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"Opportunism"
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Really really : a play
In the hazy aftermath of a wild campus party, dawn breaks on what appears to be just another day in the undergrad carnival that revolves around a circle of friends. But when morning-after gossip about privileged Davis and ambitious Leigh turns ugly, self-interest collides with the truth and the resulting storm of ambiguity makes it hard to discern just who's a victim, who's a predator, and who's a Future Leader of America. All that's certain is when the veneer of loyalty and friendship is stripped back, what's revealed is a vicious jungle of sexual politics, raw ambition, and class warfare where only the strong could possibly survive.
Book
Opportunism is in the Eye of the Beholder: Antecedents of Subjective Opportunism Judgments
Contractualist work in business ethics as well as in economic organization theory views opportunistic behaviors as problematic since they create economic harm and are often considered to violate ethical norms. Yet, much of the empirical literature on opportunism has adopted a rather simplistic definition of opportunistic behaviors as behaviors that violate formal and/or relational contracts and assumed that instances of opportunism can be unequivocally defined by simply referring to the content of contracts. The consequence of this assumption has been a disregard for factors other than the content of contracts that may influence whether exchange partners judge an unexpected behavior they face during exchange relationships as opportunistic or not. The present investigation explores the factors that shape exchange partners' subjective opportunism judgments through two vignette-based laboratory experiments. Results from the first experiment, where subjects were asked to take the perspective of a harmed party, show that opportunism judgments are influenced by the type of the behavior, type of the causal account provided for the behavior, perceived type of the exchange, and personality traits of the actor making the judgment. The second experiment, in which subjects were asked to take the perspective of the transgressor, demonstrates the influence of perspective. In particular, victims are more likely to assess a given unexpected behavior as opportunistic than transgressors, and their judgments do not relate to the underlying factors in the same way as the victims' judgments. I discuss implications in terms of the governance of interfirm exchange relationships.
Journal Article
The dark side of supply chain digitalisation: supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, buyer opportunism and governance
PurposeIn this paper, the authors seek to contribute to the supply chain digitalisation literature by investigating a potential dark side of supply chain digitalisation from the viewpoint of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers, namely digital capability asymmetry and the partner opportunism of more digitally capable large buyers against SME suppliers. The authors seek to contribute further to the governance literature by investigating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism (legal contracts and relational contracts) in suppressing partner opportunism of this nature.Design/methodology/approachUsing survey data collected from 125 Korean SMEs, the authors employed a hierarchical regression method to test a set of hypotheses focussing on the dark side of supply chain digitalisation and the effectiveness of the governance mechanism.FindingsThe study’s findings suggest that supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, wherein a buyer has a superior digital capability than its SME supplier, increases the SME supplier's dependence on the more digitally capable buyer, with the result that it is more exposed to buyer opportunism. Moreover, the results suggest that only relational governance is effective in protecting SME suppliers from buyer opportunism of this nature.Originality/valueSo far, the overwhelming majority of supply chain digitalisation research has debated its “bright side”. On the contrary, from the resource dependence theory perspective, this paper explains its dark side by providing empirical evidence on (1) the links between supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry and a buyer's opportunism through an increased supplier's dependence and (2) the effectiveness of different types of governance in opportunism suppression.
Journal Article
Can digitalization transform conventional governance to curb supplier opportunism in emerging markets?
Purpose Building on transaction cost economics, social exchange theory and supply chain (SC) digitalization literature, we examine how different types of digital technologies (DTs) – independently and in conjunction with conventional governance mechanisms (detailed contracts and relational governance) – curb supplier opportunism of different forms in emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach We collect dyadic data from 868 managers working for 217 suppliers in China and matched buyers located in 66 countries to test the hypotheses. Interaction effects are tested using multiple regression. Multiple robustness and endogeneity tests are performed to evaluate the robustness of the findings. Findings We find that while physical DTs suppress strong-form supplier opportunism (SSO), they are not effective in curbing weak-form supplier opportunism (WSO). In contrast, network DTs have the opposite effects on SSO and WSO. Our findings further show that detailed contracts strengthen the negative effect of physical DTs on SSO, while their impact on the relationship between network DTs and WSO is negligible. Meanwhile, relational governance strengthens the negative effect of network DTs on WSO but has no effect on the relationship between physical DTs and SSO. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the direct governance functions of different types of DTs and how they interact with conventional governance mechanisms to curb SSO and WSO. This study contributes to SC governance research by identifying DTs as novel ways of governing global SCs and clarifies the controversy on whether DTs and conventional governance mechanisms complement or substitute for each other.
Journal Article
Lateral Exchange Markets: How Social Platforms Operate in a Networked Economy
Lateral exchange markets (LEMs) are sites of technologically intermediated exchange between actors occupying equivalent network positions. To develop an enriched understanding of these markets, the authors develop a more broad-based and differentiated understanding of peer-to-peer, sharing, and access-based markets. They focus on two key axes: the extent of (1) consociality and (2) platform intermediation. Drawing on these attributes, the authors theoretically deduce four ideal types—Forums, Enablers, Matchmakers, and Hubs. Each type provides value in a different way: Forums connect actors, Enablers equip actors, Matchmakers pair actors, and Hubs centralize exchange. Twenty organizational cases reveal insights into the failure, adaptation, and success of LEMs. Lateral exchange markets shift responsibility for personal and exchange security to relevant personal actors, to institutions, or to the governing algorithms of technology platforms. Extending the general proposition that sociality increasingly infuses market logics, the findings suggest a new frontier in which social resources and software platform algorithms interact as operand resources whose negative consequences (e.g., opportunism) require careful management through assurances and institutional arrangements matched to the type of LEM operation.
Journal Article
Acquaintances or friends? Exploring the effects of contracts, trust and ethical level on opportunism in manufacturer-distributor relationships
Purpose
This study aims to examine how contractual mechanisms, trust and ethical levels impact opportunism in marketing channel relationships between manufacturers and distributors. Because the type of interactions, short-term or transaction-based vs long-term or relation-based, may also affect the level of opportunism, the study includes two scenarios to assess the impact of interaction type.
Design/methodology/approach
Survey data from 145 distributors were collected with 69 being transaction-based and 75 being relation-based interactions.
Findings
The sole use for transaction-based and relation-based interactions is not a significant deterrent for opportunistic behavior by a distributor. Ethical level is negatively related to opportunism in transaction-based interactions, perhaps because of calculative commitment. Trust positively moderates the relationship between contractual enforcement and opportunism in transaction-based interactions. Under relation-based interactions, the opposite occurs as trust reduces contractual enforcement efforts, and thus, opportunism is reduced as well. Ethical level negatively moderates the relationship between contractual enforcement and opportunism in transactional and relational based interactions.
Originality/value
Researchers have called for a more holistic approach to better understand phenomena. This study addressed that call by being the first to include contracts, trust, ethical level and opportunism within the context of the transaction and relation-based interactions between a manufacturer and a distributor. Contractual enforcement is not a significant deterrent of opportunism for transactional or relational interactions. Trust is negatively related to opportunism only in transaction-based interactions; perhaps, the threshold for acting opportunistically may be lower because of the short-term nature of the interaction. The ethical level is negatively related to opportunism in transaction and relational interactions.
Journal Article
The impact of culture on the relationship between governance and opportunism in outsourcing relationships
To address concerns of opportunism, outsourcing firms are encouraged to deploy contractual and relational governance. The individual and collective effects of these mechanisms have been previously examined but not in specific contexts. This study examines the effects of contractual and relational governance on provider opportunism, incorporating the moderating influence of a \"shift parameter\"—national culture. Our results reveal that contractual governance is more effective in individualistic and low uncertainty avoidance cultures. Relational governance is more effective in collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance societies. The individualism-collectivism dimension also moderates the joint effect of these mechanisms. While the mechanisms are generally complementary in mitigating opportunism, a singular focus on either contractual or relational can be just as effective under situations of high individualism and collectivism, respectively.
Journal Article
The dilemma of inter-organizational relationships
PurposePower is central to inter-organizational relationships. The literature distinguishes between structural power (i.e. dependence) and behavioral power (i.e. use of power), yet few studies considered them simultaneously. Opportunism is generally linked to use of power, but it remains unclear whether use of power deters or invites opportunism. In this study, the authors treat dependence as a driver of use of power and opportunism as its outcome, and empirically test relationships among dependence, power, and opportunism from both buyer and supplier perspectives. The paper aims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approachThis study examines how buyer and supplier dependence influence the other’s and their own use of coercive and non-coercive power, which lead to opportunism of two parties, based on data from 240 companies in China on their perceived relationships with major suppliers.FindingsResults show that buyer/supplier dependence is positively related to supplier’s/buyer’s use of coercive and non-coercive power. Buyer’s and supplier’s use of coercive power also positively influences their opportunism. Buyer’s use of non-coercive power is negatively related to both partners’ opportunism, whereas supplier’s use of non-coercive power is not significantly related to either partner’s opportunism.Originality/valueThis study contributes to literature in two ways. First, the authors distinguish the structural aspect of power from its behavioral aspect and demonstrate that dependence, which represents structural power, generates different patterns of influence on use of coercive and non-coercive power when considered from buyer’s and supplier’s perspectives. Second, the authors reexamine relationships between use of power and opportunism and show that buyers and suppliers react differently to use of different types of power.
Journal Article
Institutions and opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges: the moderated mediating effects of contractual and relational governance
The marketing channel literature has paid limited attention to institutional environments that constrain buyer–supplier exchanges, though such institutions are fundamental determinants of transaction costs, and thus of the occurrence of opportunism in the buyer–supplier dyads. Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory, this study uncovers the critical influence of formal and informal institutions (i.e., legal effectiveness and networking expenditure) on the use of governance in deterring opportunism, as well as the moderating role of government support on the efficacy of governance mechanism. The findings from a buyer–supplier dyadic survey and 2 secondary datasets reveal that legal effectiveness mitigates opportunism through increased use of both contractual and relational governance; in contrast, networking expenditure reduces opportunism through relational governance, yet increases opportunism via lowering contractual governance. In addition, contractual governance is more efficient in constraining opportunism when government support is high, whereas relational governance deters opportunism more when government support is low. These findings offer important implications for academic research and managerial practice.
Journal Article
Oliver Williamson's Opportunism
In his study of the modern firm Oliver Williamson proposes the concept of opportunism as the reason for vertical integration. Williamson divides opportunism conditionally into ex ante and ex post opportunism by analogy with his classification of transaction costs as ex ante transaction costs incurred prior to concluding the deal and ex post transaction costs, which arise after that. Ex ante screening can prevent ex post opportunism. Opportunism is a synonym of fraud in the market game. It is the practice of cheating, lying or stealing in business relations. It is very common in some cultures and societies which hampers prosperity and economic progress.
Journal Article