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\"80% of the future workforce will be mobile, and many want to work anywhere, anytime\" (PWC, 2019). Global mobility, i.e. relocation of people across countries, has and will continue to be a major trend. The total number of expatriates, i.e., employees who live and work abroad for a limited period of time, is estimated to amount to around 66.2 million worldwide and has been on a steady rise (Finaccord, 2019). Taking a wider perspective, the OECD estimates that there are currently around 250 million people living outside their home country, amounting to 3.3% of the world's population, and with 70% of them of working age (OECD, 2017). Global mobility presents both opportunities and challenges for organisations and individuals. Organisations dispatch expatriates to transfer knowledge, for control and coordination, and management development (Edström & Galbraith, 1977), with the ultimate goal to improve innovation and organizational performance (Bebenroth & Froese, 2020; Chang, Gong, & Peng, 2012). In terms of management development, international experience is the most effective way for individuals to acquire new knowledge and skills and boost their careers (Froese, Kim, & Eng, 2016; Sarabi, Froese, & Hamori, 2017)\"-- Provided by publisher.

The international literature hypothesized a “U-shaped” pattern of immigrants’ occupational trajectories from origin to destination countries due to the imperfect transferability of human capital. However, empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is available only in single-country studies and for “old,” Anglo-Saxon migration countries with deregulated labor markets. This article compares Italy, Spain, and France, providing evidence that the more segmented the labor market, the higher immigrants’ occupational downgrade on arrival, independently from skills transferability and other individual characteristics. Paradoxically, the more segmented the labor market, the more important the acquisition of host-country specific human capital for subsequent upward mobility.

After decades of stagnation, the size of Latin America's middle class recently expanded to the point where, for the first time ever, the number of people in poverty is equal to the size of the middle class. This volume investigates the nature, determinants and possible consequences of this remarkable process of social transformation. We propose an original definition of the middle class, tailor-made for Latin America, centered on the concept of economic security and thus a low probability of falling into poverty. Given our definition of the middle class, there are four, not three, classes in Latin America. Sandwiched between the poor and the middle class there lies a large group of people who appear to make ends meet well enough, but do not enjoy the economic security that would be required for membership of the middle class. We call this group the 'vulnerable'. In an almost mechanical sense, these transformations in Latin America reflect both economic growth and declining inequality in over the period. We adopt a measure of mobility that decomposes the 'gainers' and 'losers' in society by social class of each household. The continent has experienced a large amount of churning over the last 15 years, at least 43% of all Latin Americans changed social classes between the mid 1990s and the end of the 2000s. Despite the upward mobility trend, intergenerational mobility, a better proxy for inequality of opportunity, remains stagnant. Educational achievement and attainment remain to be strongly dependent upon parental education levels. Despite the recent growth in pro-poor programs, the middle class has benefited disproportionally from social security transfers and are increasingly opting out from government services. Central to the region's prospects of continued progress will be its ability to harness the new middle class into a new, more inclusive social contract, where the better-off pay their fair share of taxes, and demand improved public services.

We examine the ability of immigrants to transfer the occupational human capital they acquired prior to immigration. We first augment a model of occupational choice to study the implications of language proficiency on the cross-border transferability of occupational human capital. We then explore the empirical predictions using information about the skill requirements from O*NET and a unique dataset that includes both the last source country occupation and the first four years of occupations in Canada. We supplement the analysis using Census estimates for the same cohort with source country occupational skill requirements predicted using detailed human capital related information such as field of study. We find that male immigrants to Canada were employed in source country occupations that typically require high levels of cognitive skills, but rely less intently on manual skills. Following immigration, they find initial employment in occupations that require the opposite. Consistent with the hypothesized asymmetric role of language in the transferability of previously acquired cognitive and manual skills, these discrepancies are larger among immigrants with limited language fluency. Dans cet article, nous avons étudié la capacité des immigrants à transférer leur capital humain professionnel développé avant leur immigration. Tout d’abord, nous avons élaboré un modèle augmenté de choix professionnels afin d’étudier l’incidence des aptitudes linguistiques sur la transférabilité transfrontalière du capital humain professionnel. Nous avons ensuite exploré les prévisions empiriques en utilisant les données du système O*NET ainsi qu’un ensemble de données uniques présentant à la fois le dernier poste occupé dans le pays de départ et les quatre premières années en emploi au Canada. Nous avons complété cette analyse en utilisant les estimations du recensement correspondant à cette même population afin d’évaluer les qualifications professionnelles requises dans le pays d’origine en tenant compte de diverses informations détaillées relatives au capital humain, notamment le domaine d’étude. Nous avons découvert que dans leur pays d’origine, les immigrants de sexe masculin au Canada étaient employés dans des domaines professionnels nécessitant habituellement des compétences cognitives de haut niveau et ne reposant pas sur des compétences manuelles. Suite à leur immigration, ils trouvent leur premier emploi dans des domaines professionnels nécessitant des compétences manuelles ne reposant pas sur des compétences cognitives. Conformément à l’hypothèse du rôle asymétrique de la langue dans la transférabilité des compétences manuelles et cognitives acquises avant l’immigration, ces différences sont plus importantes parmi les immigrants aux compétences linguistiques limitées.

This paper explores occupational and employment mobility over the previous decade in Greece and contributes to a better understanding of the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis. Our findings suggest that downward mobility was the common trend in intra-generational occupational mobility during the first period of the crisis. Significant changes occurred between 2011-2015. The recovery is apparent during the third bailout program with higher upward occupational and employment movements. However, polarization in the middle-paid professions was noticed. Additionally, this paper highlights the role of education in career mobility and the problem of overeducation. The empirical results reveal that tertiary graduates were more likely to move downward during the first period of the crisis even though overeducated workers had more possibilities to experience upward mobility. Overeducation in Greece seems to be the result of the increasing number of tertiary graduates, low proportion of high-skilled job positions and high levels of unemployment.

Using longitudinal data on the universe of workers in Denmark during the period 1991–2008, we track the labor market outcomes of low-skilled natives in response to an exogenous inflow of low-skilled immigrants. We innovate on previous identification strategies by considering immigrants distributed across municipalities by a refugee dispersal policy in place between 1986 and 1998. We find that an increase in the supply of refugee-country immigrants pushed less educated native workers (especially the young and low-tenured ones) to pursue less manual-intensive occupations. As a result immigration had positive effects on native unskilled wages, employment, and occupational mobility.

Postindustrial occupational change has ended an era of unprecedented upward mobility. We examine the political implications of this immense structural shift by introducing the concept of status discordance, which we operationalize as the difference between status expectations formed during childhood and outcomes realized in adulthood. We leverage German household panel data and predictive modeling to provide empirical estimates of status expectations based on childhood circumstances and parental background. The analysis reveals that political dissatisfaction is widespread among voters who fall short of intergenerational status expectations. We show that such dissatisfaction is associated with higher abstention rates, less mainstream party support, and more radical voting. Moreover, we explore variation in status discordance by gender, education, and occupation, which influence the choice between radical left and right parties. Our findings highlight how expectations about opportunities underlie generational voting patterns and shed light on the ongoing breakdown of the postwar political consensus.

This article reviews the sociological and economic literature on intergenerational mobility. Findings on social class, occupational status, earnings, and income mobility are discussed and discrepancies among them are evaluated. The review also examines nonlinearities in the intergenerational association, variation in mobility across advanced industrial countries, and recent mobility trends in the United States. The literature suggests an association between inequality and economic mobility at the country level, with the United States featuring higher inequality and lower mobility than other advanced industrial countries. However, mobility has not declined in the United States over the recent decades in which inequality has expanded. The inequality-mobility relationship fails to emerge when occupational measures of mobility are used, likely because these measures do not fully capture some mechanisms of economic reproduction.

Labor mobility is the flexibility of workers to walk away from an industry in response to better opportunities. I develop a model in which labor flows make bad times worse for shareholders who are left with capital that is less productive. The model shows that firms face greater operating leverage by providing flexibility to mobile workers. I construct an empirical measure of labor mobility consistent with the model and document an economically significant cross-sectional relation between mobility, operating leverage, and stock returns. I find that firms in mobile industries earn returns over 5% higher than those in less mobile industries.

The US tolerates more inequality than Europe and believes its economic mobility is greater than Europe's, though they had roughly equal rates of intergenerational occupational mobility in the late twentieth century. We extend this comparison into the nineteenth century using 10,000 nationally-representative British and US fathers and sons. The US was more mobile than Britain through 1900, so in the experience of those who created the US welfare state in the 1930s, the US had indeed been \"exceptional.\" The US mobility lead over Britain was erased by the 1950s, as US mobility fell from its nineteenth century levels.