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This article advances theory on social movements' strategic adaptation to political opportunity structures by incorporating a narrative perspective. Our theory explains how people acquire and use knowledge about political opportunity structures through storytelling about the movement's past, present, and imagined future. The discussion applies the theory in an ethnographic case study of the climate movement's mobilization around the UN Climate Summit in Paris, 2015. This analysis demonstrates how a dominant narrative of defeat about the prior protest campaign in Copenhagen, 2009 shaped the strategizing process. While those who experienced Copenhagen as a success preferred strategic continuity, those who experienced defeat developed a \"Copenhagen narrative\" to advance strategic adaptation by projecting previously experienced threats and opportunities onto the Paris campaign. Yet by relying on a retrospective narrative, movement actors tended to overlook emerging political opportunities. We demonstrate that narrative analysis is a useful tool for understanding the link between structure and agency in social movements and other actors affected by (political) opportunity structures.

We examine whether and when socially oriented shareholder activists use firms’ corporate social performance (CSP) to identify them as attractive targets for their activism. We build on the research in social movements theory and stakeholder theory to theorize how firms’ engagement with primary and secondary stakeholders reflected in their technical and institutional CSP respectively allows socially oriented shareholder activists to identify targets. We develop a theoretical model by identifying corporate targets’ degree of (1) receptivity to and (2) need to comply with activist demands as two key dimensions of their corporate opportunity structure that explains the variance in firms’ attractiveness as targets for activist demands. We show that a firm’s technical and institutional CSP independently affect the likelihood of activists targeting the firm. We also show that our model has greater explanatory power at firms with high resource slack and from activists not identifying as socially responsible investment funds. Analysis of CSP and shareholder proposals data of 992 U.S. public firms over an 8-year window of observation largely supports our theory.

While it is well-known that democratic backsliding imposes a variety of challenges on civil society organisations, it is often assumed that it represses civil society. However, a closer look at the impact of democratic backsliding on civil society organisations reveals that even in countries where democratic backsliding is fairly advanced, the relationship between civil society and the state is more complex. Close cooperation and partnership between civil society organisations and the state are scarce in backsliding countries; the relationship between civil society organisations and the state might, however, range from hostility to varying forms and degrees of co-optation. Based on interviews with representatives of civil society organisations and the examination of the sector-specific social and political environment, we aim to explore the forms and factors that shape the relationship between civil society organisations and the state in Hungary. More specifically, we analyse the impact of the changing political opportunity structures on three important sectors of civil society organisations: human rights organisations, environmental organisations, and women’s organisations. We argue that, to seize control over civil society the government applies sector-specific strategies, ranging from exclusion to co-optation. State strategies, in turn, spark different responses from civil society organisations.

In this article, we build on the stakeholder-politics literature to investigate how corporate scandals transform political contexts and give impetus to the contentious movements of fringe stakeholders against multinational corporations (MNCs). Based on Adut's scandal theory (2005), we flesh out three scandal-related processes that directly affect political-opportunity structures (POSs) and the generation of social movements against MNCs: convergence of contention towards a single target, publicisation of deviant practices, and contagion to other organisations. These processes reduce the obstacles to collective actions by fringe stakeholders by pushing corporate elites to be more sensitive to their claims, by decreasing MNCs' capability to repress contentious movements, by forcing the targeted MNCs to formalise a policy to monitor and eradicate the controversial practices and by helping fringe stakeholders find internal and external allies to support their claims. This conceptual model of scandals as catalysts of contentious actions contributes to a better understanding of stakeholder politics by unveiling the role of the political context in the coordination of fringe stakeholders.

This study argues that in China’s digital sphere, online misogyny functions less as a gateway to extremism and more as a structural hub for systemic discontent. Drawing on opportunity structure theory, our mixed-methods approach combines computational analysis of posts from Baidu Tieba (n = 91,026) with in-depth interviews (n = 27). We find that “Gendered Insults” exhibits the highest betweenness centrality, acting as a structural bridge connecting disparate frustrations. Women-targeting topics are both speakable and resonant within the community, anchored by a self-deprecating “sewer mouse” masculinity that navigates opportunity structures. Interviews reveal that when political opportunity structures remain closed while discursive and mediated (legacy platform) opportunities stay relatively accessible, misogyny becomes a functional language for channeling widespread socioeconomic anxieties. We conclude that in this context, misogyny operates not as a starting point for radicalization but as a core organizing principle for the socially disillusioned. This suggests that divergent structural conditions produce different mechanisms.

This paper investigates the development of interreligious dialogue in Brescia, a prosperous Northern Italian city with approximately 200,000 inhabitants. Despite similarities to other cities in the region, Brescia exhibits an unusually vibrant “interreligious scene,” encompassing numerous initiatives, events, and platforms. We ask why this vitality has emerged and what consequences it has for local understandings of religious freedom. To address these questions, we combine two analytical frameworks. First, drawing on the concept of political opportunity structure, we examine Brescia’s genius loci—the specific institutional, cultural, and discursive conditions that fostered interreligious engagement. Brescia’s strong Catholic tradition and inclusive integration policies, together with a diverse migrant population, have created opportunities for religious communities—especially migrant groups—to participate and get recognized. Second, using Bourdieu’s concept of the field, we consider the power dynamics among actors involved in interreligious dialogue, highlighting how different agendas and positions shape interactions and outcomes. This analysis reveals the emergence of a relatively autonomous field of interreligious dialogue in which local stakes are being defined over what dialogue entails and how it should be practiced. By linking political opportunity structures with field theory, the paper shows how local contexts shape the conditions for religious freedom, while interreligious practices themselves, in turn, reshape the meaning and application of religious freedom.

I review the development of the political opportunity or political process perspective, which has animated a great deal of research on social movements. The essential insight—that the context in which a movement emerges influences its development and potential impact—provides a fruitful analytic orientation for addressing numerous questions about social movements. Reviewing the development of the literature, however, I note that conceptualizations of political opportunity vary greatly, and scholars disagree on basic theories of how political opportunities affect movements. The relatively small number of studies testing political opportunity hypotheses against other explanations have generated mixed results, owing in part to the articulation of the theory and the specifications of variables employed. I examine conflicting specifications of the theory by considering the range of outcomes scholars address. By disaggregating outcomes and actors, I argue, we can reconcile some of the apparent contradictions and build a more comprehensive and robust theory of opportunities and social movements.

Why is the #MeToo movement very active in some countries but not in others? What factors encourage the transnational diffusion of digital feminist activism? Although transnational forces are important, we argue that domestic political opportunity structures play a more significant role than transnational influences in the country-level diffusion of #MeToo. We collected 35,211 global tweets and used Bayesian statistical modeling to test the implications of our theory. Our findings support the idea that as a country better protects its citizens’ political and civil rights and civil liberties, individuals in that country are more likely to engage in the #MeToo movement.

Political consumption is an individualized form of collective action that varies considerably across Europe. Citizens as consumers participate in boycotts and 'positive' buying of goods based on ethical, political and environmental considerations. Overcoming the individualistic bias of past research, the comparative analysis extends actor-centred explanations by focusing on political, cultural and economic opportunity structures and on globalization as contextual factors. Economic opportunities for political consumption are provided by national affluence, retailing structures and the supply of environmental and fair-labelled goods. Political and cultural opportunities are facilitated by 'statist' institutions, social movement organizations as well as trust and post-materialist culture. The impact of globalization is measured by international economic exchange. Logistic multi-level models on the first wave of the European Social Survey for 19 countries reveal that economic opportunity structures and political institutions best explain variations, while globalization does not affect citizens' decisions to voice their interest in consumption. Finally, the effect of individual value orientations is increased by a low-cost context.

Theories of mobilization suggest that groups are more likely to resort to violence in the presence of political opportunity structures that afford greater prospects for extracting concessions from the government or better opportunities to topple ruling governments. However, existing efforts to consider the possible influences of political opportunity structures on incentives for violence and civil war empirically have almost invariably relied upon measures of democracy to proxy for the hypothesized mechanisms, most notably the argument that the opposing effects of political accommodation and repression will give rise to an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and the risk of civil war. The authors detail a number of problems with measures of democracy as proxies for political opportunity structures and develop alternative measures based on the likely risks that political leaders will lose power in irregular challenges and their implications for the incentives for resort to violence. The authors evaluate empirically how the security with which leaders hold office influences the prospects of violent civil conflict. The findings indicate that recent irregular leader entry and transitions indeed increase the risk of conflict onset, while democratic institutions are found to decrease the risk of civil war, after controlling for the new measures of state weakness.