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Since their founding as independent nations, nuclear issues have been key elements of nationalism and the public sphere in both India and Pakistan. Yet the relationship between nuclear arms and civil society in the region is seldom taken into account in conventional security studies. These original and provocative essays examine the political and ideological components of national drives to possess and test nuclear weapons. Equal coverage for comparable issues in each country frames the volume as a genuine dialogue across this contested boundary.

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology-and ignore the security risk-in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of \"rogue\" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology-and ignore the security risk-in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb , Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of \"rogue\" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

From the start of the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001 to the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2014, Pakistan's military cooperation was critical to the United States. Yet Pakistani politics remain a source of anxiety for American policymakers. Despite some progress toward democratic consolidation over the last ten years, Pakistan's military still asserts power over the country's elected government. Pakistan's western regions remain largely ungoverned and home to the last remnants of al-Qaeda's original leadership as well as multiple militant groups that have declared war on the Pakistani state. The country's economy is in shambles, and continuing tensions with India endanger efforts to bring a durable peace to a region haunted by the distant threat of nuclear war. Pakistan's Enduring Challengessurveys the political and economic landscape of Pakistan in the wake of U.S. military withdrawal. Experts in the domestic and international affairs of the region consider the country's prospects from a variety of angles, including security issues and nuclear posture, relations with Afghanistan, India, and the United States, Pakistan's Islamist movements, and the CIA's use of drone warfare in Pakistan's tribal areas. This timely volume offers a concise, accessible, and expert guide to the currents that will shape the country's future. Contributors: Christopher Clary, C. Christine Fair, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Karl Kaltenthaler, Feisal Khan, William J. Miller, Aparna Pande, Paul Staniland, Stephen Tankel, Tara Vassefi, Sarah J. Watson, Joshua T. White, Huma Yusef.

This volume aims to offer a portrait of Pakistan, the complex, volatile country now situated at the fulcrum of international concerns. In the past decade Pakistan has become a country of immense importance to its region, the United States, and the world. With almost 200 million people, a 500,000-man army, nuclear weapons, and a large diaspora in Britain and North America, Pakistan is central to the hopes of jihadis and the fears of their enemies. Yet the greatest short-term threat to Pakistan is not Islamist insurgency as such, but the actions of the United States, and the greatest long-term threat is ecological change. This volume is an investigation of this highly complex and often poorly understood country: its regions, ethnicities, competing religious traditions, varied social landscapes, deep political tensions, and historical patterns of violence; but also its surprising underlying stability, rooted in kinship, patronage, and the power of entrenched local elites.

This new volume explores what the acquisition of nuclear weapons means for the life of a protracted conflict. The book argues that the significance of the possession of nuclear weapons in conflict resolution has been previously overlooked. Saira Khan argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states keeps conflicts alive indefinitely, as they are maintained by frequent crises and low-to-medium intensity violence, rather than escalating to full-scale wars. This theory therefore emphasizes the importance of nuclear weapons in both war-avoidance and peace-avoidance. The book opens with a section explaining its theory of conflict transformation with nuclear weapons, before testing this against the case study of the India--Pakistan protracted conflict in South Asia. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, IR and Asian politics and security.

The US-India nuclear accord of July 2005 and the subsequent Henry Hyde nuclear cooperation act of December 2006 have generated considerable debate among supporters and opponents largely on the basis of its potential implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Critics argue that the agreement undermines confidence in the nonproliferation regime; it enhances the political role of nuclear weapons, but it sets bad precedents for other states seeking nuclear weapons. It increases India's weapons capability and numbers and will result in a two-way nuclear arms race in Asia between India and Pakistan and India and China. In this article, I contend that the critics are stretching their points and that the accord's implications for the nonproliferation regime are not as negative as they portray. Although the accord may impinge on the regime in terms of legitimacy and fairness, its negatives are more than compensated by the positives, i.e., the integration of a rising major power as a responsible nuclear state with some restraints on its military program. In a political and strategic sense, it is better to have a rising global power inside the regime than of outside it. Bringing in India as a stakeholder of the regime is in the longer term to the benefit of the regime and to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. There are always tradeoffs and unintended consequences in major ground-breaking initiatives such as the US-India accord. For instance, during the 19703, when the US formed an alliance with China, that event pushed India onto the Soviet side, but it could have helped accelerate the Soviet decline later on. More importantly, China's political and economic integration-resulting from the Deng era reforms-would not have taken place without China's political rapprochement with the US. One can only imagine what China would be like today had there been no economic liberalization and political and economic integration of it into the global mainstream.

Byman analyzes the distinctions between counterterrorism and nuclear counterproliferation, in relation to the national security and military policy of the United States. He notes that counterproliferation and counterterrorism differ with regard to the focus on policy and the instruments involved, and that three aspects deserve particular attention: (1) the number and identity of the states of concern, (2) the states' motivations, and (3) the relevant policy instruments. He argues that while the terrorism and weapons of mass destruction nexus is indeed of grave concern, US policy has both flaws in its overall design and particular problems with regard to its practice. By changing the emphasis of US policy to better address the issue of leakage and focusing more on a few key countries like Pakistan, the US will be better able to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Considering these, he opines that US and international efforts to discourage terrorism and proliferation should continue, including the building of state capacity, influencing global opinion, avoiding the unilateralist temptation, improving technologies for recognizing nuclear attribution, and recognizing the limits of military power.

In assessing these threats, David contends that the United States's only viable option is to view other-state civil upheaval similarly to natural disasters and to develop a coherent, effective emergency response mechanism, which does not exist today in any systemic, nationwide form.