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本文旨在以債權人的觀點，針對2008年至2011年在臺灣證券交易所及櫃檯買賣中心交易之上市（櫃）公司為研究樣本，探討上市（櫃）公司購買董監事暨重要職員責任保險（簡稱D＆O保險）是否會影響債權人對企業信用風險的認知，而債權人對企業信用風險的認知係以信用評量機構發布的評等來衡量。整體而言，實證結果穩健地支持相對於未購買D＆O保險的公司，有購買D＆O保險的公司，其信用評等較佳；然而進一步針對有購買D＆O保險的公司，探討其投保金額與信用評等之關聯性時，實證結果則發現，當公司依自身之特質及所面臨的風險投保適度的金額（即正常投保金額），將可獲得較佳的信用評等；但當公司投保金額超過公司自身特質及風險所需之保險金額（即超額投保金額）愈大時，反而使債權人認為董監事與管理階層的道德風險會增加，因而導致給予較差的信用評等。

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance hereafter) on corporate governance and firm performance, with a specific focus on investment efficiency. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from the period 2007 to 2020, this study uses Ordinary Least Squares regressions to investigate the research questions, as well as moderating and mediating effects. Additionally, alternative measures of investment efficiency are used, and the Heckman two-stage model and propensity score matching model are used to demonstrate the consistency of the findings and to mitigate the risk of endogeneity. Findings The findings of this study suggest that purchasing D&O insurance has a detrimental impact on corporate investment efficiency, particularly in the context of over-investment activities; robust internal governance mechanisms, exemplified by a higher shareholding ratio of the top shareholder and enhanced internal control quality, alleviate this negative effect; and financing constraints act as a mediating factor in the association between D&O insurance and investment efficiency. Originality/value Corporate investment efficiency is of significant importance for both national macroeconomic growth and micro-enterprise development. Notably, the prevalence of D&O insurance among Chinese firms is progressively increasing, thus exerting a growing influence. This study contributes to the existing literature on D&O insurance and corporate investment efficiency, providing valuable insights into the economic impact of D&O insurance on Chinese firms. The empirical evidence presented herein facilitates future reforms and adjustments.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance on enterprise strategic change. It also explores the mediating role of litigation risk, the moderating roles of enterprise science and technology level and precipitation organizational slack between them. In addition, it examines the joint moderating roles of the top management team (TMT) external social network and enterprise science and technology level, and enterprise scale and precipitation organizational slack. Design/methodology/approach Using the unbalanced panel data of A-share listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges of China from 2002 to 2020 as the research sample, this paper uses the ordinary least square method and fixed-effect model to study the relationship between D&O liability insurance and enterprise strategic change. The study also focuses on the mediating mechanism and moderating mechanisms between them. Findings The authors find that D&O liability insurance has an “incentive effect,” which can significantly promote enterprise strategic change. Litigation risk plays a partial mediating role between D&O liability insurance and enterprise strategic change. Enterprise science and technology level and precipitation organizational slack negatively moderate the relationship between D&O liability insurance and enterprise strategic change. TMT external social network and enterprise science and technology level, and enterprise-scale and precipitation organizational slack have joint moderating effects on the relationship between D&O liability insurance and enterprise strategic change. Originality/value This paper confirms the “incentive effect hypothesis” of the impact of D&O liability insurance on enterprise strategic change, which not only broadens the research perspective of enterprise strategic management but also further expands the research scope of D&O liability insurance. Besides, this paper thoroughly explores the influencing mechanisms between D&O liability insurance and enterprise strategic change, providing incremental contributions to the research literature in the field of enterprise risk management and corporate governance. The findings have practical guiding significance for expanding the coverage of D&O liability insurance, promoting the implementation of strategic changes and improving the level of corporate governance of Chinese enterprises.

This study examines the effect of directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance on firm value. Previous studies are divided on the value implication of D&O insurance: some argue for various benefits of being covered by D&O insurance, whereas others focus on the managerial opportunism stemming from being insured. In order to address whether D&O insurance increases firm value, we utilize a sample of quoted Korean companies from a period in which the disclosure of D&O insurance information was mandatory and there was a significant cross-sectional variation in the firms' coverage of D&O insurance. We find that controlling for the endogeneity of D&O insurance coverage, D&O insurance increases firm value compared to noninsured firms. We also find evidence that the increase in firm value is pronounced for firms with greater growth opportunities, which suggests that D&O insurance can help firms to better convert growth opportunities into higher firm value.

Purpose This study analyses Chinese data to revisit the relationship between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance and accounting conservatism, aiming to investigate the impact of investors’ legal protection on the function of D&O insurance. Design/methodology/approach The study sample included all A-share firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to 2019. Multiple regression was used to investigate the association between D&O insurance and accounting conservatism. The Heckman two-stage model and the propensity score matching method were used to check the robustness of the main results. Findings D&O insured companies exhibited greater accounting conservatism. The higher the indemnity limit, the more conservative a firm’s earnings reporting. The positive correlation was stronger when investor protection was relatively weak. The impact of D&O insurance on accounting conservatism was stronger for companies with weaker internal or external supervision mechanisms. Originality/value The study findings show that D&O insurance plays a positive role in the governance of listed companies when investors’ legal protection is weak, which supports the effective supervision hypothesis of D&O insurance.

We examine whether information about firms' directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage provides insights into the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. Using Canadian firms, we find evidence that firms with D&O insurance coverage are more likely to be sued and that the likelihood of litigation increases with increased coverage. These findings are consistent with managerial opportunism or moral hazard related to the insurance purchase decision. We also find that higher premiums are associated with the likelihood of litigation, indicating that insurers price this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that coverage and premium levels have the potential to convey information about lawsuit likelihood, and a firm's governance quality, to the marketplace.

This article develops and tests hypotheses regarding the relationship between directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance purchase and firm size, governance characteristics, and business risk, using a unique panel data set on Canadian firms for years 1996–2005. The data permit examination of the determinants of insurance pricing, ownership and coverage limits, and the effects of insurance on board characteristics and earnings management. Results using panel data methods and controlling for endogenous prices and endogenous selection into insurance ownership provide strong statistical evidence for the view that D&O insurance markets take corporate risk into account, but that insurance leads to greater risk taking.