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"PHILOSOPHY - Mind "
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New conversations on the problems of identity, consciousness and mind
This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. 0The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. 0The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. 0The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.
Book
The Feeling Body
A proposal that extends the enactive approach developed in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to issues in affective science.
In The Feeling Body, Giovanna Colombetti takes ideas from the enactive approach developed over the last twenty years in cognitive science and philosophy of mind and applies them for the first time to affective science—the study of emotions, moods, and feelings. She argues that enactivism entails a view of cognition as not just embodied but also intrinsically affective, and she elaborates on the implications of this claim for the study of emotion in psychology and neuroscience.
In the course of her discussion, Colombetti focuses on long-debated issues in affective science, including the notion of basic emotions, the nature of appraisal and its relationship to bodily arousal, the place of bodily feelings in emotion experience, the neurophysiological study of emotion experience, and the bodily nature of our encounters with others. Drawing on enactivist tools such as dynamical systems theory, the notion of the lived body, neurophenomenology, and phenomenological accounts of empathy, Colombetti advances a novel approach to these traditional issues that does justice to their complexity. Doing so, she also expands the enactive approach into a further domain of inquiry, one that has more generally been neglected by the embodied-embedded approach in the philosophy of cognitive science.
eBook
Radicalizing enactivism
A book that promotes the thesis that basic forms of mentality—intentionally directed cognition and perceptual experience—are best understood as embodied yet contentless.
Most of what humans do and experience is best understood in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with the environment. Many philosophers and cognitive scientists now acknowledge the critical importance of situated, environment-involving embodied engagements as a means of understanding basic minds—including basic forms of human mentality. Yet many of these same theorists hold fast to the view that basic minds are necessarily or essentially contentful—that they represent conditions the world might be in. In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds—basic minds—are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. Hutto and Myin oppose the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. They defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.
eBook
Wittgenstein on Other Minds
The book brings together Constantine Sandis’s essays on Wittgenstein’s approach to understanding others. Sandis sketches a picture of how his anti-scepticism with regard to the philosophical problem of ‘other minds’ is not only compatible with but also supported by his scepticism concerning the real-life difficulty of understanding others (and being understood by them). While each individual essay focuses on particular issues in Wittgenstein (including philosophical anthropology, interpersonal psychology, and animal concepts), they collectively paint a picture of what he takes the real problem of other minds to be, how to overcome it, and the limitations of our understanding. Sandis not only offers a fresh exegesis of Wittgenstein’s public and private writings on these matters, but proceeds to show the relevance of Wittgenstein beyond the academy.
eBook
The Matter of the Mind
\"The Matter of the Mind\" focuses on the mind-body problem. Such a problem should be viewed not as a philosophical or metaphysical problem, but as a cognitive one. What needs to be accounted for is a representation of how the interaction of the mind and brain can become more intelligible. The author proposes that science can provide such a representation, especially the contemporary physics of string theory. String theory offers a new conception of matter, allowing a passage of matter to the mind without the difficulties imposed by a traditional/common sense corpuscular conception of material objects. In other words, string theory will enable us to conceive of a continuum between matter and the mind. There is no discontinuity between them once we abandon the visual perception-based description of matter, depicting it as solidity, impenetrability, and extension in space.
eBook
The Material Mind
The Material Mind develops a concept of reduction that is compatible both with scientific change and with the possibility of multiple reduction bases. It shows that cognitive and other higher-level properties can be construed as causal powers, develops a concept of emergence compatible with reduction, and shows that the integration of the mind into a scientific conception of the world does not deprive mental properties and events of causal efficiency. The book defends the possibility of downward causation of physiological effects by cognitive causes, by questioning the justification of both the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal-explanatory exclusion.
eBook