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It has been 40 years since the oil crisis of 1973/74. This crisis has been one of the defining economic events of the 1970s and has shaped how many economists think about oil price shocks. In recent years, a large literature on the economic determinants of oil price fluctuations has emerged. Drawing on this literature, we first provide an overview of the causes of all major oil price fluctuations between 1973 and 2014. We then discuss why oil price fluctuations remain difficult to predict, despite economists’ improved understanding of oil markets. Unexpected oil price fluctuations are commonly referred to as oil price shocks. We document that, in practice, consumers, policymakers, financial market participants, and economists may have different oil price expectations, and that, what may be surprising to some, need not be equally surprising to others.

This paper is dedicated to studying and modeling the interdependence between the oil returns and exchange-rate movements of oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Globally, twelve countries/regions are investigated, representing more than 60% and 67% of all oil exports and imports. The sample period encompasses economic and natural events like the Great Recession period (2007–2009) and the COVID-19 pandemic. We use the dynamic conditional correlation mixed-data sampling (DCC-MIDAS) model, with the aim of investigating the interdependencies expressed by the long-run correlation, which is a smoother (but always daily observed) version of the (daily) time-varying correlation. Focusing on the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the long-run correlations of the oil-exporting countries (Saudia Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Canada, United States, United Arab Emirates, and Nigeria) and (lagged) WTI crude oil returns strongly increase. For a subset of these countries (that is, Saudia Arabia, Iraq, United States, United Arab Emirates, and Nigeria), the (lagged) correlations turn out to be positive, while for Canada and Russia they remain negative as before the advent of the pandemic. In addition, the oil-importing countries and regions under investigation (Europe, China, India, Japan, and South Korea) experience a similar pattern: before the COVID-19 pandemic, the (lagged) correlations were negative for China, India, and South Korea. After the COVID-19 pandemic, the correlations of these latter countries increased.

This paper explores the impact of investor flows and financial market conditions on returns in crude oil futures markets. I argue that informational frictions and the associated speculative activity may induce prices to drift away from \"fundamental\" values, and may result in price booms and busts. Particular attention is given to the interplay between imperfect information about real economic activity, including supply, demand, and inventory accumulation, and speculative activity in oil markets. Furthermore, I present new evidence that there were economically and statistically significant effects of investor flows on futures prices, after controlling for returns in the United States and emerging-economy stock markets, a measure of the balance sheet flexibility of large financial institutions, open interest, the futures/spot basis, and lagged returns on oil futures. The largest impacts on futures prices were from intermediate-term growth rates of index positions and managed-money spread positions. Moreover, my findings suggest that these effects were through risk or informational channels distinct from changes in convenience yield. Finally, the evidence suggests that hedge fund trading in spread positions in futures impacted the shape of term structure of oil futures prices. This paper was accepted by Wei Xiong, finance.

Shocks to the real price of oil may reflect oil supply shocks, shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities, or demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. Each shock has different effects on the real price of oil and on US macroeconomic aggregates. Changes in the composition of shocks help explain why regressions of macroeconomic aggregates on oil prices tend to be unstable. Evidence that the recent surge in oil prices was driven primarily by global demand shocks helps explain why this shock so far has failed to cause a major recession in the United States. (JEL E31, E32, Q41, Q43)

We explore the effect of the sharp and sustained decline after June 2014 in the global price of crude oil (and hence in the U.S. price of gasoline) on U.S. real GDP growth. Our analysis suggests that this decline produced a cumulative stimulus of about 0.9 percent of real GDP by raising private real consumption and non-oil-related business investment, and an additional stimulus of 0.04 percent, reflecting a shrinking petroleum trade deficit. This stimulative effect, however, has been largely offset by a large reduction in real investment by the oil sector. Hence, the net stimulus since June 2014 has been close to zero. We show that the U.S. economy’s response was not fundamentally different from that observed after the oil price decline of 1986. Then as now, the U.S. economy’s response is consistent with standard economic models of the transmission of oil price shocks. We find no evidence that frictions in reallocating capital and labor across sectors or increased uncertainty about the price of gasoline explain the sluggish response of U.S. real GDP growth. Nor do we find evidence of financial contagion, of spillovers from oil-related investment to non-oil-related investment, of an increase in household savings, or of households deleveraging.

Do oil prices and stock markets move in tandem or in opposite directions? The complex and time varying relationship between oil prices and stock markets has caught the attention of the financial press, investors, policymakers, researchers, and the general public in recent years. In light of such attention, this paper reviews research on the oil price and stock market relationship. The majority of papers we survey study the impacts of oil markets on stock markets, whereas, little research in the reverse direction exists. Our review finds that the causal effects between oil and stock markets depend heavily on whether research is performed using aggregate stock market indices, sectorial indices, or firm-level data and whether stock markets operate in net oil-importing or net oil-exporting countries. Additionally, conclusions vary depending on whether studies use symmetric or asymmetric changes in the price of oil, or whether they focus on unexpected changes in oil prices. Finally, we find that most studies show oil price volatility transmits to stock market volatility, and that including measures of stock market performance improves forecasts of oil prices and oil price volatility. Several important avenues for further research are identified.

Using time-varying BVARs, we find a substantial decline in the shortrun price elasticity of oil demand since the mid-1980s. This finding helps explain why an oil production shortfall of the same magnitude is associated with a stronger response of oil prices and more severe macroeconomic consequences over time, while a similar oil price increase is associated with smaller output effects. Oil supply shocks also account for a smaller fraction of real oil price variability in more recent periods, in contrast to oil demand shocks. The overall effects of oil supply disruptions on the US economy have, however, been modest.

A popular view is that the surge in the real price of oil during 2003-08 cannot be explained by economic fundamentals, but was caused by the increased financialization of oil futures markets, which in turn allowed speculation to become a major determinant of the spot price of oil. This interpretation has been driving policy efforts to tighten the regulation of oil derivatives markets. This survey reviews the evidence supporting this view. We identify six strands in the literature and discuss to what extent each sheds light on the role of speculation. We find that the existing evidence is not supportive of an important role of speculation in driving the spot price of oil after 2003. Instead, there is strong evidence that the co-movement between spot and futures prices reflects common economic fundamentals rather than the financialization of oil futures markets.

This paper investigates the effect of oil price uncertainty on global real economic activity using a quarterly vector autoregressive model with stochastic volatility in mean. Stochastic volatility allows oil price uncertainty to vary separately from changes in the level of oil prices, and allows one to incorporate an extraneous indicator of oil price uncertainty such as realized volatility that greatly improves the precision of the estimated uncertainty series. The estimation results show that an oil price uncertainty shock has negative effects on world industrial production all else equal. For example, it is shown that a doubling of oil price volatility is associated with a cumulative decline as high as 0.3 percentage points in world industrial production.

It is shown that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock differs greatly depending on whether the change in the price of oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the oil market. The demand and supply shocks driving the global crude oil market jointly account for 22% of the long-run variation in U.S. real stock returns. The responses of industry-specific U.S. stock returns to demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market are consistent with accounts of the transmission of oil price shocks that emphasize the reduction in domestic final demand.