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The rapid growth of organized crime in Mexico and the government’s response to it have driven an unprecedented rise in violence and impelled major structural economic changes, including the recent passage of energy reform. Los Zetas Inc. asserts that these phenomena are a direct and intended result of the emergence of the brutal Zetas criminal organization in the Mexican border state of Tamaulipas. Going beyond previous studies of the group as a drug trafficking organization, Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera builds a convincing case that the Zetas and similar organizations effectively constitute transnational corporations with business practices that include the trafficking of crude oil, natural gas, and gasoline; migrant and weapons smuggling; kidnapping for ransom; and video and music piracy. Combining vivid interview commentary with in-depth analysis of organized crime as a transnational and corporate phenomenon, Los Zetas Inc. proposes a new theoretical framework for understanding the emerging face, new structure, and economic implications of organized crime in Mexico. Correa-Cabrera delineates the Zetas establishment, structure, and forms of operation, along with the reactions to this new model of criminality by the state and other lawbreaking, foreign, and corporate actors. Since the Zetas share some characteristics with legal transnational businesses that operate in the energy and private security industries, she also compares this criminal corporation with ExxonMobil, Halliburton, and Blackwater (renamed “Academi\" and now a Constellis company). Asserting that the elevated level of violence between the Zetas and the Mexican state resembles a civil war, Correa-Cabrera identifies the beneficiaries of this war, including arms-producing companies, the international banking system, the US border economy, the US border security/military-industrial complex, and corporate capital, especially international oil and gas companies.

Organized Crime in Mexicotakes a hard look at the dire implications of the pervasive and powerful criminal enterprises in northern Mexico, comparing and contrasting the present threat to past issues, including drug and human smuggling during the latter half of the twentieth century. Criminal organizations operating in Mexico and the United States threaten the economic well-being of North America as well as the democratic freedoms of our neighbor to the south. Cameron H. Holmes, an experienced organized-crime prosecutor and anti-money laundering expert, shows how this shift in criminal activity is extremely damaging to North American economies and explains that in order to halt this economic erosion, U.S. policy requires a new strategy, changes in thinking, and new and increased countermeasures. Strategically, we have light-years to travel and little time to do it. Without intervention criminal activity will strangle legitimate business, degrade the Mexican economy, and, because the United States itself is so intimately affected, undermine the U.S. economy in turn. Continued prosperity in both countries depends on our joint success in controlling these criminal enterprises.Organized Crime in Mexicoexamines the new diversification and strategies of organized criminal groups, suggests a series of countermeasures, and places these issues in a global context. What is transpiring in Mexico is part of a larger international problem, and criminal enterprises currently pose new and consistent threats to economies around the world.

Studies on the connections between organized crime and terrorism tend to focus on non-state armed groups, and on the convergence of violent tactics. This article demonstrates that such a focus can overlook well-documented connections between state terrorism and organized crime. Particularly in post-Cold War Latin America, criminal groups recruit violence specialists from military and paramilitary units with histories of using indiscriminate violence and other forms of terrorism during counterinsurgency campaigns. Through this recruitment process, tactics of state terrorism are appropriated into the repertoires of criminal groups. This article demonstrates this process with a case study of the Zetas in Mexico, which was the first group in the country to actively recruit soldiers with counterinsurgency training. By doing so, the group caused a paradigm shift in criminal operations in the country, leading to the widespread adoption of terrorist tactics. This case study highlights the need for scholars of terrorism and organized crime to bring state terrorism back in, and to more thoroughly examine the points of contact between state and non-state terrorism.

In the past 10 years in Mexico, more than 100,000 people have been killed in violence related to organized crime. Some attacks have left horrific scenes, meant to send messages to the public or government. Debate continues about how to characterize this violence, and some observers describe it as “terrorism” or its perpetrators as “terrorists.” This article emphasizes that Mexico has experienced terrorist tactics by criminal organizations. This implies that while the perpetrators are better thought of (and dealt with) as criminal groups, some of their violence at least partially fulfills the criteria to be defined as terrorism. The use of terrorist tactics by criminal groups is an understudied aspect of the crime-terror nexus because more research examines crime by terrorist groups. The article discusses three tactics seen in Mexico: bombings, violent communication, and attacks against politicians. It then presents comparable examples from other countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, Italy, and Russia. Similarities and differences between criminal groups and terrorist groups are discussed. The violence in Mexico is relatively unique for its scale, for the number of people killed, but in general the use of terrorist tactics by criminal organizations is not new.

Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: The Transition from Felipe Calderón to Enrique Peña Nieto examines the major trends in organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico.The book provides an exhaustive analysis of drug-related violence in the country.

In the wake of so-called “hardline policies” against criminal groups (persecution, militarization, strengthening of security apparatuses), we take a comprehensive approach to the study of violent territorial disputes. We offer features for studying the violence attributed to organized crime, particularly in Mexico from 2007 to 2011, a time known as the “War on Drugs”; we identify characteristics of the drug-related criminal organizations in Mexico; further we show different strategies for the use of and dispute for territory. We propose four components that give us a better understanding of organized-crime groups: economic activities, ability to negotiate with other cartels, relations with state authorities, and strength of local roots.

Research on ‘the War on Drugs’ in Mexico finds that military interventions increase lethal violence in the country. However, these studies fail to account for other processes that may be driving the behavior of lethal violence in the Mexican municipalities. We find confirmation that these rival processes influence the relative impact that military interventions have on lethal violence. In particular, we find that seasonality in violence, competition for scarce resources and PAN’s governance in the municipalities are associated with higher levels of lethal violence, as measured by the young male homicide rate. We argue that the literature may have overestimated the effect that military interventions have in lethal violence in municipalities and that other drivers of violence should be taken into account to accurately measure the impact that military interventions have on lethal violence.

This paper explores the effects of criminal networks involved in corruption and drug trafficking on democratic formal institutions in Colombia and Mexico. The theoretical framework is sustained in the concepts of State Capture (StC) and Co-opted State Reconfiguration (CStR). Three illicit networks are analyzed: (i) The Familia Michoacana in Mexico, (ii) the Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare (ACC) in Colombia and (iii) the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). These cases are analyzed throughout the Social Network Analysis (SNA) in order to identify (i) the hub and (ii) the structural bridge of each network. A methodological variation referenced as Social Network Analysis for Institutional Diagnosis (SNAID) is also applied, in order to analyze the institutional scope of processes of StC and CStR. Conclusions and explorative venues regarding the application of SNA and SNAID as a diagnosis tool are presented.

U.S. demand for illicit drugs creates markets for Mexican drug- trafficking organizations (DTOs) and helps foster violence in Mexico. This paper examines how marijuana legalization in California might influence DTO revenues and the violence in Mexico.