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9,485 result(s) for "PARTY DISCIPLINE"
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Reform in the House of Commons
One of the most significant changes in the British House of Commons has been the development in 1979 of a system of select committees charged with monitoring government ministries. Unlike previous experiments in parliamentary reform, these committees are staffed exclusively with backbench MPs, who regularly review executive policies and offer recommendations. Michael Jogerst reappraises the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in light of these new circumstances, which are likely to affect the entire governmental structure of the United Kingdom.
The formation of national party systems
Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman rely on historical data spanning back to the eighteenth century from Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States to revise our understanding of why a country's party system consists of national or regional parties. They demonstrate that the party systems in these four countries have been shaped by the authority granted to different levels of government. Departing from the conventional focus on social divisions or electoral rules in determining whether a party system will consist of national or regional parties, they argue instead that national party systems emerge when economic and political power resides with the national government. Regional parties thrive when authority in a nation-state rests with provincial or state governments. The success of political parties therefore depends on which level of government voters credit for policy outcomes. National political parties win votes during periods when political and economic authority rests with the national government, and lose votes to regional and provincial parties when political or economic authority gravitates to lower levels of government. This is the first book to establish a link between federalism and the formation of national or regional party systems in a comparative context. It places contemporary party politics in the four examined countries in historical and comparative perspectives, and provides a compelling account of long-term changes in these countries. For example, the authors discover a surprising level of voting for minor parties in the United States before the 1930s. This calls into question the widespread notion that the United States has always had a two-party system. In fact, only recently has the two-party system become predominant.
Party Discipline and the Crisis of Election Administration in Contemporary Nigeria
The literature on the challenges of election administration in Nigeria is replete with issues bordering on the ineffectiveness of the election management body (EMB), ostensibly leaving out the political behaviour of other critical stakeholders and its implications for the administration of elections. It is against this backdrop that this article examined the crisis of election administration from the prism of party discipline. It argued that, since Nigeria’s Election Management Body (EMB) is saddled with the responsibilities of conducting elections, a means by which political parties compete for, and attain political power, the manner in which political parties and their members conduct themselves and abide by the rules guiding their organisations has ripple effects on the performances of the EMB. Anchored on group and power theories as its analytical framework, the study noted that party indiscipline has continued to fuel election maladministration in contemporary Nigeria. The study employed a qualitative research method with data for the study drawn from secondary sources including books, journal articles and internet materials. Data were argumentatively and descriptively analysed. It concluded that playing by the rules of the game remains the assured way political parties could enhance the effectiveness of Nigeria’s EMB in ensuring credible electoral processes. The paper recommended that the EMB should entrench stiffer penalties, including deregistration and outright ban from contesting election for a specified period, for political parties and candidates found culpable of indiscipline.
The Chinese Communist Party's capacity to rule : ideology, legitimacy and party cohesion
\"This book studies the survival strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Examining both the CCP's quest for popular legitimacy and its search for party cohesion, Zeng argues that ideological reform and the institutionalization of power succession are crucial factors in the party's retention of power. China's economic success has created a fundamental dilemma for the CCP: if a communist party does not deliver communism and class victory, why is it there at all? There is a potential contradiction between generating economic success by utilizing quasi-capitalist economic policies on the one hand, and the fact that this is a communist party that supposedly justifies its rule by being the vehicle to deliver a communist society on the other. This contradiction has proved a challenge to the CCP's rule, generating belief crises in Chinese society and ideological battles within the party. This book shows how the CCP has remained in power by continually revising the ideological basis that justifies its rule\"-- Provided by publisher.
The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress
To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically \"out of step\" with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan.
Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods
Several prominent theories of legislative organization contend that members coalesce into parties to minimize the collective action problems inherent in pursuing goals that have the character of public goods. Models in that vein ascribe a constrained and primarily reactive role to party leaders, affording them little independent discretion. Such an approach is particularly problematic when considering the nature of public goods pursuits in conjunction with electoral demands for party cohesion and legislative output. Furthermore, the standard treatment of party leadership is inconsistent with empirical findings that party leaders systematically punish disloyalty. The model forwarded herein assumes that party leaders are proactive in shaping members’ contribution decisions by setting punishment levels to produce coalitions of a certain size, but they are always mindful of the overall welfare of the party. I find support for the theoretical propositions derived from my model when examining US House roll-call data over the period of 2001 to 2018.
Representation and Partisanship: What Determines the Topics That Members of Parliament Prioritize in Communications with Their Constituents?
What determines how Members of Parliament (MPs) and their staff frame their communications with all constituents in their electoral district? Prior research has suggested that constituency operations are one of the last bastions of freedom that MPs have from the full grasp of party discipline in Canada. If this remains true, MP communications with their constituents should reflect the MPs’ background or the constituency context and not their political partisanship. We collected a sample of published newsletters (“householders”) that Canadian MPs’ offices sent to all households in their electoral districts during the COVID-19 pandemic. We supplement our analysis with original insights about householders from a selection of MPs and their staff. Our results suggest that in a system of strict party discipline, the most important predictor of what MPs include in their constituent communications is indeed partisanship. The results inform our understanding of democratic representation, centralized co-ordination and political communication, and the pervasiveness of partisan messaging in Canada.