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The present study sheds light on the phenomenon whereby groups experience adversity, following which they show signs of growth. We propose the conceptualization of post-traumatic growth as a phenomenon that also exists at the group level, “community post-traumatic growth” (CPTG). The concept of CPTG is explained using a case study on the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Israel following the first wave of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The study describes shared characteristics of Israeli ultra-Orthodox society and the crisis it experienced during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, both in terms of physiological features such as the relatively high proportion of affected people and in terms of psychological characteristics such as the shut-down of synagogues and yeshivas, and the perceived discrimination they experienced from the general population in Israel. The present study views the sense of discrimination as a traumatic factor at the group level. In total, 256 participants completed online questionnaires examining three hypotheses: (1) sense of discrimination (trauma) will be correlated with level of CPTG; (2) the level of identification with the ultra-Orthodox culture will be positively related to CPTG, while the level of identification with Israeli culture will be negatively correlated with CPTG; (3) the level of life satisfaction of the individual will be predicted by CPTG. The results supported the hypotheses and are discussed at length in the discussion section.

This study focuses on a purposive sample of 30 immigrants from France, students at the Technion Institute of Technology, and examines the following from the participants’ perspectives: (1) the process of integration into Israeli society while wanting to remain out of any ethnic/religious bubbles in which French immigrants insulated themselves once in Israel and (2) the dynamics of identity formation when becoming Israeli. During in-depth interviews, participants mentioned a strengthened Jewish identity and Zionism consequent to the anti-Israel climate of France, as well as their fascination with modern Israel and its technology as incentives for emigration. Once in the Technion, they intentionally separated themselves from their Francophone milieu to master the Hebrew language and interact with other Israelis in the army, dorms, and study groups. At the time of the interviews, 5–10 years postmigration, the participants were fluent in Hebrew and felt part of the Israeli society. In the process of identity formation, the Jewish, Zionist, and at times religious dimensions defining them when in France had become united rather than absorbed into their Israeli identity. Additionally, at first denying any French component in their identity, their manners and education emerged as worthy of integration when confronting the chutzpah of some Israelis. Fluent in both languages and appreciating both cultures, they communicated mostly in Hebrew and engaged in French–Hebrew code switching with French friends, parents, and relatives. Rejecting the ethnic/religious bubbles that isolated French immigrants from other Israelis, they felt Israeli and part of modern Israel’s society and culture.

This paper contributes to current debates over the “Jewish continuity crisis” and its paradigmatic status, by broadening the scope to include the Israeli context, shifting the focus from reproduction and intermarriage to struggles over Jewish divorce, and challenging gendered assumptions about the nature of the crisis and its solutions. Based on a qualitative study of agunah activists’ narratives and Israel’s rabbinic courts’ rulings, it demonstrates how both religious-feminist activists and conservative judges frame their actions as caring for the collective. They aim to rescue not only Jewish families, but “the Jewish family” writ large, entangling national, gendered, and religious politics in supposedly private divorce disputes. This paper argues that Israeli marriage and divorce is a central, intractable battlefield shaped by overlapping “wars.” Understanding it as (also) a site of contention over Jewish continuity clarifies the field’s affective dynamics of anxiety, urgency, and risk, and challenges dominant scholarly constructions of a single binary conflict. Juxtaposing the North American and Israeli continuity debates allows for critical reflection on how each political, social, and academic context shapes the issues similarly and differently. Specifically, this study broadens the possible political and theoretical implications of the “Jewish continuity” frame, arguing that agunah activists’ family-centered logic and commitment to Jewish continuity bridge autonomy and collectivism to advance feminist politics.

Over the last two decades, a rift has emerged on the US political left regarding the State of Israel. Public polling has shown that young people and the ideological far left have developed distinctly negative views toward Israel. In the fall of 2020, we surveyed 3500 US adults, including oversampling of 2500 adults aged 18–30. We first explore the young left’s views toward Israel in comparison to how they view other foreign countries, and in comparison to how older adults and more conservative adults view Israel. We then ask whether their negative views toward Israel are explained by an issue prioritization of the Israel/Palestine conflict (no). Finally, we ask whether the young left’s negative attitudes toward Israel are focused on Israel’s politics and government or on other features of the country, such as its cultures and religions (it’s both). Overall, the young left evaluates Israel like it evaluates US adversaries such as Russia and Iran, whereas the center and right evaluate Israel like they evaluate other US allies, such as Mexico and India.