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An essential responsibility of the U.S. Congress is holding the president accountable for the conduct of foreign policy. In this in-depth look at formal oversight hearings by the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, Linda Fowler evaluates how the legislature's most visible and important watchdogs performed from the mid-twentieth century to the present. She finds a noticeable reduction in public and secret hearings since the mid-1990s and establishes that American foreign policy frequently violated basic conditions for democratic accountability. Committee scrutiny of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, she notes, fell below levels of oversight in prior major conflicts. Fowler attributes the drop in watchdog activity to growing disinterest among senators in committee work, biases among members who join the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, and motives that shield presidents, particularly Republicans, from public inquiry. Her detailed case studies of the Truman Doctrine, Vietnam War, Panama Canal Treaty, humanitarian mission in Somalia, and Iraq War illustrate the importance of oversight in generating the information citizens need to judge the president's national security policies. She argues for a reassessment of congressional war powers and proposes reforms to encourage Senate watchdogs to improve public deliberation about decisions of war and peace. Watchdogs on the Hillinvestigates America's national security oversight and its critical place in the review of congressional and presidential powers in foreign policy.

In the first comprehensive study of the subject in decades, political scholar Matthew Green disputes the conventional belief that the minority party in the U.S. House of Representatives is an unimportant political player. Examining the record of the House minority party from 1970 to the present, and drawing from a wide range of quantitative and qualitative data, Green shows how and why the minority seeks to influence legislative and political outcomes and demonstrates that the party's efforts can succeed. The result is a fascinating appreciation of what the House minority can do and why it does it, providing readers with new insights into the workings of this famously contentious legislative chamber.

Special rules enable the Senate to act despite the filibuster. Sometimes. Most people believe that, in today's partisan environment, the filibuster prevents the Senate from acting on all but the least controversial matters. But this is not exactly correct. In fact, the Senate since the 1970s has created a series of special rules-described by Molly Reynolds as \"majoritarian exceptions\"-that limit debate on a wide range of measures on the Senate floor. The details of these exemptions might sound arcane and technical, but in practice they have enabled the Senate to act even when it otherwise seemed paralyzed. Important examples include procedures used to pass the annual congressional budget resolution, enact budget reconciliation bills, review proposals to close military bases, attempt to prevent arms sales, ratify trade agreements, and reconsider regulations promulgated by the executive branch. Reynolds argues that these procedures represent a key instrument of majority party power in the Senate. They allow the majority-even if it does not have the sixty votes needed to block a filibuster-to produce policies that will improve its future electoral prospects, and thus increase the chances it remains the majority party. As a case study,Exceptions to the Ruleexamines the Senate's role in the budget reconciliation process, in which particular congressional committees are charged with developing procedurally protected proposals to alter certain federal programs in their jurisdictions. Created as a way of helping Congress work through tricky budget issues, the reconciliation process has become a powerful tool for the majority party to bypass the minority and adopt policy changes in hopes that it will benefit in the next election cycle.

Making Congress Work, Again, Within the Constitutional System Congress for many years has ranked low in public esteem—joining journalists, bankers, and union leaders at the bottom of polls. And in recent years there's been good reason for the public disregard, with the rise of hyper-partisanship and the increasing inability of Congress to carry out its required duties, such as passing spending bills on time and conducting responsible oversight of the executive branch. Congress seems so dysfunctional that many observers have all but thrown up their hands in despair, suggesting that an apparently broken U.S. political system might need to be replaced. Now, some of the country's foremost experts on Congress are reminding us that tough hyper-partisan conflict always has been a hallmark of the constitutional system. Going back to the nation's early decades, Congress has experienced periods of division and turmoil. But even in those periods Congress has been able to engage in serious deliberation, prevent ill-considered proposals from becoming law—and, over time, help develop a deeper, more lasting national consensus. The ten chapters in this volume focus on how Congress in the twenty-first century can once again fulfill its proper functions of representation, deliberation, legislation, and oversight. The authors offer a series of practical reforms that would maintain, rather than replace, the constitutional separation of powers that has served the nation well for more than 200 years.

Matthew N. Green provides the first comprehensive analysis of how the Speaker of the House has exercised legislative leadership from 1940 to the present. Green finds that the Speaker's party loyalty is tempered by a host of competing objectives, including reelection, passage of desired public policy laws, handling the interests of the president, and meeting the demands of the House as a whole.

Parliamentary obstruction, popularly known as the \"filibuster,\" has been a defining feature of the U.S. Senate throughout its history. In this book, Gregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler explain how the Senate managed to satisfy its lawmaking role during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when it lacked seemingly essential formal rules for governing debate. What prevented the Senate from self-destructing during this time? The authors argue that in a system where filibusters played out as wars of attrition, the threat of rule changes prevented the institution from devolving into parliamentary chaos. They show that institutional patterns of behavior induced by inherited rules did not render Senate rules immune from fundamental changes. The authors' theoretical arguments are supported through a combination of extensive quantitative and case-study analysis, which spans a broad swath of history. They consider how changes in the larger institutional and political context--such as the expansion of the country and the move to direct election of senators--led to changes in the Senate regarding debate rules. They further investigate the impact these changes had on the functioning of the Senate. The book concludes with a discussion relating battles over obstruction in the Senate's past to recent conflicts over judicial nominations.

Few pieces of legislation in recent years have caused as much public controversy as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. This book analyzes the passage of this law, compares it to other federal education policies of the last fifty years, and shows that No Child Left Behind is an indicator of how and why conservative and liberal ideologies are gradually transforming. This is a fascinating story about the changing direction of politics today, and it will intrigue anyone interested in the history and politics of education reform. The No Child Left Behind Act, proposed by conservative politicians, was approved by Congress in order to make states more accountable for their education systems and to hold all children to high academic standards. Until quite recently, conservative politicians were protesting federal involvement in schools. Today we find quite the opposite. Starting with the National Defense Education Act of 1958, Anderson weaves a detailed story of political evolution that is engaging, informative, and timely.

This report addresses two questions: first, whether the spatial distribution of the American electorate has become more geographically clustered over the last 40 years with respect to party voting and socioeconomic attributes; and second, whether this clustering process has contributed to rising polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives.

From 1789 to 1913, U.S. senators were not directly elected by the people-instead the Constitution mandated that they be chosen by state legislators. This radically changed in 1913, when the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, giving the public a direct vote.Electing the Senateinvestigates the electoral connections among constituents, state legislators, political parties, and U.S. senators during the age of indirect elections. Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart find that even though parties controlled the partisan affiliation of the winning candidate for Senate, they had much less control over the universe of candidates who competed for votes in Senate elections and the parties did not always succeed in resolving internal conflict among their rank and file. Party politics, money, and personal ambition dominated the election process, in a system originally designed to insulate the Senate from public pressure. Electing the Senateuses an original data set of all the roll call votes cast by state legislators for U.S. senators from 1871 to 1913 and all state legislators who served during this time. Newspaper and biographical accounts uncover vivid stories of the political maneuvering, corruption, and partisanship-played out by elite political actors, from elected officials, to party machine bosses, to wealthy business owners-that dominated the indirect Senate elections process.Electing the Senateraises important questions about the effectiveness of Constitutional reforms, such as the Seventeenth Amendment, that promised to produce a more responsive and accountable government.

The level of detail in a given law can have dramatic consequences for how that law is interpreted and applied. In The Devil Is in the Details, Rachel VanSickle-Ward focuses on the dynamics of social policy construction in the United States in order to better understand why the wording of legislation can range from the specific to the ambiguous. When policies are high salience, the fissures produced by partisan discord, interest group diversity, and pluralistic executive branches promote ambiguous policy. When policies are lower profile, this relationship is more tenuous and, at times, inverted, with contention producing more policy detail. Put simply, on important and controversial legislation, ambiguity serves as a vehicle for compromise when key participants disagree over details. Moreover, fragmentation is a more powerful driver of ambiguity than limits in technical expertise or legislative capacity. This multi-method investigation is the first to measure statute specificity directly. VanSickle-Ward combines comprehensive content analysis of more than 250 health and welfare bills passed in 44 states in the 1990s and 2000s with in-depth interviews of policy-making elites.