Explore the vast range of titles available.

Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command assigns the name Operation Bugle Call to the plan to drop Propaganda Publications over Cuba

Propaganda Publications to be dropped over Cuba contain [Photographs; Maps] of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba; Operation Bugle Call Publications to be dropped over Cuba state that the Naval Quarantine of Cuba (24 October - 20 November 1962) was implemented to prevent Soviet arms shipments and will be lifted following Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba

Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence reports the possibility of naval Mines in Cuban Territorial waters; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command reports that there is no Evidence of Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines among the four Soviet Submarines sighted in the Western Atlantic Ocean; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command is ordered to prepare Operation Bugle Call which calls for dropping Propaganda leaflets on designated Urban areas in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that planning for Operation Plan 316 be refined and that planning for Operation Plan 314 be postponed; Low altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba are subject to Anti-aircraft weapons Attacks; [U.S. Air Force; U.S. Marine Corps] Aircraft are dispersed from southern Florida to reduce their vulnerability; Aerial reconnaissance mission of 26 October 1962 reveals that three IL-28 Aircraft have been assembled in Cuba; U.S. Marine Corps. 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is reported en route to the Panama Canal to join the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet

[Donald M. Wilson; Newton N. Minow; Pierre E.G. Salinger] hurriedly arranged for seven commercial Radio stations to begin Voice of America Radio broadcasting to Cuba in the Spanish language in time to transmit John F. Kennedy Speech Announcing Soviet Missile Deployment in Cuba (22 October 1962); Donald M. Wilson arranged for the printing of 6 million Propaganda Publications for Operation Bugle Call which were never dropped on Cuba as planned; Donald M. Wilson headed United States Information Agency Psychological warfare activities during the Cuban Crisis

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes Soviet counteractions to U.S. action in Cuba most likely to be in Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany) but could be against [Iran; Turkey; Korea (Republic); Taiwan Strait]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Council believed that likely Soviet counteractions to U.S. military intervention in Cuba would be an [Intercontinental ballistic missiles; \"accident\" on the U.S. site for; Nuclear weapon tests] at Johnston Island; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command is directed to prepare Operation Grey Wolf Rescue and recovery mission in case Aircraft downings of Low altitude reconnaissance flights Military aircraft occur; Joseph F. Carroll informs Maxwell D. Taylor that Cuba. Armed Forces lack Anti-aircraft weapons capable of seriously interfering with [Low altitude reconnaissance flights; U-2 Flights over Cuba]; Statistics [on the number of; U-2 Flights over Cuba] and Low altitude reconnaissance flights by [RF-101 Aircraft; F-8U Aircraft] from 14 October - 10 December 1962; Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy authorizes acknowledgement that SS Trajan (Naval vessel) was boarded at the Naval quarantine line on 13 November 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 6 November 1962 to recall U-2 Aircraft Aerial reconnaissance flights because of hostile fire received from Cuban Air defense systems; U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command is authorized to reduce Airborne alert to one-eighth status effective 15 November 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff chronology of Cuban Crisis; U-2 Aircraft Aerial reconnaissance monthly flights increased from 20-50 to 95 during October 1962; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reports Evidence of Cuba receiving Electronic equipment from the Soviet Union for conducting Electronic countermeasures; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency established a Cuban Situation Room on 4 October 1962; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider proposal for Air attacks on Soviet missile bases for Medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba to be \"unsound\"; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Air attacks on Medium-range ballistic missiles Missile bases would be unsound unless they were accompanied by Blockades of Cuba and strikes against [Tanks; Bomber aircraft; Patrol boats; Nuclear warhead bunkers]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decide on 17 October 1962 that Missiles in Cuba were a sufficient Military threat to warrant U.S. military intervention in Cuba even after they reached Operational readiness; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Council believe that likely Soviet counteractions to U.S. military intervention in Cuba would be actions against [Iran; Berlin (Federal Republic of Germany); U.S. Navy]; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff report that 21 October is the earliest feasible date for Air attacks on Cuba and that 23 October 1962 is the optimum date; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the earliest feasible date for Operation Plan 316 was 28 October 1962; Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that the U.S. military intervention in Cuba should be prepared for on 19 October 1962 while the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff support immediate Military intervention; U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary approves cancellation of Exercise Phibriglex-62 on 20 October 1962; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 20 October 1962 discovery of Nuclear warhead bunkers confirmed Soviet motivations for Deployment of Nuclear warheads in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are unwilling to launch air Blockades of Cuba unless United States counteractions against Cuban Air defense systems are authorized in response to U.S. Aircraft downings; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff request decoding of Communications among Soviet Diplomats in Latin America; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency provides a daily Intelligence Report describing Operational readiness of Soviet [Intermediate-range ballistic missiles; Medium-range ballistic missiles; IL-28 Aircraft] sites and other Weapon systems; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe was notified on 27 October 1962 of U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary approval to load Nuclear weapons on U.S. \"strike\" Aircraft on \"quick release\" Military alert status; U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary canceled the implementation of Operation Bugle Call and authorized the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command to destroy 6 million leaflets; Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force Continental Air Defense Command was informed that his Rules of engagement including a restriction against using Nuclear weapons were not changed for Contingency plans for military actions against Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff request recommendation from Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command on use of tactical Nuclear weapons to support any U.S. military intervention in Cuba; Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is instructed to direct U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities to develop a worldwide Psychological operations program to gain support for removal of all Soviet Offensive weapons from Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to Robert S. McNamara that Soviet Union-United States Negotiations in New York (25 October - 4 December 1962) include a provision guaranteeing the U.S. right to conduct Aerial reconnaissance in return for a U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that United States policy toward Cuban refugees should refrain from aiding groups such as Alpha 66; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates a maximum of 18,500 Casualties in the first ten days of a U.S. military intervention in Cuba assuming no use of Nuclear weapons; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that \"alongside\" Ship inspection by U.S. Naval vessels was not sufficient to assure Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with 5 November 1962 decision of Robert S. McNamara not to disclose the U-2 Aircraft encounter with MiG aircraft but to make Diplomatic protests; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concludes on 12 November 1962 that only implementation of [Operation Plan 312; Operation Plan 316] can produce a final Cuban Crisis Settlement; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommends that after a \"limited\" period U.S. Air attacks should be conducted to destroy all IL-28 Aircraft in Cuba; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff decides on 9 November 1962 that it \"would be preferable\" if IL-28 Aircraft remained in Cuba which would relieve the need for a U.S. Non-Invasion Commitment; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency informs U.S. Air Force. Strategic Air Command that redeployment of Soviet missile bases is unlikely providing that adequate Verification of Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba occurs; U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency identifies total of 27 Surface-to-air missile sites of which three were alternate sites; Aerial reconnaissance does not substantiate reports of Submarine bases in Cayo Largo (Cuba)