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"POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS"
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PRE-COLONIAL ETHNIC INSTITUTIONS AND CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
We investigate the role of deeply rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions in shaping comparative regional development within African countries. We combine information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities before colonization with regional variation in contemporary economic performance, as proxied by satellite images of light density at night. We document a strong association between pre-colonial ethnic political centralization and regional development. This pattern is not driven by differences in local geographic features or by other observable ethnic-specific cultural and economic variables. The strong positive association between pre-colonial political complexity and contemporary development also holds within pairs of adjacent ethnic homelands with different legacies of pre-colonial political institutions.
Journal Article
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.
Journal Article
REGIONAL FAVORITISM
We complement the literature on distributive politics by taking a systematic look at regional favoritism in a large and diverse sample of countries and by employing a broad measure that captures the aggregate distributive effect of many different policies. In particular, we use satellite data on nighttime light intensity and information about the birthplaces of the countries’ political leaders. In our panel of 38,427 subnational regions from 126 countries with yearly observations from 1992 to 2009, we find that subnational regions have more intense nighttime light when being the birth region of the current political leader. We argue that this finding provides evidence for regional favoritism. We explore the dynamics and the geographical extent of regional favoritism and show that regional favoritism is most prevalent in countries with weak political institutions and poorly educated citizens. Furthermore, foreign aid inflows and oil rents tend to fuel regional favoritism in weakly institutionalized countries, but not elsewhere.
Journal Article
Rents and economic development
We present the approach to comparative economic development of Why Nations Fail. Economic prosperity requires inclusive economic institutions—those which create broad based incentives and opportunities in society. Extractive economic institutions, which lack these properties, create poverty. Variation in economic institutions is created by differences in political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions are the result of political choices which arise under inclusive political institutions: a strong state and a broad distribution of power in society. When either of these conditions fails one has extractive political institutions that lead to extractive economic institutions. We relate our analysis to Tullock’s notion of ‘rent seeking’.
Journal Article
Human rights, state compliance, and social change : assessing national human rights institutions
\"This book critically examines the significance of National Human Rights Institutions by collecting work from experts spanning international law, political science, sociology, and human rights practice\"-- Provided by publisher.
BOOK
Configuring political relationships to navigate host-country institutional complexity: Insights from Anglophone sub-Saharan Africa
We examine how ties with multiple host-country political institutions contribute to MNE subsidiary performance in countries with weak formal institutions. We suggest that forging relationships between subsidiaries and host-country government actors, local chieftains, and religious leaders generates regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive political resources. We integrate institutional and configuration theories to argue that similarity to an ideal configuration of the three political resources contributes to MNE subsidiary performance, and that the more dysfunctional host-country institutions, the greater the impact on performance. We test our hypotheses using primary and archival data from 604 MNE subsidiaries in 23 Anglophone sub-Saharan African countries and find support for our hypotheses. In our conclusion, we discuss the wider theoretical, managerial, and public-policy implications of our findings.
Journal Article