. InNorth Korea and the World, Clemens poses the question, \"Can, should, and must we negotiate with a regime we regard as evil?\" Weighing the needs of all the stakeholders -- including China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea -- he concludes that the answer is yes. After assessing nine other policy options, he makes the case for engagement and negotiation with the regime. There still may be time to freeze or eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. Grounded in philosophy and history, this volume offers a fresh road map for negotiators and outlines a grand bargain that balances both ethical and practical security concerns.

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades. Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.

This book examines the state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the issues it faces in the early 21st century. Despite the fact that most countries in the world have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) there is growing concern that the NPT is in serious trouble and may not be able to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons. If so, international stability will be undermined, with potentially disastrous consequences, and the vision of a nuclear weapon-free world will become utterly unrealistic. More specifically, the NPT is exposed to four main challenges, explored in this book: challenges from outside , as three countries that have not signed the Treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan – are known to possess nuclear weapons; challenges from within , as some countries that have signed on to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states have nevertheless developed or are suspected to be trying to develop nuclear weapons (North Korea and Iran being cases in point); challenges from below in the shape of terrorists and other non-state actors who may want to acquire radioactive materials or even nuclear weapons; and, finally, challenges from above due to the perceived failure of the five legal nuclear weapons states to keep their part of the ‘double bargain’ made by the parties of the NPT and take serious steps towards nuclear disarmament. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international security, war and conflict studies and IR in general. Olav Njølstad is Research Director at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo. 1. Introduction: The Present Nuclear Order, How it Came About, Why it May Not Last Hans Blix Part 1: Challenge from Outside: The Problem of Non-Legal Nuclear Weapon States 2. The Indian Nuclear Program: Motivations, Effects, and Future Trajectories S. Paul Kapur 3. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme: Past and Future Bhumitra Chakma 4. Israel’s Nuclear Capability: Implications on Middle East Security Mohamed Kadry Said Part 2: Challenge from Within: The NPT Defectors 5. How to bring North Korea back into the NPT Leon V. Sigal 6. Challenge from Within: The Case of Iran Sverre Lodgaard Part 3: Challenge from Below: Nuclear Trafficking and Terrorism 7. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Morten Bremer Mærli 8. The Atomic Terrorist? John Mueller Part 4: Challenge from Above: The Unfulfilled Nuclear Disarmament Pledge of the Five Legal Nuclear-Weapon States 9. The United States and the NPT \"Double Bargain\" David Holloway 10. The Nuclear Policy of Russia and the Perspectives for Nuclear Disarmament Vladimir Dvorkin 11. Creating \"Nuclear Order\": An Open-Ended Process Sergey Oznobishchev 12. The UK, Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty and the Disarmament Threshold William Walker 13. France and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: From Benign Neglect to Active Promotion Bruno Tertrais 14. Departing Revolution: China’s Changing Nuclear Policies during the Cold War Chen Jian 15. China’s Policy on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament Yao Yunzhu 'This book is obligatory reading for anyone wishing to obtain a deeper understanding of not just the challenges facing the NPT, but also wider challenges to nuclear security and stability that appear likely to dominate the twenty-first century. It will undoubtedly be of use to both scholars and policy-makers, and indeed to anyone with an interest in ensuring a stable and peaceful global order, and of course, to those interested in the much publicized renewal of the global nuclear zero agenda.' - Andrew Futter, International Affairs, Volume 88, 4, July 2012

A PDF version of this book is available for free in open access via www.tandfebooks.com as well as the OAPEN Library platform, www.oapen.org. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license and is part of the OAPEN-UK research project. This book examines the current debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, notably the international non-proliferation regime and how to implement its disarmament provisions. Discussing the requirements of a new international consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this book builds on the three pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reviews the impact of Cold War and post-Cold War policies on current disarmament initiatives and analyses contemporary proliferation problems: how to deal with the states that never joined the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel); how states that have been moving toward nuclear weapons have been brought back to non-nuclear-weapon status; and, in particular, how to deal with Iran and North Korea. The analysis centres on the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation in an increasingly multi-centric world involving China and India as well as the US, the European powers and Russia. It concludes with a description and discussion of three different worlds without nuclear weapons and their implications for nuclear disarmament policies. This book will be of great interest to all students of arms control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, and IR/security studies in general Sverre Lodgaard is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

The nuclear arms control regime—centered on the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—faces five challenges: failure of nuclear disarmament by the five NPT-licit nuclear powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States); possible cheating by non-nuclear signatories like North Korea and Iran; India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the NPT; terrorists' interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons; and the safety, security and proliferation risks of the increased interest in nuclear energy to offset the financial and environmental costs of fossil fuel.

Russia has had a consistent policy of promoting a nuclearfree Korean peninsula, opposing resolution of the nuclear issue through pressure or sanction, supporting a multilateral process and solution, promoting adherence to Non-Proliferation Treaty rules, and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Moscow first suggested initiating a six-party process regarding a solution to the divided Korean peninsula in 1994. North Korea is generally positive about Russia's suggestions. The United States has belatedly and reluctantly recognized Russia's positive role in the process. Russia hopes the Six Party Talks (6PT) will gradually evolve into a multiparty security and cooperation system including a peaceful DPRK. This will be facilitated by international economic assistance to the DPRK and institutionalization of the 6PT. Successful Russia-U.S. cooperation may have much wider implications.

Unchecked nuclear weapons development in North Korea and the incipient nuclear weapons programme in Iran currently pose seminal challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The disposition of these cases may determine the future of the NPT and will shape non-proliferation and disarmament efforts for the next decade or more. This article assesses these two challenges, focusing on the actions concerned European states might take to leverage and guide the inevitably central US role. The article concludes that, by smoothing the sharper edges of US nuclear and strategic policies, European states can promote political conditions more favourable to non-proliferation solutions in both critical cases and help reduce reliance on nuclear weapons threats in global security relations more broadly.

This article examines the metamorphosis of Russia-North Korean relations from alienated allies to normal allies from 1991 to 2006. This research begins with a discussion of the distant relationship under Yeltsin and the normalized relationship under Putin. It then examines Russia's role in the midst of the North Korean nuclear crisis. This is followed by an analysis of Russia's saber-rattling in connection with North Korea's nuclear issue. By way of conclusion, this study makes a few observations on the current state and future prospects of the Russo-DPRK relations. After the implosion of the Soviet empire, the Russian Federation lost a global superpower status and has been groping to find a proper place in Northeast Asia as a great power. Even-handedness and balance now characterize Putin's Korea policy. With the convening of the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear issue in August 2003, Russia was for the first time allowed to sit at a multinational negotiating table to discuss the North Korean question. Russia's role at the negotiating table has been marginal and its efforts for resolving North Korea's nuclear issue have focused on good offices and mediation. Adapted from the source document.

Since last year's breakthrough Sep 19 Joint Statement, the North Korean nuclear issue has drawn considerable attention in the international community. The historical origin of the North Korean nuclear issue can be traced to both the immediate aftermath of World War II, which led to the division of the Korean peninsula, and the Cold War. In any kind of engagement strategy, the first and only viable step is always dialogue. The Sep 19 Joint Statement, itself a product of dialogue, has already provided all the parties in the region with the framework for engagement. Paragraph Four of the statement stipulates that the Six Parties are committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Now a full-fledged democracy with a thriving market economy, the Republic of Korea aspires to strengthen the United Nations as a preeminent institution of multilateralism that can live up to the growing expectations of the global era.