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49,666 result(s) for "Oligarchy"
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Oligarchy
\"The common thread for oligarchs across history is that wealth defines them, empowers them, and inherently exposes them to threats. The existential motive of all oligarchs is wealth defense. These variations yield four types of oligarchy: warring, ruling, sultanistic, and civil\"-- Provided by publisher.
How Bernie Sanders Sees Things
Bernie Sanders has been on a country-wide tour called Fighting Oligarchy. In this episode of “The Opinions” with David Leonhardt, he explains why that’s so important right now and reveals what question he wishes more reporters would ask him.
Sanders, AOC rally draws crowds in LA
Crowds filled Gloria Molina Grand Park in Los Angeles on April 12, as Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont) and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-New York) held a \"fighting oligarchy\" rally.
Un mese nei tweet per conoscere, per riflettere, per costruire reti
Per pupil funding of education went down by 8% in the decade after 2010 @marmotihe. All distinct versions of the protocol and SAP should accompany publication. @IoanaA_Cristea | Ioana Cristea | 17.10.2022 Interviewer: Where do you get your ideas? Quindi tranquilli, possiamo dedicarci allo scioglimento del Pd. @pecoraro_fr | Francesco Pecoraro | 3.10.2022 No cabinet discussion about cutting the top rate of income tax.
Collective leadership in Soviet politics
This book studies the way in which the top leadership in the Soviet Union changed over time from 1917 until the collapse of the country in 1991. Its principal focus is the tension between individual leadership and collective rule, and it charts how this played out over the life of the regime. The strategies used by the most prominent leader in each period - Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev - to acquire and retain power are counterposed to the strategies used by the other oligarchs to protect themselves and sustain their positions. This is analyzed against the backdrop of the emergence of norms designed to structure oligarch politics. The book will appeal to students and scholars interested in the fields of political leadership, Soviet politics and Soviet history.
CESIONES POR MANDATO Y ADQUISICIÓN DE PROPIEDADES DE LA OLIGARQUÍA URBANA DE SEVILLA (1400-1441)
Abstract This study analyzes twelve cases from early fifteenth-century Sevillian notarial records involving the acquisition of properties that were later transferred to important members of the urban oligarchy of the city, such as Diego Lopez de Estuniga and Pedro Ponce de Leon. Through these examples, the use of intermediaries by these individuals is highlighted and the diplomatic discourse of the document is examined, particularly the segments in which the detailed accounts of the specific circumstances under which these «transfers by mandate* took place. Al mismo tiempo, varias ciudades fueron escenario de luchas banderizas entre las principales familias nobiliarias por el control de las mismas, como ocurría, entre otras, en la vecina Córdoba3 y en la propia Sevilla, donde los bandos estaban liderados por las casas de Niebla y Arcos, a las que se unieron otras familias como los Estúñiga4, cuyocabeza, Diego López de Estúñiga, fue enviado a la ciudad por Enrique III como elemento moderador, pero cuyo linaje acabó por involucrarse de lleno en las luchas por el poder5. Sevilla permaneció leal al rey, y el papel fundamental en la coordinación de su defensa del representante de la casa de Niebla, Juan de Guzmán, ahora duque de Medina Sidonia, supuso un punto de infexión en el proceso de señorialización del gobierno hispalense a partir de la segunda mitad de siglo9. Afortunadamente, desde hace unos años no faltan estudios sobre el mercado inmobiliario urbano y la destacada participación en este de la oligarquía, desde las aportaciones al congreso celebrado en Estella10, a los referidos a las cercanas poblaciones de Córdoba y Jerez de la Frontera. Pero, como constata Ruiz Pilares, los inmuebles urbanos también tuvieron importancia para este colectivo, no solo desde el punto de vista económico sino, muy especialmente, como modo de consolidación de su presencia en la ciudad y de ejercer el evergetismo13.
Ressourcen und Grenzen der Macht
Personalistische Politik befreit Politiker wie Putin und Erdoğan von der Mühsal, Entscheidungen aushandeln zu müssen. Sie geht mit exklusiven, intransparenten Formen der Auswahl politischen Führungspersonals, Zentralismus und informellem Regieren einher. Die Regime in Russland und der Türkei haben eine Schwäche: Die Loyalität regimetreuer Wähler und der Günstlinge in Wirtschaft und Staatsapparat droht zu erodieren, wenn klientelistische Güter nicht mehr zur Verfügung stehen. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Eigeninteressen der Machthaber, der Privilegierung von Bürokraten und regimenahen Oligarchen sowie der Orientierung an regimestützenden sozialen Gruppen birgt Krisenpotential. Personalistic politics frees politicians such as Putin and Erdoğan from the bother of having to negotiate decisions. This goes hand in hand with a lack of transparency in the selection of the political leadership, centralism and informal government. The regimes in Russia and Turkey have one weakness: the loyalty of voters who continue to support the regimes and of protégés in the business world and the state apparatus risks to erode when clientelistic benefits are no longer available. A potential crisis looms as a result of the charged relationship between the interests of the holders of power themselves, the privileged status of bureaucrats and oligarchs loyal to the regime and the orientation to social groups that support the regime.