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The market of energy services for the residential sector in Europe is very limited at present. Various reasons can be argued such as the high transaction costs in a highly fragmented market and the low energy consumption per dwelling. The rather long payback time for investments render Energy Services Companies’ (ESCOs) services financially unattractive for many ESCOs and building residents, thus hindering a large potential of energy savings in a sector that is responsible of almost half of Europe’s energy consumption. If the ambitious 2030 and 2050’s decarbonisation targets are to be met, the EU’s residential sector must be part of the solution. This paper offers insights about novel ESCO business models based on intensive data-driven Artificial Intelligence algorithms and analytics that enable the deployment of smart energy services in the domestic sector under a Pay-for-Performance (P4P) approach. The combination of different sources of energy efficiency services and the optimal participation of domestic consumers in aggregated demand response (DR) schemes open the door to new revenue streams for energy service providers and building residents and reduce the hitherto long payback periods of ESCOs services in the sector. Innovative business models for ESCOs and demand flexibility Aggregators are thoroughly described. Especially customised Performance Measurement and Verification protocols enable fair and transparent P4P ESCO contracts. The new human-centric energy and non-energy services increase the energy consumption awareness of building users and deploy behavioural and automated responses to both environmental and market signals to maximise the economic benefit for both energy service providers and consumers, always respecting data protection rules and the consumers’ comfort preferences. The new hybrid business models of P4P energy services make traditional EPC more attractive to energy service providers, with low cost data collection and treatment systems to bring payback periods below 10 years in the residential building sector.

This article examines how the behaviour of occupants is assessed in a project with ambitious targets for energy use reductions and within the framework of an approach based on an energy performance contract. Its starting point is the observation that there may be significant disparities between the consumption threshold required by the regulations or the labels and the actual building consumption in its post-delivery existence. While behaviour cannot be the only factor explaining this overconsumption, the promoters of high-performance renovation operations often marginalise their importance. The recent surge in requirements for energy consumption reductions in new or renovated buildings in Europe further exacerbates these problems. In light of these challenges, there is a strong demand for compulsory verification of post-delivery performances and for developing energy performance contracts. In this context, the behaviour of a building’s occupants can no longer be considered as a simple adjustment variable. Through the analysis of Energiesprong, a net-zero energy renovation approach for the social housing developed in the Netherlands and in France, built around the principle of an energy performance contract over a long timeframe, the article highlights the injunctions to behavioural changes, the strategies, the negotiations, and the adjustments deployed by the project leaders. It finally shows that there is still a long way to go before the occupant’s behaviour in a high-energy performance renovation project is fully taken into account.

The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has produced continent-wide analysis of many aspects of Africa's infrastructure challenge. The main findings were synthesized in a flagship report titled Africa's Infrastructure: a time for transformation, published in November 2009. Meant for policy makers, that report necessarily focused on the high-level conclusions. It attracted widespread media coverage feeding directly into discussions at the 2009 African Union Commission Heads of State Summit on Infrastructure. Although the flagship report served a valuable role in highlighting the main findings of the project, it could not do full justice to the richness of the data collected and technical analysis undertaken. There was clearly a need to make this more detailed material available to a wider audience of infrastructure practitioners. Hence the idea of producing four technical monographs, such as this one, to provide detailed results on each of the major infrastructure sectors, information and communication technologies (ICT), power, transport, and water, as companions to the flagship report. These technical volumes are intended as reference books on each of the infrastructure sectors. They cover all aspects of the AICD project relevant to each sector, including sector performance, gaps in financing and efficiency, and estimates of the need for additional spending on investment, operations, and maintenance. Each volume also comes with a detailed data appendix, providing easy access to all the relevant infrastructure indicators at the country level, which is a resource in and of itself.

Contracting for services represents one mechanism employed to improve the performance of government agencies. While research examining contract performance sheds substantial light on the circumstances under which contracting achieves intended goals, it has rarely considered how the technical and human factors of the contracting process jointly affect contract performance. As a result, relatively little is known about how human factors affect contract performance under shifting technical contingencies. This gap is addressed by exploring how autonomy over contract management and perceived ethical behavior (social factors) are contingent upon changes in contract rules training (a technical factor). The study finds that contract managers who have had more rules training tend to believe that they have less autonomy and view the behaviors of others as unethical. Findings also indicate that more training in contracting rules may inhibit perceived contract performance when mediated by autonomy and perceptions of ethical behaviors.

This book explores energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) as a means of overcoming some of the more difficult hurdles in promoting energy efficiency in public facilities. ESPCs represent a very attractive solution to many of the problems that are unique to public agencies, since they involve outsourcing a full project cycle to a service provider. From the detailed audit through implementation and savings verification, ESPCs can relieve public agencies of bureaucratic hassles, while service providers can secure the off-budget project financing and be paid from the actual energy savings, thus internalizing project performance risks. ESPC bidding also allows public agencies to select from a range of technical solutions, maximizing the benefit to the agency. Global experience suggests that ESPCs have been more effective at realizing efficiency gains than many other policy measures and programs, since the service providers have a vested interest in ensuring that a project is actually implemented. Many of the country governments interviewed for the study also saw enormous potential in bundling, financing, and implementing energy efficiency projects on a larger scale in the public sector, a method that increases the rate of efficiency gains and creates further benefits through economies of scale.

Research Summary: This study examines the effectiveness of targets as a tool for the contractual governance of cross‐sector partnerships. Applying a difference‐in‐differences methodology, we find that the use of explicit targets within performance contracts is an effective means for improving partnership outcomes, especially where partner diversity and partnership capabilities are high. Furthermore, we find evidence that target intensity is associated with stronger partnership performance. These findings suggest that contractual forms with explicit targets may be a particularly successful approach for enhancing the public value created by cross‐sector partnerships. A downward turn in performance following the removal of targets lends further support to this conclusion. Managerial Summary: Cross‐sector partnerships have become a vital means for creating value in pursuit of the public interest. In particular, the effective management of these partnerships is thought to hold the key to addressing the strategic and organizational challenges posed by major social and environmental issues, such as big data and climate change. In this article, we combine data on waste recycling from 2003 to 2014 with information on performance contracts between local cross‐sector partnerships and higher levels of government in England to quantify the impact of governance by targets on the performance of those partnerships. The benefits of target‐setting for partnership performance that we identify are even stronger when partner diversity is high and partnership capabilities are strong. We discuss the managerial and policy implications of our findings.

Although control theory has often been invoked to explain the coordination between client and vendor for information systems development (ISD), insights into its moderating effects for explicating ISD contract performance, especially in the offshore context, is rather limited. Such insights would enable better understanding of variables that have complementary or substitutive effects on performance. Further, the control literature talks about different control modes (e.g., formal and informal control modes classified as behavior, outcome, clan, and self-control modes) without adequately distinguishing among the different control mechanisms enacting each of the control modes. In this research, by explicitly classifying the distinctions that exist within each of the control modes, we uncover the key role played by mechanistic governance in outsourced ISD. Grounding our arguments in the information requirement for performance evaluation, the study theorizes the moderating influence of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity and relational governance with ISD quality and cost performance. We test the theorized model in a field study comprising 160 offshore ISD projects executed by Indian vendors. Our results establish the significant complementary role of mechanistic governance on the relationships of contract specificity with both cost and quality performance variables. Further, mechanistic governance substitutes the impact of relational governance on cost performance. Thus, the study theoretically as well as empirically establishes the need for conceptualizing mechanistic governance as a viable and significant governance mechanism for offshore ISD contracts. The study also teases out the distinctions between the two prime contract types in vogue for managing offshore ISD contracts, namely, fixed price and time and materials contracts. The study thus contributes not only to control theory but also to the stream of literature examining offshore ISD contracts. Further, the study provides insights to managers on having well-specified contracts and acknowledging the role of mechanistic governance for better performance.

Exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. The goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal. We study a two-tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments. In the experiments, the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end-consumer demand than the human supplier. The supplier offers either a quantity discount contract (with two or three price blocks) or a price-only contract, contracts that are commonplace in practice, yet different in complexity. Results show that, contrary to theoretical predictions, quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier's profits. We also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts. These observations can be described with three decision biases (the probabilistic choice bias, the reinforcement bias, and the memory bias) and can be modeled using the experience-weighted attraction learning model. Our results demonstrate that simpler contracts, such as a price-only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks, are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information. This paper was accepted by Christian Terwiesch, operations and supply chain management.

Conflicts are frequent within the complex professional environment of the construction industry. If claims cannot be overcome amicably, they result in disputes that lead to litigation. Identification of the causes of these claims and their impact on the duration, cost, and quality of the final project is expected to facilitate the prevention of unsuccessful performance of construction contracts. The novelty of this study is that after codifying the most common causes of construction contract claims derived from the extant literature, they are further investigated in terms of their probability of occurrence and the perceived impact they have on the project completion time, its total cost, and quality. Based on calculated relative importance indices from expert opinion, this paper proposes probability and severity of impact values for 39 common causes of claims in the construction industry. These can be applied to calculate their risk values for stakeholders in public construction contracts to plan mitigation measures for contractual claims. The findings show that the top five highest risk causes of contractual claims in the Greek construction industry are changes in quantities, work, or scope, design quality deficiencies or errors, payment delays, delays in work progress, and the financial failure of the contractor.

The equipment procurement contract performance evaluation is an important means to effectively solve the problem like \"inefficient progress\", \"low targets\", and \"increased costs\" in equipment procurement. This paper defined the concept and connotation of the performance of equipment procurement contract, and proposed the equipment procurement contract performance evaluation, including influence factors analysis, evaluation indicators establishment, evaluation model construction, calculating results, etc., constructed four-dimension equipment procurement contract performance evaluation indicator system consisting of quality, schedule, funding, and service, and constructed the equipment procurement contract performance evaluation model based on BP neural network, and carried out a case analysis. The research conclusions provide a reference for the evaluation practices of equipment procurement contract performance.