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7 result(s) for "OSI reference model"
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Wired and Wireless Ethernet
This chapter is primarily about wired and wireless Ethernet (both of which are used a great deal with the Raspberry Pi) and focuses on the bottom four layers, including the transport layer, network layer, data link layer, and physical layer. One way to think of it is that the transport set is about moving data, whereas the top three layers, called the application set, are about processing data via networked applications. These layers are the application layer, presentation layer, and session layer. Wi‐Fi is analogous to Ethernet with wireless media, in that it too spans the data link and physical layers of the open system interconnection (OSI) model, with several variations of the medium access (MAC) mechanism and physical layers. Most models of the Raspberry Pi have a wired Ethernet port that is standard and will work without any tweaking on Linux distributions like Raspbian.
System Architecture
This chapter contains sections titled: Domain View of AutoNets ISO/OSI Reference Model View Profiling Standardised Architectures Subsystem Architectures Summary References
Transport Layer
This chapter contains sections titled: Transport Layer Integration in the AutoNet Generic Reference Protocol Stack TCP in AutoNets Summary References
Application of Storage Networks
This chapter contains sections titled: Definition of the Term ‘Storage Network’ Storage Sharing Availability of Data Adaptability and Scalability of IT Systems Summary
Air Interface – Physical Layer
This chapter contains sections titled: Logical channels Physical channels Synchronization Mapping of logical onto physical channels Radio subsystem link control Channel coding, source coding and speech processing Source coding and speech processing Channel coding Power‐up scenario
Physical layer capture aware MAC for WLANs
The physical layer capture (PLC) effect occurs frequently in the real wireless deployment; when two or more nodes transmit simultaneously, a receiver can successfully decode the collided frame if the signal strength of one frame is sufficiently high enough. Although the PLC effect increases the channel utilization, it results in an unfair channel access among the wireless nodes. In this paper, we propose a PLC-aware media access control (MAC) algorithm that employs the average waiting time as a common control reference. It enables the nodes to converge to a fair channel access by changing one of the IEEE 802.11 enhanced distributed channel access parameters: contention window, arbitration interframe space, or transmission opportunity. We then find multiple control references that meet the fair channel access constraint and obtain the near-optimal reference that maximizes the overall throughput. Through ns-2 simulations and real in-door experiments using the universal software radio peripheral platform, we evaluate the fairness and throughput performance of the PLC-aware MAC algorithm.
Toward a secure Kerberos key exchange with smart cards
Public key Kerberos (PKINIT) is a standard authentication and key establishment protocol. Unfortunately, it suffers from a security flaw when combined with smart cards. In particular, temporary access to a user’s card enables an adversary to impersonate that user for an indefinite period of time, even after the adversary’s access to the card is revoked. In this paper, we extend Shoup’s key exchange security model to the smart card setting and examine PKINIT in this model. Using this formalization, we show that PKINIT is indeed flawed, propose a fix, and provide a proof that this fix leads to a secure protocol.