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Questions about the legal regulation of the family - same-sex family formation - marriage equality - significant shifts in the law's understanding of parenthood - California from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s - role of marriage in early lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) parenting litigation - litigation reshaped norms governing marriage and parenthood.

During the Trump Administration, disturbing images of immigration officials forcibly separating parents from their children at the U.S.–Mexico border have rightly invited an onslaught of criticism. Voices across the political spectrum have called these actions immoral and insisted that this is not who we are. The underlying moral imperative of this critique is correct, but this Essay argues that it rests on a mischaracterization of our immigration system. In fact, the principle of “family separation” pervasively defines our entire immigration system. The law governing admissions, enforcement, adjustment of status, and remittances routinely leaves noncitizens waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless in their efforts to remain or reunite with their family members. In other words, a legal system predicated on principles of family separation captures precisely who we are. To make this argument, I borrow insights developed by scholars in the humanities and social sciences who have developed the theory of “slow death” or “slow violence.” Unlike acts of “spectacular violence” (a label for which border apprehensions and forcible separations certainly qualify) the process of slow death happens over time, offering no signs of impending ruination, a reality that frustrates the ability to generate momentum for change. Reframing the experience of migrants in terms of slow death can help recontextualize immigrant suffering in terms of family separation thereby drawing the public’s attention to the need for systemic, and not just episodic, change.

In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, courts and legislatures claim in principle to have repudiated the privileging of different-sex over same-sex couples and men over women in the legal regulation of the family. But as struggles over assisted reproductive technologies (ART) demonstrate, in the law of parental recognition such privileging remains. Those who break from traditional norms of gender and sexuality—women who separate motherhood from biological ties (for instance, through surrogacy), and women and men who form families with a same-sex partner—often find their parent-child relationships discounted. This Article explores what it means to fully vindicate gender and sexual-orientation equality in the law of parental recognition. It does so by situating the treatment of families formed through ART within a longer history of parentage. Inequalities that persist in contemporary law are traceable to earlier eras. In initially defining parentage through marriage, the common law embedded parenthood within a gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order. Eventually, courts and legislatures repudiated the common-law regime and protected biological parent-child relationships formed outside marriage. While this effort to derive parental recognition from biological connection was animated by egalitarian impulses, it too operated within a gender-differentiated, heterosexual paradigm. Today, the law increasingly accommodates families formed through ART, and, in doing so, recognizes parents on not only biological but also social grounds. Yet, as courts and legislatures approach the parental claims of women and same-sex couples within existing frameworks organized around marital and biological relationships, they reproduce some of the very gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries embedded in those frameworks. With biological connection continuing to anchor nonmarital parenthood, unmarried gays and lesbians face barriers to parental recognition. With the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family continuing to structure marital parenthood, the law organizes the legal family around a biological mother. Against this back-drop, nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples, as well as nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples, struggle for parental recognition. To protect the parental interests of women and of gays and lesbians, this Article urges greater emphasis on parenthood's social dimensions. Of course, as our common law origins demonstrate, the law has long recognized parental relationships on social and not simply biological grounds. But today, commitments to equality require reorienting family law in ways that ground parental recognition more fully and evenhandedly in social contributions. While this Article focuses primarily on reform of family law at the state level, it also contemplates eventual constitutional oversight.

Drawing from life history theory and developmental perspectives, we test the hypothesis that the relation between parental discipline practices and delinquency is explained in part by short-term mindsets. We argue that such practices induce an orientation towards the here-and-now rather than the future, which, in turn, promotes delinquency. We used longitudinal data (N = 1,197) from the Zurich Project on the Social Development from Childhood into Adulthood (z-proso). We distinguished between two types of disciplining practices, corporal and inconsistent punishment, which map onto two main environmental parameters, harshness and unpredictability. Results show that short-term mindsets, operationalized by impulsivity and low future orientation, mediate the relation between corporal and erratic punishment and delinquency, with impulsivity being the most important mediator.

Research on desistance from crime has given little attention to the transition to parenthood as a 'turning point.' Parenthood might have different implications for men and women, as well as for individuals in different relationship contexts. Using a within-individual design and Norwegian register data on men and women who became parents in 1997—2001, we provide detailed descriptions of offending patterns. The results imply that, for men and women, the relative likelihood of offending declines before the birth. In the post-birth period, women's offending resumes at a lower likelihood than before the birth, while men's stabilizes at a low level. For men with no relationship to the other parent, the likelihood of offending continues to decline after the birth.

A pharmacist fills a prescription for birth control pills with prenatal vitamins. An in vitro lab loses a cancer survivor's eggs. A fertility clinic exposes embryos to mad cow disease. A sperm bank switches a selected sample with one from a donor of a different race. An obstetrician predicts that a healthy fetus will be born with a debilitating condition. These errors go virtually unchecked in a profession that operates free of meaningful regulation. Private remedies meanwhile treat reproductive negligence more as trifle than tragedy. Courts do not deny that specialists are to blame for botching vasectomies or misimplanting embryos. But in the absence of property loss or physical injury, existing law provides little basis to recognize disrupted family planning as a harm worthy of protection. This Essay sets forth a novel framework of reproductive wrongs. It distinguishes misconduct that (1) imposes unwanted pregnancy or parenthood, (2) deprives wanted pregnancy or parenthood, and (3) confounds efforts to have or avoid a child born with particular traits. It also introduces a right to recover when reproductive professionals perpetrate these wrongs. This new cause of action would measure the injuries of imposed, deprived, and confounded procreation as a function of their practical consequences for victims' lives and the probability that wrongdoing was responsible for having caused those harms. Damages would accordingly be reduced, for example, by the plausible role of user error in cases of defective condoms, by preexisting infertility in cases of dropped embryos, and by genetic uncertainties in cases of prenatal misdiagnosis.

Overview of study investigating the expectations parents have for their unborn children - methodology - results and discussions - limitations of study.

The United States is the single remaining United Nations (UN) member state that has not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the most important international human rights treaty governing children's rights. This Note focuses on a key objection to U.S. ratification of the CRC: the fear that its emphasis on children's rights threatens parents' rights under U.S. law. This Note uses Article 12 of the CRC, which recognizes the right of children to be heard in decisions involving their lives, as a proxy to examine how much of an actual threat the CRC poses to the constitutional right of parents to raise their children. In so doing, this Note compares Article 12 with three of the areas of U.S. law in which the rights of parents to control their children arguably most conflict with their children's right to be heard: family law proceedings, medical decisionmaking, and psychiatric commitment. The Note concludes that the conflict between parental rights and children's rights is ultimately reconcilable, and that in fact the CRC presents not a threat but an opportunity for fresh reexamination and reconciliation.

Interpersonal neurobiology of mother-infant attachment relationship - optimal attachment experiences facilitate experience-dependent maturation of early development right brain - application of regulation theory for early intervention and prevention programs - implications for family law, cultural and political systems and human capital formation.

Paternal imprisonment creates a significant risk for the intergenerational transmission of offending. However, there is little research on the mechanisms underpinning this risk, including how paternal imprisonment interrupts parenting and father-child relationships. Culturally relevant research is also essential in the context of high imprisonment rates of Indigenous Australian men. We conducted interviews with 41 Indigenous Australian fathers from two prisons in North (Queensland to examine their identities as fathers in prison and the barriers associated with maintaining nlationships with their children. Findings are discussed in relation to contact and distance; intergenerational absence of fathers; paternal involvement through play, care and culture; and diminished opportunities for men's parental and cultural generativity. We consider the implications of the findings for children's well-being.