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Recent protests against police brutality in Nigeria and the Arab Spring, which was sparked by an incident of police brutality in Tunisia, led to public demands that brought political reforms. This paper explores the question, how do citizens evaluate their government in regards to corruption? Using the Afrobarometer Wave 6 dataset, I investigate the relationship between the public's perception of police and upper-level government officials’ corruption in African countries. Due to lack of transparency, the public has no direct information from upper-level bureaucracy but can evaluate corruption of upper-level government officials through direct experience with police. My finding demonstrates that regardless of regime type, the corruption perception of police influences the corruption perception of upper-level government officials. The public cues to evaluate their government quality are likely derived from interactions with police. Therefore corruption perception of police can affect government legitimacy.

This article studies corruption as a rational choice phenomenon. Unlike the widespread game-theory approach to explaining corrupt behaviour, this article attempts to describe corruption as continuous utility-maximizing problem. It comes up with a demand for corruption function, which shows how the readiness of a rational person to accept corrupt income depends on several factors such as official wage rate, severity of punishment, awareness of those penalties, probability of being detected and probability of being prosecuted.

This volume provides an analytical framework and operational approaches needed for the implementation of results-based accountability. The volume makes a major contribution to the literature on public management and evaluation. Major subject areas covered in this book include: performance based accountability, e-government, legal and institutional framework to hold government to account; fighting corruption; external accountability and the role of supreme audit institutions on detecting fraud and corruption.

PurposeThis paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries.Design/methodology/approachThis paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so.FindingsA high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries.Research limitations/implicationsThe model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model.Practical implicationsTraditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption.Social implicationsFighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors.Originality/valueThis paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.

More than 1 billion people around the world live without access to safe, potable water, in part because of poor governance and corruption. Illegal connections and substantial losses caused by deferred maintenance have eroded the revenues of water utilities, leading to a downward spiral in performance. Embezzlement of funds, bribes for access to illegal water connections, manipulation of meter counters, and collusion in public contracts add to the litany of corrupt practices. 'Improving Transparency, Integrity, and Accountability in Water Supply and Sanitation' is a useful tool for diagnosing, analyzing, and remedying systemic corruption in the water supply and sanitation sectors. It will serve as a practical guide for governments; utility regulators, managers, and staff; civil society organizations; contractors; and citizens in their quest for a model of service provision that responds to the pressing needs of people in the developing world. The book aims to increase the involvement of civil society by engaging all stakeholders in setting priorities and monitoring performance; help water and sanitation delivery contribute to poverty reduction by increasing the service quality and coverage provided by service delivery organizations to poorer communities on an equitable basis; provide a tool that promotes the financial sustainability of service delivery organizations, thus building stakeholders' confidence in those institutions' ability to expand and improve service; and raise ethical standards among all stakeholders, especially service delivery organizations, thereby instilling a sense of public service in these organizations.

In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee government and to hold government to account; often, audit institutions, ombuds and anti-corruption agencies report to parliament, as a means of ensuring both their independence from government and reinforcing parliament's position at the apex of accountability.

Controlling corruption is an essential part of good governance and poverty reduction, and it poses an enormous challenge for governments all around the world. Anticorruption in Transition 2 analyzes patterns and trends in corruption in business-government interactions in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It points to some encouraging signs that the magnitude and negative impact that corruption exerts on businesses may be declining in many countries in the region. It also shows how some types of firms—most notably small private ones—encounter more corruption than others, and it underscores the importance of policy and institutional reforms in achieving long-term success in the fight against corruption. The longer-term sustainability of recent improvements is not certain, however, and the challenges ahead remain formidable.

This chapter examines how market corruption happens spontaneously “on the spot” where participants meet. In 2009, many respondents reported extensive low-level market corruption in Hungary, but by the late 2010s this type had become less widespread. Interviewees found it much riskier than in the preceding two decades to bribe a police officer to turn a blind eye to traffic violations, something considered quite normal in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2021, the Orbán government also started to systematically curb another major form of petty corruption, hálapénz, a widespread informal practice of giving gratitude money to nurses and doctors for priority or more complete health care. According to the new law, hálapénz is now considered bribery, so whoever gives or accepts it commits a crime. The chapter considers how the relative social status of the actors is an important factor in corrupt transactions, shaping communication strategies and in fact the whole setting of the corrupt exchange.

This note reports part of a larger study of “petty corruption“ by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are “socially efficient”, and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats’ bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.

Corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon that rears its head in many places. For this reason, it is difficult and challenging to assess how well a country is doing in addressing it. This title provides guidance to practitioners and policymakers in the design of anticorruption reforms.