Explore the vast range of titles available.

Since the beginning of the third millennium, the phenomenon of Indonesian society's religious diversity has been emerged which is characterized by exclusive Islamism. A part of society wants to separate Islamic elements from Indonesian elements and between the virtues that exist in Islam and humanity. Whereas according to NurcholishMadjid and Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam is a religion that promotes mercy for all creatures (rahmatanlil 'alamin), and is universal for all mankind. Islam is an inseparable part of indonesianity and it also carries a universal mission of virtue for all mankind. The two mentioned Muslim scholars seek to integrate Islam, humanity and Indonesian identity in a harmonious way so that the virtues of Islam can be accessed in a global-international context as well as in a national-Indonesian context. Both figures have undertaken a comprehensive integration of Islam with humanity and indonesianity. Therefore, this article will explore the discourse on the integration of Islam with humanity and indonesianity in the perspective of Nurcholish Madjid and Ahmad Syafii Maarif by rolling out the following epistemological questions: How is the construction of integration of Islam with humanity and Indonesianity according to Nurcholish Madjid and Ahmad Syafii Maarif? What is the relevance of the construction of the integration of Islam with humanity, and the indonesianity of the two scholars for the Indonesian people? The study of these two figures uses historical, comparative and synthetic approaches.

Civil Islamtells the story of Islam and democratization in Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation. Challenging stereotypes of Islam as antagonistic to democracy, this study of courage and reformation in the face of state terror suggests possibilities for democracy in the Muslim world and beyond. Democratic in the early 1950s and with rich precedents for tolerance and civility, Indonesia succumbed to violence. In 1965, Muslim parties were drawn into the slaughter of half a million communists. In the aftermath of this bloodshed, a \"New Order\" regime came to power, suppressing democratic forces and instituting dictatorial controls that held for decades. Yet from this maelstrom of violence, repressed by the state and denounced by conservative Muslims, an Islamic democracy movement emerged, strengthened, and played a central role in the 1998 overthrow of the Soeharto regime. In 1999, Muslim leader Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President of a reformist, civilian government. In explaining how this achievement was possible, Robert Hefner emphasizes the importance of civil institutions and public civility, but argues that neither democracy nor civil society is possible without a civilized state. Against portrayals of Islam as inherently antipluralist and undemocratic, he shows that Indonesia's Islamic reform movement repudiated the goal of an Islamic state, mobilized religiously ecumenical support, promoted women's rights, and championed democratic ideals. This broadly interdisciplinary and timely work heightens our awareness of democracy's necessary pluralism, and places Indonesia at the center of our efforts to understand what makes democracy work.

During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, many Muslim modernists exhibited mixed records regarding democracy. On the one hand, they articulated cogent arguments that Islam was, at its heart, democratic in nature and worked to counter Islamist claims to the contrary. Some crafted robust visions for Islamic democratic governance. On the other hand, many of the same modernists forged political alliances with military authoritarian regimes. How can we explain this seeming inconsistency between modernist democratic ideals and their not-so-democratic practices? This article argues that this paradoxical pattern stems from a classic dilemma within democratic theory: the tyranny of the majority. After providing a brief history of majoritarian fears in Western political theory, the article investigates two prominent case studies from mid-twentieth-century Pakistan and Indonesia. The first examines Fazlur Rahman’s ties to Ayub Khan’s military regime in 1960s Pakistan, and the second analyzes why a movement of young modernists was willing to collaborate with Suharto’s New Order regime in 1970s Indonesia. Together, the two cases demonstrate that Muslim modernists balance their genuine hopes for an Islamic democratic future with persistent fears of majoritarian tyranny by advocating for constraints on the majority will. While these constraints can be controversial and even authoritarian in nature, they have important parallels in Western democratic thought. Ultimately, this article argues that Muslim modernists’ mixed records are a function of democratic theory itself rather than some Islamic exception to it.

The establishment of the caliphate in Indonesia is offered as a solution to advancement based on theological considerations by its advocates. Many Muslim academics, including Nurcholish Madjid and Yudian Wahyudi, have disputed this allegation. Using data from written works and interviews, this study examined the perspectives of these two figures. The findings revealed that caliphate speech is problematic, conceptual, social, political, and argumentative. As a result, efforts to create this discourse as a concept in Indonesia are not only superfluous, but also futile, laborious, and harmful to the principle of monotheism and the spirit of teaching Islam with blessing for the world (rahmatan li al-'alamin). Pancasila is the best option supported by Islamic teachings that have a strong ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundation. When understood, believed, and implemented consistently, the numerous precepts consist of historical justification, reason, and actuality, which can sustain remarkable achievements in the life of the nation.

This article discusses the thoughts of Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid regarding democratization in the reform era of Indonesia. It focuses on how Islam is articulated and implemented according to these two thinkers in the context of the changing of society-state relation in the reform era of Indonesia. To analyse and elaborate on their thoughts, the sociological and historical approaches as well as the prophetic sociology of knowledge are utilised or applied. It is argued here that the religio-political thoughts of the two thinkers go beyond a procedural democracy, arguing for a kind of democracy that is based on ethics and rationality where the relationship between strong society and the effective state in Indonesia is solidified and dignified.

Even within the tolerant strain of Islam in Indonesia, [Nurcholish Madjid] was often attacked for what was perceived as his liberal interpretation of Islam. He traveled often to Europe and the Middle East to speak on the compatibility of democracy and Islam. After the collapse of [Suharto]'s government, Madjid was often asked to run for president but demurred, preferring to play a behind-the-scenes role. Last year, he staged a brief candidacy but dropped out after a poor showing in opinion polls.

Mr. Madjid, known as the conscience of his nation, preached a moderate form of Islam that has come under increasing pressure in the last few years. Soft-spoken but steadfast in his belief that Indonesia must remain a secular state, Mr. Madjid flirted with running for the presidency last year. Even within the broadly tolerant strain of Islam in Indonesia, Mr. Madjid was frequently attacked at home for what was perceived as his liberal interpretation of Islam. He traveled often to Europe and the Middle East to speak on the compatibility of democracy and Islam. He was an Eisenhower Fellow in the United States in 1990.

The inclusive brand of Islam that Mr. [Madjid] has preached for decades is coming under pressure from more militant quarters in the world's most populous Muslim country. But this tolerant man is unbowed, arguing that the idea of an Islamic state is at odds with the teachings of the Koran, that religion should remain in the realm of the transcendental, and that understanding should prevail. This has been Mr. Madjid's theme since he first appeared on the national stage, shocking his fellow Muslims with a speech that gave a favorable interpretation of ''secularization'' at the moment that the new military dictator, General Suharto, was consolidating power. ''Islam yes, Islamic party no,'' was Mr. Madjid's watchword. Many Muslims thought Mr. Madjid was buying into the general's agenda. Mr. Madjid remembers the confrontation this way: ''Suharto said, 'I'm tired of being president.' He used a term in Indonesian cukup. I said, 'No, you are tuwuk,' which means you are fed up to here, meaning up to your neck, that you are about to vomit.'' Mr. Madjid swiftly drew his hand across his throat, and contorted his face. ''This was rough language but I didn't care.''

But Madjid was surprised. Rather than steely resistance, he found Suharto in a relaxed, even jocular mood, as if a weight had just been lifted. \"I'm fed up with being president,\" he recalls Suharto telling him. And so Madjid summoned his own courage. \"You should resign,\" he told him. The next morning, Tuesday, May 19, Suharto announced the compromise plan that he thought would end weeks of rioting and demonstrations: He would set up a new \"reform council,\" hold elections for a new parliament \"as soon as possible\" and then step down once that parliament chose a new president and vice president. But it was too late for compromises. Two days later, May 21, Suharto was forced to hold another news conference in the same room at the ornate Merdeka Palace, this time announcing that he was resigning immediately, and that Vice President B.J. Habibie was assuming the presidency. The seven days began just before dawn on Friday, May 15, when Suharto's Garuda Indonesian MD-11 ER jet touched down at Halim Perdanakusuma Airport, after a 10-hour flight from Cairo. Suharto was returning to a country, and a capital, in chaos. An orgy of rioting and looting the day before had left much of the city in flames, and hundreds of charred bodies were being pulled out of the wreckage of burned-out shopping centers. Foreigners, as well as ethnic Chinese Indonesians, were fleeing the country by the thousands, or holing up for safety in downtown hotels. And the demands for political reform, and Suharto's resignation, were growing louder.